party.1 (y) The parties in that suit claimed title to lands under grants from different states. The plaintiff brought his ejectment

in the Circuit Court of Connecticut, claiming title under a grant from that state, and under a claim that the lands lay within the jurisdiction of that state. The defendant claimed title under a grant from New York, and on the ground that the lands lay within the rightful as well as actual jurisdiction of New York. The court laid down this rule on the subject of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, on account of the interest that a state has in the controversy, that it must be a case in which a state is either nominally or substantially the party; and that it is not sufficient that the state may be consequentially affected, as being bound to make retribution to her grantee upon the event of eviction. Though there may be a controversy relative to soil or jurisdiction between two states, yet if that controversy occurs in a suit between two individuals, to which neither of the states is a party upon the record, it is not a case within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, because the states may contest the right of soil in the Supreme Court at any time, notwithstanding a decision in the suit between the individuals. Nor will a decision as to the right of soil between individuals affect the right of the state as to jurisdiction; and that jurisdiction * 324 may remain unimpaired, though the state may have parted

203; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196. In New Hampshire v. Louisiana; New York v. Same, 108 U. S. 76, it was held that one state could not acquire jurisdiction to sue another in the Supreme Court of the United States, by taking assignments of debts due from defendant state to citizens of plaintiff state for purposes of collection merely.-B.]

Shortly after the close of the rebellion a suit was brought in the Supreme Court purporting to be by the state of Texas, and sanctioned by the provisional governor of 1865, by the governor elected under the constitution of 1866, and by the governor afterwards appointed by the commander of the district. It was held to be well brought, three judges dissenting on the ground that, as a political fact, Texas was not one of the United States. Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700. Two other cases of interest, arising out of the war, may as

well be stated here as elsewhere, though not strictly in place. In the first, the state of Mississippi sought to file a bill to enjoin Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, from carrying into effect the Reconstruction Acts, so called, which were alleged to be unconstitutional; but the court refused to allow it, on the ground that they could not restrain or enforce the performance of his executive and political functions by the President. Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475; ante, 296, n. 1. In the second case, a bill by the state of Georgia to enjoin the Secretary of War, general of the army, and district commander from carrying out the same Reconstruction Acts (acts of Congress of March 2 and 23, 1867), on the ground that their doing so would destroy the corporate existence of the state, was dismissed, on motion, for want of jurisdiction. Georgia v. Stanton, 6 Wall. 50; ante, 322, n. 1.

with the right of soil. In such a case the Supreme Court would not allow an injunction, on a bill filed by the State of New York against the State of Connecticut, to stay proceedings in the ejectment suit between individuals, though a general claim of soil and jurisdiction was involved in the private suit, because the State of New York was not a party to the suit in the Circuit Court, nor interested in the decision. (a)

5. Its Appellate Jurisdiction regulated by Congress. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court exists only in those cases in which it is affirmatively given. In the case of Wiscart v. Dauchy, (b) the Supreme Court considered that its whole appellate jurisdiction depended upon the regulations of Congress, as that jurisdiction was given by the Constitution in a qualified manner. The Supreme Court was to have appellate jurisdiction, "with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress should make;" and if Congress had not provided any rule to regulate the proceedings on appeal, the court could not exercise an appellate jurisdiction; and if a rule be provided, the court could not depart from it. In pursuance of this principle, the court decided, in Clarke v. Bazadone, (c) that a writ of error did not lie to that court from a court of the United States territory northwest of the Ohio, because the act of Congress had not authorized an appeal or writ of error from such a court. It was urged that the judicial power extended to all cases arising under the Constitution, and that where a Supreme Court had not original, it had appellate jurisdiction, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress should make; and that the appellate power was derived from the Constitution, and must be full and complete, in all cases appertaining to the federal *325 judiciary where Congress had not by law interfered and controlled it by exceptions and regulations. The court, however, adhered to the doctrine which they had before laid

*

(a) New York v. Connecticut, 4 Dallas, 3. In the case of Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 12 Peters, 657, it was decided, after a very elaborate discussion, that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction to ascertain and establish boundaries between two states, and to restore and confirm rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction. (x) (b) 3 Dallas, 321.

(x) See ante, 298, n. (y). After the true boundary is adjusted, grants previously made by one of the States beyond

(c) 1 Cranch, 212.

its true limits are void, if not confirmed by the other State. Coffee v. Groover, 123 U. S. 1.

down, and proceeded upon the principle, that though the appellate powers of the court were given by the Constitution, they were limited entirely by the judiciary statutes, which are to be understood as making exceptions to the appellate jurisdiction of the court, and to imply a negative on the exercise of such a power, in every case but those in which it is affirmatively given and described by statute.1 This was the principle also explicitly declared in the case of The United States v. More, (a) and in the case of Durousseau v. The United States. (b) In the first of those cases, the rule of construction was carried to the extent of holding that no appeal or writ of error lay in a criminal case from the Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, because the appellate jurisdiction, as to that district, applied, by the terms of the statute, to civil cases only. The rule was afterwards, in Ex parte Kearney, (c) laid down generally, that the Supreme Court had no appellate jurisdiction from circuit courts in criminal cases confided to it by the laws of the United States. Nor has it any appellate jurisdiction over a judgment of the circuit courts, in cases brought before it by writ of error from a district court, though it has over judgments and decrees of the circuit courts in suits brought before them by appeal from the district courts. (d) 6. Its Appellate Jurisdiction confined to Cases under the Constitu

tion, Treaties, and Laws. The Constitution says, that the judicial

(a) 3 Cranch, 159.

(b) 6 Cranch, 307.

(c) 7 Wheaton, 38; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Peters, 193; 7 Peters, 568, s. P. (x) (d) United States v. Goodwin, 7 Cranch, 108; United States v. Gordon, ib. 287. But see supra, 299, now altered by act of Congress. Mr. Justice Story, in the case Ex parte Christy, 3 How. 292, 317, stated that no appeal was given or lies from the judgments either of the district or circuit courts in criminal cases. So it was adjudged that the Supreme Court has no power of appeal from the decrees of the District Court sitting in bankruptcy, and no power to issue a prohibition, except when the District Court is proceeding as a court of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. See also infra, 383.

1 Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506; The Lucy, 8 Wall. 307; Ex parte Graham, 10 Wall. 541, 542.

Neither a writ of prohibition nor certiorari will lie from the Supreme to the Circuit Court in a criminal case. The only mode of bringing such a case before

the Supreme Court is by a certificate of the judges of the Circuit Court that they are divided in opinion. Ex parte Gordon, 1 Black, 503; Forsyth v. United States, 9 How. 571; United States v. Circuit Judges, 3 Wall. 673, 679.

(x) See also Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 290; In re Coy, 127 U. S. 731.

power shall extend to all cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States; (y) and it has been made a

question as to what was a case arising under a treaty. In *326* Owings v. Norwood, (a) there was an ejectment between

two citizens of Maryland, for lands in that state; and the defendant set up an outstanding title in a British subject, which he contended was protected by the British treaty of 1794. The Court of Appeals decided against the title thus set up; and the Supreme Court of the United States held that not to be a case within the appellate jurisdiction of the court, because it was not a case arising under the treaty. The treaty itself was not drawn in question, either directly or incidentally. The title in question did not grow out of the treaty, and as the claim was not under the treaty, the title was not protected by it; and whether the treaty was an obstacle to the recovery, was then a question exclusively for the state court. (b) 1 (z)

(a) 5 Cranch, 344.

(b) A case, in the sense of the Constitution, says Mr. Justice Story (Commentaries on the Constitution, iii. 507), is a suit in law or equity, and arises when some subject touching the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States is submitted to the courts by a party who asserts his rights in the form prescribed by law. See also 9 Wheaton, 819, and 9 Peters, 224; [infra, n. 1, ad finem.]

1 Appeals from State Courts. Owings v. Norwood is confirmed by Henderson v. Tennessee, 10 How. 311; Verden v. Coleman, 1 Black, 472; [Miller v. Lancaster Bank, 106 U. S. 542; Long v. Converse, 91 U. S. 105; Hartell v. Tilghman, 99 U. S. 547.] See Lanfear v. Hunley, 4 Wall. 204, Semple v. Hagar, ib. 431, for cases where jurisdiction was declined;

(y) By the U. S. Rev. Stats. § 707, the United States may appeal to the Supreme Court from all adverse judgments of the court of claims, and the claimant also has a like right of appeal where the amount in controversy exceeds $3,000, or his claim is forfeited under § 1089. Such review is limited to appeals, and cannot be had by writ of error. See United States v. Young, 94 U. S. 258; 95 id. 641; United States v. Jones, 119 U. S. 477; Shepherd v. Thompson, 122 U. S. 231; United States

Reichart v. Felps, 6 Wall. 160, Silver v. Ladd, ib. 440, where jurisdiction was taken.

The Supreme Court cannot revise the judgment of a state court merely because the validity of a treaty or statute, or of an authority exercised under the United States, was drawn in question before it, if the decision was in favor of the author.

v. Gleeson, 124 U. S. 255; United States v. Davis, 131 U. S. 36; United States v. Mosby, 133 U. S. 273.

(z) When this jurisdiction depends solely upon some title, right, privilege, of immunity under the Constitution or laws of the United States, specially set up or claimed in the State Court, and there decided adversely thereto, "certain propositions," says Mr. Chief Justice Fuller in Sayward v. Denny, 158 U. S. 180, 183, "must be regarded as settled. 1. That the