only the particular interests of the employees, and is unduly oppressive upon employers and arbitrarily interferes with and restricts the management of private business operations.

Further:

Whether this legislation be regarded as a mere exercise of the power of regulation, or as a combination of regulation and taxation, the crucial inquiry under the Fourteenth Amendment is whether it clearly appears to be not a fair and reasonable exertion of governmental power, but so extravagant or arbitrary as to constitute an abuse of power. All reasonable presumptions are in favor of its validity, and the burden of proof and argument is upon those who seek to overthrow it. In the present case it will be proper to consider: (1) Whether the main object of the legislation is, or reasonably may be deemed to be, of general and public moment, rather than of private and particular interest, so as to furnish a just occasion for such interference with personal liberty and the right of acquiring property as necessarily must result from carrying it into effect. (2) Whether the charges imposed upon employers are reasonable in amount, or, on the other hand, so burdensome as to be manifestly oppressive. And (3) whether the burden is fairly distributed, having regard to the causes that give rise to the need for the legislation.

Applying these principles it was decided that compensation was "of sufficient public moment . . . to be administered through state agencies" and that the burden on industry was not excessive. The exclusive compulsory state fund principle was upheld in the following terms:

In the absence of any particular showing of erroneous classification-and there is none-the evident purpose of the original act to classify the various occupations according to the respective hazard of each is sufficient answer to any contention of improper distribution of the burden amongst the industries themselves

we

are unable to discern any ground in natural justice or fundamental right that prevents the State from imposing the entire burden upon the industries that occasion the losses.

We are clearly of the opinion that a State . . . may require that these human losses shall be charged against the industry, either directly . . . or by publicly administering the compensation and distributing the cost among the industries affected by means of a reasonable system of occupation taxes.

We are unable to find that the Act, in its general features, is in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment.

These decisions establish the constitutionality of the compulsory principle so far as the federal constitution is concerned. The divided opinion on the Washington case, however, leaves the constitutionality of a compulsory exclusive state fund somewhat in doubt.

ELECTIVE LAWS

The decision in the Ives case led to the passage of elective laws in many states to dodge the constitutional question.10 Such laws have been attacked on

10 For an explanation of methods of election see p. 104 ff.

the ground that the alternatives presented are discriminatory and that in practical effect they amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. These contentions have failed of support in the highest court of every state except Kentucky where the original elective act, which provided for a presumption of election and which abrogated the common-law defenses for employers who rejected the law, was declared unconstitutional.11 The United States Supreme Court has passed on two elective laws in the cases of Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg,12 and Howkins v. Bleakly and Garst.13 In the former case the only question considered was whether the provision of the Ohio law limiting its application to employers with five or more employees was justifiable classification. It was decided that such classification was within the power of the legislature.

The latter case, involving the Iowa elective law and decided on the same day as those involving the constitutionality of the New York and Washington compulsory laws, brought up the whole question of the validity of the principle of presumptive election combined with the removal of common law rights in case of rejection. The reasoning of the court in the other two cases applied a fortiori to this case and the opin

"Kentucky State Journal v. Workmen's Compensation Board, 170 S. W. 1166. Leading cases for the contrary view are: In re Opinion of Justices, (Mass.) 96 N. E., 308; Borgnis et al. v. The Falk Co., (Wisc.) 133 N. W. 209; State ex rel Yaple v. Creamer, 85 Ohio St. 349; Middleton v. Texas Power and Light Co., (Tex.) 185 S. W. 556.

12 235 U. S. 571.

13 No. 35-October Term, 1916.

ion leaves no doubt of the constitutionality of the elective principle.

REFERENCES

The cases cited in this chapter and the additional citations which they contain are the best sources for further study.