haps, among the most prominent in giving effect to the law of the situs as above explained), there has never been any doubt upon this question. On the contrary, in Thuret v. Jenkins, 7 Mart. (La.) 318, 12 Am. Dec. 508, it was held that where the title had passed, "the circumstance of the chattel being afterwards brought into a country, according to the law of which the sale would be invalid, would not affect it." The doctrine of this case has since been affirmed in Southern Bank v. Wood, 14 La. Ann. 554; 74 Am. Dec. 446.

To the same effect is Langworthy v. Little, 12 Cush. 109, where Shaw, C. J., says that "a party who obtains a good title to property, absolute or qualified, by the laws of a sister state is entitled to maintain and enforce those rights in this state." The property was attached in Massachusetts as the property of the mortgagor, and the sheriff was held liable for its conversion.

So in Jones on Chattel Mortgages, 301, it is said that “although the mortgage be not executed in conformity with the laws of the state to which the property is afterwards removed, if executed and recorded according to the laws of the state or country of its execution, it is effectual to hold the property in the state to which it is removed."

So in Ballard v. Winter, 39 Conn. 179, the supreme court of Connecticut sustained an action of trover against one of its own citizens for suing out attachment proceedings against property which had been mortgaged according to the law of Massachusetts, but which had been subsequently removed to the former state. The court said: "By the general rules of law, title thus perfected in one state is respected in all other states and countries into which the property may come.

It would certainly be very inconvenient if such mortgages fairly made in Massachusetts should be held invalid in Connecticut in respect to movable property which may be daily passing to and fro along the dividing lines between the states.' This case is reported in 12 American Law Register, 759, and is highly approved by the annotator, who cites several authorities in its suppprt.

The same point was decided by the supreme court of the United States in United States Bank v. Lee, 13 Pet. 107. There, certain property, being in Virginia, was conveyed in trust to Richard Bland Lee for the benefit of Mrs. Lee. The title passed according to the Virginia law, but the property being subsequently removed to the District of Columbia, where, un

der a prevailing Maryland statute, such a transfer would not be good, except upon certain conditions which had not been .complied with, the court (Catron, J.) said that "the statute had no reference to a case where the title has been vested by the laws of another state, but operates only on sales, mortgages, and gifts made in Maryland." The following authorities are also directly in point: Hilliard on Mortgages, 412; Keenan v. Stimson, 32 Minn. 377; Ferguson v. Clifford, 37 N. H. 86; Jones v. Taylor, 30 Vt. 42; Rhode Island Central Bank v. Danforth, 14 Gray, 123; Martin v. Hill, 12 Barb. 631; Kanaga v. Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134; 70 Am. Dec. 62; Wilson v. Carson, 12 Md. 54; Smith v. McLean, 24 Iowa, 322; Hicks v. Skinner, 71 N C. 539; 17 Am. Rep. 16; Barker v. Stacy, 25 Miss. 477; Feurt v. Rowell, 62 Mo. 524.

The defendants, however, contend that they are protected by the sale under the attachment proceedings in the Virginia court. They rely upon the case of Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. 139, and insist that, under the act of Congress, full faith and credit must be given to the judgments of the courts of a sister state. It is true that the decision referred to was chiefly based upon that statute; but it must be observed that the record of such an adjudication has only (we quote from the opinion) "the same faith and credit as it has in the state court from which it is taken"; and that, "in order to give due force and effect to a judicial proceeding, it is often necessary to show by evidence outside of the record the predicament of the property on which it operated." Such was the course pursued by the court in that case, and as we have seen that the title to the property had not passed according to the law of the situs, the attachment proceedings were sustained. If, however, it had appeared that at the time of the execution of the mortgage in New York, the property was also there, but had been afterwards removed to Illinois, it cannot be doubted that the decision would have been otherwise. Happily, we have a case directly in point from the supreme court of Illinois: Mumford v. Canty, 50 Ill. 370; 99 Am. Dec. 525. It is there distinctly held that "where personal property was mortgaged in the state of Missouri, and permitted to remain with the mortgagor (contary to the law of Illinois) after the maturity of the debt to secure which the mortgage was given, and upon being subsequently brought into Illinois was seized under an attachment in favor of a bona fide creditor of the mortgagor, the rights of the mortgagee (would) be determined

...

by the law of Missouri," and the mortgagee was permitted to recover the property of the purchaser. Here, then, we have an express decision as to the effect which is to be given to such. a judgment in the state in which it is rendered, and it is only to this extent, and no further, that the judgment is conclusive in a sister state. To hold otherwise would go beyond what the statute requires, and give the same effect to an attachment proceeding, which generally follows a proceeding which is strictly and technically in rem. Such is not the law. An attachment proceeding, though often spoken of as a proceeding in rem, "cannot be admitted to come within the strict ineaning of that term. . . . . The judgment is conclusive only upon the actual parties to the litigation and those in privity with them, . . . . and they use the hold obtained by the seizure of specific property merely as a means of reaching and giving effect to the rights of parties, and neither claim nor exercise any controlling authority over the title of strangers. The same remark applies to replevin ": 2 Black on Judgments, 801; Drake on Attachment, sec. 245; Duchess of Kingston's Case, 1 Leach C. C. 146; 1 East P. C. 468; 3 Smith's Lead. Cas. 2011. In his notes to the latter case, Judge Hare cites, with entire approval, the opinion of Hale, J., in Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vt. 65, in which it is said that the operation of such a proceeding "must be limited to the parties to it, and cannot in any manner affect the right or interest of any other person having an independent and adverse claim to the goods,"

etc.

Having shown, we think, that the title perfected here was not lost by the removal of the property to Virginia, and that the record of the judgment in the attachment proceeding is only to be respected in so far as effect is given to it in that state, we cannot but assume, in the absence of any decision to the contrary, that the same principle of comity, so universally recognized and acted upon, likewise prevails in Virginia, and that even if these plaintiffs were suing in that jurisdiction they would be permitted to recover. This would seem all the more reasonable, as we have extended this very comity to a citizen of our sister state in a case precisely similar to the one under consideration: Anderson v. Doak, 10 Ired. 295. There, a slave, being in Virginia, was mortgaged by its owner, and the mortgage duly registered in Carroll County. It was never registered in this state, nor was it executed according to its laws. The slave came to this state and was attached by a

creditor of the mortgagor. In an action of trover, brought by the mortgagee against the sheriff, the plaintiff was permitted

to recover.

It will be noted that we have discussed this question as if the plaintiffs were seeking redress in the courts of Virginia. If we have shown that, according to what appears to be the entire course of judicial opinion, they would be entitled to recover there, a fortiori can they recover in the courts of this state when they have acquired jurisdiction over the parties.

To the foregoing authorities we will add a recent decision. of the court of appeals of New York. In that case (Edgerly v. Bush, 81 N. Y. 199), B. executed to plaintiff a chattel mortgage upon a span of horses, both parties then residents of New York. B. subsequently took them to Canada, where they were sold by a regular trader dealing in horses, the purchaser buying in good faith. Under the laws of Canada, property cannot be reclaimed from one so purchasing without refunding the price paid. Defendant, a resident of this state, bought the horses in Canada from such purchaser, and they were left in Canada. Upon refusal of defendant to deliver them, the plaintiff sued for their conversion. The court held (Folger, C. J., delivering an elaborate opinion) that the plaintiff was entitled to recover.

We are of the opinion that his honor very properly overruled the demurrer; but he should have given the defendants an opportunity to answer: Code, sec. 272; Moore v. Hobbs, 77 N. C. 65; Bronson v. Wilmington etc. Ins. Co., 85 N. C. 411. Modified and affirmed.

CHATTEL MORTGAGE-CONFLICT OF LAWS. - Removal to another state of mortgaged chattels by the mortgagor subjects them to attachment by his creditors in the state to which they were removed: Corbett v. Littlefield, 84 Mich. 30; 22 Am. St. Rep. 681, and note. The doctrine of the leading case is sustained by Kanaga v. Taylor, 7 Ohio St. 134; 70 Am. Dec. 62, and extended note.

AM. ST. REP., VOL. XXVI. — 36

BRUCE V. NICHOLSON.

[109 NORTH CAROLINA, 202.]

HUSBAND AND WIFE-ESTATE BY ENTIRETIES NOT SUBJECT TO CONVEY ance, Encumbrance, or JudgmENT LIEN. — A conveyance of land in fee to husband and wife vests the title in them by entireties with the right of survivorship; and neither can convey or encumber the estate without the assent of the other, nor can the interest of either be sold, under judgment and execution against the other, so as to pass title during their joint lives, or as against the survivor after the death of one of them.

JUDGMENT LIEN - EXTENT OF. - The lien of a judgment does not vest in the judgment creditor any estate or interest in the real property subject to it. It extends to and embraces only such estate, legal and equitable, in the real property of the judgment debtor, as he could sell or dispose of at the time it attached, and creates, and during its continuance secures, the right of the judgment creditor to have his debt paid out of the proceeds of the sale of the property.

ENTIRETIES. — JUDGMENT LIEN AGAINST HUSBAND DOES NOT EXTEND to his contingent interest in an estate held by himself and his wife by entireties. PRACTICE-PARTIES. —A junior judgment creditor is not entitled to become a party to an action to foreclose a prior mortgage, in order that he may attack it for fraud. His remedy is by separate action against the parties.

ACTION to foreclose a mortgage. The plaintiff, Bruce, was the holder of two mortgages executed by one Sugg and wife. All of the land covered by the mortgages was owned by Mrs. Sugg, except one tract which was owned by Sugg and wife under a joint deed to them. The defendants Nicholson and Sons were the judgment creditors of Sugg, and moved for leave to be made parties defendant, that their rights as judgment creditors might be protected. The motion was denied, and judgment given for plaintiff by consent of defendants Sugg and wife. Nicholson excepted and appealed.

C. M. Barnard, for the appellant.

T. F. Davidson, and Jarvis and Blow, for the respondent.

MERRIMON, C. J. The appellant's judgment is not against the feme defendant, who is the wife of her co-defendant, I. A. Sugg, nor do they seek to have her property-land - devoted to its satisfaction; it is against the defendant husband. ·

The land, except a small tract of four acres embraced by the mortgages of the plaintiffs, which they seek by this action to foreclose, is that of the feme defendant wife. The court so expressly finds and declares. The husband has no such interest in her land as is subject to levy and sale to satisfy the appellant's judgment. It does not appear that he is tenant