formed at some future time, when affairs were ripe for the revolution predicted. The main purpose of the common law and of the statute relating to unlawful assemblies is the protection of the public peace. Incendiary speeches, under the circumstances disclosed in this case, before a crowd of ignorant, misguided men, are not less dangerous because the advice to arm for the redress of grievances, and the threats of murder, are accompanied with the suggestion that the time is not quite come for action. This is illustrated in this case by the circumstance appearing in evidence. When Most said, "The day of revolution is not far distant," one of the audience rose and said excitedly, "Why not to-night? We are ready and prepared." No one can foresee the consequences which may result from language such as was used on this occasion, when addressed to a sympathizing and highly excited audience.

The point that threats of personal violence made in this state against persons in another state, although made at an assembly here, are not within the statute, is untenable. The offense of an unlawful assembly of which the defendant was convicted was committed here. We are administering our own laws, and not the laws of a foreign jurisdiction, and our state may properly pass laws to punish plotters here against the public peace of a sister state. We are of opinion, on the main question, that a case within the statute was made out for the jury. The common-law offense of unlawful assembly is defined to be "a disturbance of the peace by persons assembling together with an intention to do a thing which, if executed, would make them rioters, but neither executing it nor making a motion towards its execution": 1 Russell on Crimes, 275. It is unnecessary to decide whether the circumstances of the present case constitute the offense within this definition. They bring the case within the statute definition, and that is sufficient.

The exception to the question put to the witness on crossexamination as to his belief in a Supreme Being is frivolous. The exception to the proof that the persons assembled at the meeting of November 12th were anarchists is also without force. That they were in the main anarchists appears by other testimony. They were addressed by Most as "brother anarchists," and they saluted him as their leader. Moreover, proof that they were anarchists was competent to aid the jury in determining, in connection with other circumstances, the

point whether the meeting joined in the threats made by the defendant.

We discover no error in the record, and the judgment should therefore be affirmed.

UNLAWFUL ASSEMBLY-WHAT CONSTITUTES, and other questions kindred thereto, are discussed in Spies v. People, 122 Ill. 1; 3 Am. St. Rep. 320, and

note.

GILMAN V. TUCKER.

[128 NEW YORK, 190.]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-GIVING ONE PERSON'S PROPERTY TO ANOTHER. — Ân act of the legislature which provides for the involuntary transfer of property from one person to another without due process of law, whether with or without compensation, violates the principle of the fundamental law, whatever may be the pretext upon which it is founded.

-

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW - DENIAL OF RELIEF IN THE COURTS. — It is not competent for the legislature to deny, for any cause, to a party who has been illegally deprived of his property access to the constitutional courts of the state for relief.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DEPRIVING PERSON OF PROPERTY, WHAT 18. —A statute which assumes to destroy or invalidate a party's muniments of title is just as effective in depriving him of his property as one which bestows it directly upon another. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-VALIDATING VOID EXECUTION SALE — A statute declaring that if the title of a grantee under an execution sale, or his assignee, shall, for any cause whatsoever, be adjudged null and void in an action brought by the judgment debtor, or his assignee, such judgment shall have no force or effect, unless, within twenty days after its entry, the plaintiff shall pay to such grantee, or his assignee, the sum of money which was paid upon the sale, with interest from the time of the sale, including the costs and expenses of the defendant in defending the action in which such judgment was recovered, and in the event of the plaintiff's failure to pay such purchase-money and expenses within the time specified, said title shall be valid in such grantee, attempts to deprive a person of property without due process of law, and is void.

Esek Cowen, Everett P. Wheeler, and Tucker, Hardy, and Wainwright, for the appellant.

Charles E. Hughes and George H. Fletcher, for the respond

ent.

RUGER, C. J. This appeal involves the construction and constitutionality of section 1440 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by chapter 681 of the Laws of 1881, relating to the sale, redemption, and conveyance of real property sold

on execution.

The questions arise upon the affirmance, by the general term, of an order of the special term denying the defendant's motion to set aside and vacate a judgment entered herein for the plaintiff. No claim was made but that the judgment was regular and authorized by the evidence in the case, or that it had been paid or satisfied, or that there was any statute or rule of law which required the court to set aside such judgment. The purposes of the act referred to, if valid, do not require an order of the court to render them effective. The contention is, that the defendant is entitled to the relief asked for, because the plaintiff did not, within twenty days after the recovery of the judgment, make certain payments to the defendant required by the statute, in default of which the section referred to declares the judgment to be of "no force or effect."

Even if it be conceded that the provisions of the code are valid, it does not follow that the defendant is entitled, as of course, to the relief demanded. It is not required by the language of the statute, and the court might well have said, in the exercise of its discretion, that the defendant should be left to the remedies which the statute gave him, and that it would not determine the controversy in a summary way upon motion. But we are disinclined to dispose of the appeal on this point, as important questions are raised by the case which, in the interest of justice, require an early disposition.

The evidence in the case shows that previous to the commencement of this action, the defendant had, as a subsequent judgment creditor of the plaintiff, acquired the right to a deed from the sheriff, by the redemption from the purchaser upon an execution sale, of a house and lot in New York belonging to the plaintiff; and she, believing the sale to have unauthorized and illegal, brought this action to compel a determination of the defendant's claim under such redemption.

In answer to the action, the defendant set up title in himself through the proceedings to redeem from the former judgment creditor, who had bid it in on an execution sale upon a judgment in his favor against the plaintiff. The question litigated upon the trial was as to the validity of the execution upon which such sale was had. The trial court found that it was "a void process, and that therefore the sale under that void process was also void and of no effect, and therefore the defendant Tucker could and did take no valid title by reason of his redemption from a sale which was void ": Place v. Riley, 98 N. Y. 1. Judgment was therefore rendered in favor of this

AM. ST. REP., VOL. XXVI-80

plaintiff, with costs, and that judgment was affirmed, not only by the general term, but also by this court, with costs. It is now claimed that this judgment is ineffective, because the plaintiff did not, within twenty days after its recovery, in compliance with section 1440, pay to the defendant the moneys required to be paid by that section. The section, as amended, reads as follows: "The right and title of the judgment debtor, or of a person holding under him, or deriving title through him, to real property, sold by virtue of an execution, is not divested by the sale, until the expiration of the period within which it can be redeemed, as prescribed in this article and the execution of the sheriff's deed. But if the property is not redeemed and a deed is executed in pursuance of the sale, the grantee in the deed is deemed to have been vested with the legal estate from the time of the sale." Then follows the amendment: "And if the title of such grantee, or his assignees, is adjudged, for any reason or cause whatsoever, to be null and void in any action for that purpose brought by the judgment debtor, or his assignees, such judgment shall have no force or effect, unless within twenty days after the entry of such judgment the plaintiff shall pay to such grantee, or his assignees, the sum of money which was paid upon the sale, with interest from the time of the sale, as prescribed in this article, including the costs and expenses of defendant in defending the action in which such judgment was recovered, to be adjusted by a judge of the court in which said action was brought; and in the event of plaintiff's failure to pay such purchase-money and expenses within the time aforesaid, said title shall be valid in said grantee."

It was also provided that if, in any pending action to recover such property, an appeal had been taken, the plaintiff should have twenty days from final judgment in his favor to make the payments required.

In considering the meaning and effect of the amendatory act, it is desirable to have in mind the previous condition of the law on the subject. The Code of Civil Procedure, which was a substantial re-enactment of the provisions of the Revised Statutes in respect to this subject, provided that on a sale of lands on execution, the debtor's title should not be divested until fifteen months after the sale. This period was allowed him and his judgment and mortgage creditors to enable them to redeem from the sale. The first year was allowed to the debtor, and the three succeeding months to the creditors en

titled to the benefit of the redeeming statute. On the expiration of the fifteen months, in case there was no redemption by the owner, the sheriff was bound to execute a deed of the premises to the purchaser on the sale, or to his assignees, or to the person entitled thereto under the provisions of the statutes relating to redemption: Sec. 1471. Upon a redemption by the judgment debtor, or his heirs, executors, or assignees, the sale and certificates thereof become null and void, and no conveyance, therefore, was required to be executed, as the judgment. becaine satisfied to the extent of the sum collected and applied on the execution, and the title of the property sold remained in the judgment debtor: Sec. 1448.

In case of a redemption by a judgment or mortgage creditor, he was required not only to pay the amount specified by the statute to the person from whom he redeemed, but also to execute a satisfaction of his judgment or mortgage, stating that the redemption satisfies the judgment or mortgage in full, or to a specified amount: Sec. 1463. The purchaser of real prop erty, sold by virtue of an execution, who has been evicted from the possession thereof, or against whom judgment is rendered in an action to recover the same, in consequence, first, of any irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale, or second, of the judgment upon which the execution was issued, being vacated or reversed, or set aside for irregularity, or error in fact, may recover the purchase-money paid by him, with interest, from the person for whose benefit the property was sold: Sec. 1479.

In case of a sale vacated upon an "irregularity in the proceedings concerning the sale," the judgment under which the Bale was made is revived and becomes valid, to enable the judgment creditor to collect the sum paid on the sale with interest: Sec. 1480. It is also provided that a judgment creditor who completes proceedings for redemption acquires all the right, title, and interest in the property which the purchaser acquired by the sale: Sec. 1471.

The protection which this scheme affords persons who have purchased land on an illegal sale is apparently sufficient for all of the requirements of justice or equity, independent of the amended section. Thus when such sale is declared void, the security of the judgment creditor is restored for the purpose of enabling him to reimburse himself for the moneys paid on the sale, and a purchaser on a sale whose title is defeated for any of the causes specified is authorized to recover the pur