1 When the Constitution of the United States was under the consideration of the state conventions, there was much * 392 * concern expressed on the subject of the general power vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States, or by any state, on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." These amendments have been a number of times before the courts, and in the construction of them the whole subject of the relative powers of the United States and of the states respectively has been largely discussed. There are two systems of government combined in one. The same person may be a citizen of both, entitled to the protection of each, and amenable to the laws of each. The United States has only the power which have been delegated to it, but within the range of these powers is supreme. The same act may be an offence against both state and United States law (e. g. passing forged coin). Each may then punish for the infringement of its own laws. There are certain immunities and privileges belong ized, taxed, or recognized as a citizen, either by the United States or a State, is not a citizen within the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U. S. 94. The Fourteenth Amendment restricts the action of the States, and does not relate to legislation by Congress. In re Sing Lee, 54 Fed. Rep. 334; Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578; Freeland v. Williams, 131 U. S. 405. It applies to all the departments of State government. Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Sawyer, 552. It applies, as to due process of law, to a taking by right of eminent domain, after the amendment, under a State statute previously enacted. Kaukauna Water-power Co. v. Green Bay & M. Canal Co., 142 U. S. 254; Marchant v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 153 U. S. 380, 388. It does not apply in a particular State to corporations foreign to that State. Norfolk & W. R. ing to citizens of the United States, as such, or which are guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and these are under the protection of the federal govern ment. Such privileges and immunities as do not fall within this class are exclusively under state protection. In Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, it was held that there was nothing in the amendments (13th or 14th) to prevent a state from granting to a corporation the exclusive right to erect cattle-yards and slaughtering-houses, and from prohibiting the landing or slaughtering of cattle at any other than specified places which were under the control of said corporation, and for the use of which it was entitled to charge a reasonable compensation. In Minor v. Happersett, 21 Wall. 162, it was held that no right to vote is given or guaranteed by the thirteenth or fourteenth amendments. Hence, that an ex Co. v. Pennsylvania, 136 U. S. 114; Pembina Mining Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U. S. 181; Singer Manuf. Co. v. Wright, 33 Fed. Rep. 121. The defence of the Statute of Limitations against a debt already barred is not "property " within the Fourteenth Amendment, of which the debtor is deprived by a repeal of the statute. Campbell v. Holt, 115 U. S. 620. The following are in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment: Exclusion laws as applied to Chinese children born in the United States: Gee Fook Sing v. United States, 49 Fed. Rep. 146; discriminating State legislation against one class of persons of a particular race or nation: In re Parrott, 6 Sawyer, 349; an Act imposing the full term of the original sentence of a convict after his attempt to escape, without any allowance for the time already served: State v. Lewin, 53 Kansas, 679; discrimi of taxation over all objects of taxation, vested in the national government; and it was supposed that it would be in the power of Congress, in its discretion, to destroy in effect the clusion of females from the suffrage, by a state, was not unconstitutional. See also United States v. Reese, infra. The right of jury trial is not protected by the fourteenth amendment. Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 90. It is a violation of the fourteenth amendment for a state, through any of its departments or agencies, to discriminate in the selection of jurors between different persons on account of race or color. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303; Ex parte Virginia, ib. 339; Commonwealth v. Johnson, 78 Ky. 509. But a colored person has not any absolute right to have even a single colored juror on the jury that tries him, provided only there be no discrimination in the choice. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313. The fifteenth amendment gives simply the right to exemption from discrimination on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude, in the exercise of the elective franchise; and Congress has no power to legislate for any purpose nating taxes: Jennings v. Coal Ridge I. & C. Co., 147 U. S. 147; Columbus S. Ins. Co. v. Wright, 151 U. S. 470; Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Walker, 47 Fed. Rep. 681; Shirk v. La Fayette, 52 id. 857; special assessments without notice to the owner or opportunity for him to be heard. Murdock v. Cincinnati, 39 Fed. Rep. 891. The following are not: A State law upheld by the State courts as not providing a cruel and unusual punishment: McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155; State punishments, penalties, and fair provisions for trials applying equally to all persons of the same class: Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Woodson, 134 U. S. 614; Marchant v. Penn. R. Co., 153 U. S. 380; In re Boggs, 45 Fed. Rep. 475; San Mateo County v. beyond this. United States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 214. As to" due process of law,” see Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480; McMillen v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 37; Kelley v. Pittsburgh, 104 U. S. 78. The history of these amendments, and their purpose as peculiarly applicable to the colored race, is discussed in the foregoing cases. They do, however, it would seem, apply to other races as well; and it has been held that the effect of them is to forbid all class legislation, such legislation being a denial of the "equal protection of the laws." Ah Kow v. Nunan, 5 Saw. 552; s. c. 18 Am. L. Reg. N. s. 676, and note; Parrott's Chinese Case, 6 Saw. 349; In re Ah Chong, ib. 451; Slaughter-House Cases, 16 Wall. 36, 72. Comp. State v. Ah Chong, 16 Nev. 50. For further discussion of the respective rights and powers of the United States and of the states, see United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542; Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U. S. 257. — B.] Southern Pac. R. Co., 8 Sawyer, 238; a State law making all grain elevators public warehouses: Brass v. North Dakota, 153 U. S. 391; a State law fixing elevator rates, for cities exceeding a certain population: Budd v. New York, 143 U. S. 517; or forbidding laundry business in parts of a city between certain hours at night, but not applying to other kinds of business: Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703; or the carrying of dangerous weapons: Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535; a State law making it a misdemeanor to issue a policy of fire insurance without express authority therefor by charter, and making the policy void: Com'th v. Vrooman, 164 Penn. St. 306; a State law requiring a certificate or license appropriate to a par⚫ concurrent power of taxation remaining in the states, and to deprive them of the means of supplying their own wants. All the resources of taxation might, by degrees, become the subjects ticular profession: Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114; admitting or refusing to admit women to practise law in a State: Ex parte Lockwood, 154 U. S. 116; separate railroad cars for white and negro passengers, if the accommodations are equally good: Anderson v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 62 Fed. Rep. 46; or empowering railroad commissioners to abolish grade crossings: New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556; absence of the accused in a capital case from court when judgment is affirmed by the appellate court Schwab v. Berggren, 143 U. S. 442; Fielden v. Illinois, id. 452; State statutes prohibiting intermarriage between whites and blacks. Dodson v. State (Ark.), 31 S. W. Rep. 977. See also Walston v. Nevin, 128 U. S. 578; Kauffman v. Wootters, 138 U. S. 285; Fielden v. Illinois, 143 U. S. 452; Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Emmons, 149 U. S. 364; New York & N. E. R. Co. v. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556; Pittsburgh &c., R. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421; Indianapolis & V. R. Co. v. Backus, id. 438; Gilchrist v. Helena Hot Spring & S. R. Co., 58 Fed. Rep. 708; Ex parte Murray, 35 id. 496; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Chowning, 86 Texas, 654; Braceville Coal Co. v. People, 147 Ill. 66; Att.-Gen. v. Jochim, 99 Mich. 358; Wulzen v. Supervisors, 101 Cal. 15; State v. Goodwill (33 W. Va. 179), 25 Am. St. Rep. 863, and note; cases cited supra, 248 n. (y). The provision as to due process of law in the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the acts of State officers. Pacific Gas Imp. Co. v. Ellert, 64 Fed. Rep. 421. The police power is a right reserved by the States, and was not surrendered to the general government when authority was conferred upon Congress to regulate commerce. Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465, 513; Cantini v. Tillman, 54 Fed. Rep. 969. Summary power vested in health officers to quaran. tine those afflicted with dangerous and infectious disease, or to remove dead animals, is due process of law. In re Smith, 84 Hun, 465; National F. Co. v. Lambert, 48 Fed. Rep. 458. So is the right of em. inent domain when duly exercised. Barr v. New Brunswick, 67 Fed. Rep. 402. A State statute authorizing the exactions of tolls, fixed without notice or hearing, for using an improved waterway is not a taking of property without due process of law. Sands v. Manistee River Imp. Co., 123 U. S. 288. Nor is an act fixing a max. imum charge for grain elevators. Budd r. New York, 143 U. S. 517. The principle that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, which was in substance embodied also in the constitutions of nearly all the States when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, is not incompatible with the equally vital principle that all property is held under the implied obligation that the owner's use of it shall not be injurious to the community. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 665. A constitutional require ment of due process of law will preclude the State Supreme Court from answering a question propounded by the legislature and governor as to the priority of appro priations for private claims, all of which are in excess of the constitutional limitation. In re Priority of Legislative Appropria. tions (Col.), 34 Pac. Rep. 277. Under the exclusion acts, due process of law places the burden upon the government to show that a Chinaman is unlawfully in this country. United States v. Long Hop, 55 Fed. Rep. 58; Barr v. New Brunswick, 67 Fed. Rep. 402; Sanford v. Poe, 69 id. 546. of federal monopoly. The states must support themselves, by direct taxes, duties, and excises, and Congress may lay the same burden, at the same time, on the same subject. Suppose the national tax should be as great as the article, whether it be land, or distilled spirits, or pleasure-carriages, for instance, will conveniently and prosperously bear, and the state should be obliged to lay a further tax for its own necessities; the doctrine, as I understand it, is, that the claim of the United States would be preferred, and must be first satisfied, because the laws of the United States, made in pursuance of the Constitution, are the supreme law of the land. The author of the Federalist (a) admits that a state might lay a tax on a particular article, equal to what it would well bear, but the United States would still have a right to lay a further tax on the same article; and that all collisions, in a struggle between the two governments for revenue, must and would be avoided by a sense of mutual forbearance. He nowhere, however, meets and removes the difficulty in the case of a want of this mutual forbearance, where there is a concurrent tax laid on the same subject, which will not bear both taxes. He says only that the United States would have no right to abolish the state tax. This is not contended; but would not the United States have a right to declare that their taxes were liens from the time they were imposed; and would they not, as of course, be entitled to be first paid; and must not the state. collector, in all cases, stand by and wait until the national *tax is collected, before he proceeds to collect his state tax * 393 out of the exhausted subject? Upon the doctrine of the federal courts, and upon the doctrine of the Federalist himself, this must be the case; and though the state legislatures have a concurrent jurisdiction in the case of taxation, except as to imposts, yet, in effect, though not in terms, this concurrent power becomes a subordinate and dependent power. In every other case of legislation, the concurrent power in the states would seem to be a power entirely dependent, and subject to be taken away absolutely, whenever Congress shall choose to exercise their powers of legislation over the same subject. I do not mean to be understood to question the validity, or to excite alarm at the existence, of this doctrine. The national government ought to be supreme within its constitutional limits, for it is intrusted with (a) No. 32. See also Nos. 31, 33, 34. the paramount interests and general welfare of the whole nation. Our great and effective security consists in the fact, that the constituents of the general and of the state governments are one and the same people; and the powers of the national government must always be exercised with a due regard to the interest and prosperity of every member of the Union; for on the concurrence and good will of the parts, the stability of the whole depends. My object is to discover what this concurrent power of legislation amounts to, and what is its value, and on what constitutional foundation it is supported. It was observed by Mr. Hamilton, in the convention of New York, in 1788, (a) that if the United States and the state should each lay a tax on a specific article, and the individual should be unable to pay both, the party who first levied would bold the property. But this position must be received with some * 394 qualification. The United States have * declared, by law, that they were entitled, in respect to their debts, to priority of payment; and when it was said that this claim would interfere with the rights of the state sovereignties, and would defeat the measures they had a right to adopt, to secure themselves against delinquencies, the answer given in United States v. Fisher (a) is, that "the mischief suggested, so far as it can really happen, was the necessary consequence of the supremacy of the laws of the United States, on all subjects to which the legislative power of Congress extends." It would seem, therefore, that the concurrent power of the legislation in the states is not an independent, but a subordinate and dependent power, liable, in many cases, to be extinguished, and in all cases to be postponed, to the paramount or supreme law of the Union, whenever the federal and the state regulations interfere with each other. (b) (a) Debates in the New York Convention, printed by Francis Childs, 113. (a) 2 Cranch, 358, 397. (b) Mr. Hamilton, as Secretary of the Treasury, in his Report in January, 1790, on "a provision for the support of the public credit of the United States," recommended the assumption of the state debts, on the ground, among others, that if the states were left with the duty and burden of providing for the payment of the state debts contracted during the Revolutionary War (and which were then estimated at twenty-five millions of dollars), there might be a competition for resources, producing interfering regulations, collision, and confusion. Particnlar branches of industry might be oppressed by an accumulation of taxation upon them, in the exercise, at the same time, of the powers of the Union and of the states upon the same objects, and by different modes. The Secretary, though fully and deeply impressed with the embarrass |