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3. Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. * The Supreme Court was instituted by the Constitution, which ordained

the United States as drawer, in like manner as any individual holder of a protested bill would be. Mr. Ch. J. Taney, who was the Attorney-General that gave the opinion alluded to in the former part of this note, added a new opinion founded on the special circumstances of the case, against the allowance of the set-off, denying that the United States were bound, either in law or equity, to pay, or the bank entitled to claim, the contested damages. Independent of anything special in the case, the general doctrine of the decision was sound and unquestionable. To entitle the party to his set-off, his claim must have been previously submitted to the accounting officers of the treasury and been disallowed, or he must reasonably account for the omission. See sec. 3 and 4 of the act aforesaid. In the case Ex parte Madrazzo, 7 Peters, 627, a subject of the King of Spain filed a libel in the admiralty against the State of Georgia, alleging that the state was in possession of moneys, being the proceeds of certain property belonging to him, and claiming a right to institute a suit in the admiralty for the same, and that the 11th amendment to the Constitution of the United States did not take away the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States in suits in admiralty against a state. But on appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court, sustaining the libel, to the Supreme Court of the United States, it was held that the proceeding in question was a mere personal suit against a state, to recover property in its possession; and that a private person could not commence such a suit; and

hence that the court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the title of the United States. An equally elaborate dissenting opinion was delivered by Mr. Justice Gray, and concurred in by Jus tices Woods and Bradley, and Waite, C. J., holding that the court had no such

sumes the character of a trader, waives
his privilege; but this view will not be
taken in the Courts of the government
against which the suit is brought. Troy
& Greenfield Railroad v. Commonwealth,
127 Mass. 43; United States v. Clarke,
8 Pet. 436; Curran v. Arkansas, 15 How.
304; The Davis, 10 Wall. 15; Carr v.
United States, 98 U. S. 433; Long v. The
Tampico, 16 Fed. Rep. 491. An assign-
ment of a claim against a foreign govern-
ment, made before it is established, will
be upheld in Equity.
112 U. S. 737.

Peugh v. Porter,

A foreign sovereign, residing in England, cannot be sued there against his will for breach of a contract of marriage which he has there entered into under an

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assumed name. A certificate from the Foreign or Colonial office, as the case may be, is conclusive as to such sovereign's status. Mighell v. Sultan of Johore, [1894] 1 Q. B. 149; see 21 Journal du Droit Int. 576; Hettihewage Siman Appu v. Queen's Advocate, 9 App. Cas. 571, 588.

(x) By the "Bowman Act" (22 St. at L. 485) claims pending in Congress, which involve the investigation of facts, and claims or matters pending in any executive department which may involve contraverted questions of law or fact, may be transmitted to the Court of Claims for adjustment. See Taylor v. United States, 25 Ct. Cl. 75; Moore v. United States, id. 82; Conard v. United States, id. 433. The "Tucker Act" (Mar. 3, 1887, 24 St.

that "the judicial power of the United States should be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress

of admiralty, or The jurisdiction

A state cannot be

that it was not a case where the property was in the custody of a court brought within its jurisdiction, and in possession of any private person. would seem to have been impliedly admitted in the latter case. sued in its own courts without its consent. Michigan State Bank v. Hastings, Walker, Ch. (Mich.) 9. This is an attribute of sovereignty and of universal law. But a foreign sovereign may voluntarily become a party to a suit in the tribunals of another country, and have his rights asserted and enforced. And it was declared in the case of The Exchange, 7 Cranch, 116, that all persons and property within the territorial jurisdiction of any sovereign were amenable to the local jurisdiction, with such exceptions only as common usage and public policy had allowed. The result is, (1.) That no citizen of any of the United States, or subject of a foreign state, can sue a state. (2.) That a foreign state may sue one of the United States before the Supreme Court of the United States, and there only. (3.) That the United States cannot be sued. (4.) That the United States may sue a state, and perhaps they may, as a bona fide assignee of an individual creditor of a state, and perhaps an individual state, or a foreign state, as such assignee, may do it. See Hamilton's Report on Public Credit, 1790, p. 9. This last point is without any judicial support that I am aware of; and it may be questioned how far voluntary assignments, made and accepted for the sake of the remedy, would be available.

1855 that steps were taken to remedy this
failure of justice, and the act of Feb. 24
(10 U. S. St. at L. 612, c. 122) estab-
lished a court for the investigation of cer-
tain claims against the United States.
This board, however, had no power to
render final judgments, or to do more
than to make a favorable or adverse re-.
port to Congress. And it was only by
the act of March 3, 1863 (12 U. S. St. at
L. c. 92, p. 765), that it became an inde-
pendent court. It still has the jurisdic.
tion given by the earlier statute over all

at L. 505) defines the jurisdiction of this
court. See this act fully annotated in
Gould & Tucker's Notes on the U. S.
Statutes, p. 353. See also United States
v. Tinsley, 68 Fed. Rep. 433; Cole v.
United States, 29 Ct. Cl. 47. The French
Spoliation Claims were referred to this
court by 23 St. at L. 283; also claims for
depredations of friendly Indians, by 26
St. at L. 851. The claims of the Potta-
watomie Indians were also referred to the
Court of Claims by 23 Stat. at L. 372; 26
id. 1021.

claims founded upon any law of Congress, or upon any regulation of an executive department, or upon any contract, express or implied, with the government of the United States, which may be suggested to it by a petition filed therein; and also all claims which may be referred to said court by either house of Congress; and it cannot qualify its jurisdiction by rules. Clyde v. United States, 13 Wall. 38. The act of 1863, § 2, provides that petitions, &c., for the satisfaction of such private claims against the government shall be

After the decision in Bonner v. United States, 9 Wall. 156, that the Court of Claims had no jurisdiction of a suit founded upon equitable considerations, the Act of Mar. 3, 1887 (24 St. at L. 505) was passed, allowing suits against the government in that court either at law, in equity, or admiralty, and also allowing suits on such claims, if not exceeding $1,000 in value for the district courts, and $10,000 in value for the circuit courts, to be brought in the district where the claimant resides. See Jones v. United

might from time to time ordain and establish." (a) (x) But it received its present organization from Congress, for the Consti

(a) Art. 3, sec. 1.

transmitted to the court unless it is otherwise resolved by the house in which they are presented. Section 3 gives additional jurisdiction of all set-offs, counter-claims, &c., on the part of the government against the claimant, and the court may give judgment in favor of the government for the balance found due to it, if any. [See Allen v. United States, 17 Wall. 207. The provision is not rendered void by the seventh amendment to the Constitution. McElrath v. United States, 102 U. S. 426.B.] It may be mentioned that the rule is otherwise when the United States is plaintiff; for under the statutes allowing a set-off in that case, no judgment can be rendered against the government, although a balance be shown in the defendant's favor. United States v. Eck

States, 13 Sawyer, 341, 346; United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1; Southern Pac. R. Co. v. United States, 38 Fed. Rep. 55; Johnson v. United States, 6 Utah, 403. The findings of this court upon matters referred to it by a department under the Act of 1887, § 12, with the claimant's consent, is merely advisory, and not subject, as a judgment, under § 9, to review by the Supreme Court. In re Sanborn, 148 U. S. 222; 27 Ct. Cl. 485; See Armstrong v. United States, 29 id. 148; Cotton v. United States, id. 207.

The Court of Claims cannot entertain a suit against the government founded upon a tort: Schillinger v. United States, 155 U. S. 163; United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262; Carpenter v. United States, 45 Fed. Rep. 341; or upon the infringement of a patent, apart from con

(7) Upon the history of the U. S. Supreme Court, see Mr. H. L. Carson's History in the Centennial volume, and the

ford, 6 Wall. 484 (citing De Groot v. United States, 5 Wall. 419, 432); Watkins v. United States, 9 Wall. 759.

The jurisdiction of the court is extended to claims of owners of property abandoned or captured during the rebellion, by act of March 12, 1863 (12 U. S. St. at L. c. 120, p. 820). It has been thought to be exclusive. Elgee v. Lovell, 1 Woolw. 102, 117. Compare Mail Co. v. Flanders, 12 Wall. 130, 135. And held not to be subject to appeal by the claimant. Pargoud's Appeal, 4 Ct. of Cl. 349. It is not to include claims growing out of destruction or appropriation of, or damage to, property by the army or navy during the war. July 4, 1864 (13 U. S. St. at L. c. 240, p. 381); Filor v. United States, 9 Wall. 45; United States v. Russell, 13

tract United States v. Berdan, F. M. Co., 156 U. S. 552; or upon a treaty with a foreign nation: Great Western Ins. Co. v. United States, 112 U. S. 193; Alling v. United States, 114 U. S. 564; Burthe v. Denis, 133 U. S. 514; The Ganges, 25 Ct. Cl. 110; not including, however, a claim originally based upon a treaty but really founded, as in the Alabama Claims, upon an appropriation made by Congress in pursuance thereof: United States v. Weld, 127 U. S. 55; Williams v. Heard, 140 U. S. 537. As to claims upon "im plied contract," see United States v. Gill, 20 Wall. 517; United States v. Palmer, 128 U. S. 262; Hollister v. Benedict Manuf. Co., 113 U. S. 59, 67; McAleer v. United States, 25 Ct. Cl. 238; Gill v. United States, id. 415; Central Pacific R. Co. v. United States, 28 id. 427;

essay of Mr. Westel W. Willoughby (John Hopkins' series).

tution had only declared, in general terms, that there should be a Supreme Court, with certain original and appellate powers.

Wall. 623; Pugh v. United States, ib. 633; United States v. Kimball, ib. 636. The Supreme Court has determined that the Court of Claims has not jurisdiction of claims against the government founded in fact on the unauthorized torts of its agents, although in form on an implied contract. Gibbons v. United States, 8 Wall. 269. [Langford v. United States, 101 U. S. 341.] Nor of suits founded on merely equitable considerations. Bonner v. United States, 9 Wall. 156. Persons complaining of exactions under the reve nue laws are confined to the remedies which those statutes furnish. Nichols v. United States, 7 Wall. 122. [Where the suit is to recover money which the United States has obtained by fraud of its agents, the court has jurisdiction. United States v. State Bank, 96 U. S. 30; Boughton v. United States, 12 Ct. of Cl. 330. As to its equitable, jurisdiction, see Burke v. United States, 13 Ct. of Cl. 231. The jurisdiction does not extend to claims under treaties. Ex parte Atocha, 17 Wall. 439; Langford v. United States,

McArthur v. United States, 29 id. 191; Merriam v. United States, id. 250; Forehand v. United States, 17 Wash. L. R. 37. The Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359 (24 St. at L. 505) allows suits to be brought against the United States upon express or implied contracts, and the United States may file set-offs or counterclaims in such suits. As to interest upon claims appealed to the Supreme Court, see 26 St. at L. 537; Harvey v. United States, 113 U. S. 243; United States v. Jones, 131 U. S. 1; White v. Arthur, 10 Fed. Rep. 83, 87. The limitation as to claims against the United States is six years. See 24 St. at L. 505; Ford v. United States, 116 U. S. 213; Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227; United States v. Louisiana, 127 U. S. 182; Buck v. United States, 25 Ct. Cl. 120;

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When sec. 14 of the act of 1863 was in force, it was construed to give the Secretary of the Treasury power to revise all the decisions of the Court of Claims re

quiring payment of money. This was held to take away the judicial character of the court, and to make an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States impossible. Post, 326, n. 1; Gordon v. United States, 1 Nott & H. xxxiii, note, 2 Wall. 561. The section was repealed after the rendering of the above decision, by the act of March 17, 1866, 14 U. S. St. at L. 9, and a claimant has now an ap peal as of right when the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000. United States v. Adams, 6 Wall. 101; Ex parte Zellner, 9 Wall. 244.

An appeal is given on behalf of the

Warder v. United States, id. 159. The Court of Claims may, within two years after its judgment, grant a new trial. Belknap v. United States, 150 U. S. 588. The prosecution of claims against the United States in the Court of Claims, or the Supreme Court, is wholly dependent upon the acts of Congress. United States v. Gleeson, 124 U. S. 255. Technical objections to the pleadings are not favored in this court. See United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 338; United States v. Old Settlers, 148 U. S. 427; Chappell v. United States, 34 Fed. Rep. 673. A State may prosecute in the Court of Claims its demand against the United States, if founded upon a Federal law. United States v. Louisi ana, 123 U. S. 32.

1

It consists of a chief justice and eight associate justices, any five of whom make a quorum; and it holds one term annually, at the seat of government, commencing on the first Monday in December, and continued at discretion. (b) But though five of the judges are requisite for business in general, yet any one or more of them may make all necessary orders in a suit, preparatory to the hearing or trial, and continue the court from day to day, in the absence of a quorum; and the judge of the fourth circuit attends at the city of Washington, on the first Monday of August, annually, for interlocutory matters.

The Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies of a civil nature, where a state is a party,1 except between a state as defendant and its citizens; and except, also, between a state as defendant, and citizens of other states or aliens, in which cases it has no jurisdiction; but in all these cases where a state is plaintiff, it has original but not exclusive jurisdiction. (y) It has, also, exclusively, all such jurisdiction of suits, or proceedings against ambassadors, or other public ministers, or their

(b) Acts of Congress of April 29, 1802; February 24, 1807, sec. 5; May 4, 1826: January 21, 1829 [c. 12]; March 3, 1837, c. 34; and of 17th June, 1844, c. 96.

United States from all final judgments
adverse to the United States. Act of
June 25, 1868, 15 U. S. St. at L. c. 71, p.
75, § 1.

Only such aliens as are citizens or sub-
jects of a government which accords to
citizens of the United States the right to
prosecute claims against such government
in its courts can sue in the Court of Claims
under the abandoned and captured prop-
erty acts before mentioned. Act of July

(y) The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was intended to be exercised sparingly, and not to be extended by construction. California v. So. Pac. Ry. Co., 157 U. S. 229. In the constitutional grant to it (Art. III., sec. 2) of judicial power in "all cases, in law and equity, arising under this constitution," &c., the clauses providing for cases where a State is a party, only distribute the jurisdiction under the first clause and do not add to such

27, 1868, c. 276, § 2, 15 U. S. St. at L. 243. A British subject is not prevented from suing by this act, United States v. O'Keefe, 11 Wall. 178; nor a Prussian, Brown's Case, 5 Ct. of Cl. 571; nor a French, Rothschild's Case, 6 Ct. of Cl. 204; nor a Spanish, Molina's Case, 6 Ct. of Cl. 269; nor a Swiss, Lobsiger's Case, 5 Ct. of Cl. 687.

1 Post, 323, n. 1.

jurisdiction; and in a suit between a State and citizens of another State the parties' character is the vital consideration, the addition of a Federal question being im material. Ibid. Under that constitutional provision this court may entertain an original suit by the United States against a state to settle the boundary between a State and a Territory. United States v. Texas, 143 U. S. 621.

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