your loss, and must therefore decline to give the matter further consideration."

As before stated, plaintiff commenced this action on February 3, 1890, which was six months and three days after the fire occurred. It is not claimed by counsel for appellee that the limitation of time expressed in the policy for the commencement of an action for the loss sustained is invalid, and so far as we have been able to ascertain from an examination of adjudicated cases, such stipulations have been uniformly held valid and binding. But counsel contend that plaintiff could not have maintained an action against the company until August 13, 1889, at which time the company refused to pay the loss, and that the action was therefore commenced in time, although more than six months had elapsed since the happening of the fire. In other words, appellee claims that the time of limitation did not commence to run at the date of the fire, but at the time when the cause of action accrued, and that all of the provisions of the policy, taken together, warrant that construction. Numerous authorities are cited in support of appellee's contention. The decisions in these cases are based upon the assumption that the provision in the policy postponing a right of action until proof of loss is made, or until a certain number of days thereafter, is in conflict with the provision limiting the time within which an action may be commenced, and that these stipulations must therefore be harmonized by judicial construction. We cannot assent to this doctrine. The most careful reading of the provisions and stipulations in the policy now before us will fail to disclose any conflict therein. In the case at bar, every stipulation in favor of the company was waived, excepting that providing for the proof of loss. After adjustment of the loss, and the waiver of all other conditions, appellee still had five and one half months of the stipulated time remaining. No excuse or reason is given by him for his procrastination; and yet we are now called upon to sustain the action, notwithstanding the delay in bringing it until after the contract limitation had expired, upon the ground that the contract really means something different from what it says. The parties stipulated that no action upon the policy "shall be sustained unless commenced within six months after the time the fire shall have occurred"; and that "the lapse of time shall be taken and admitted as conclusive evidence" against the validity of any claim against the company. This language is certainly plain and unam

biguous. The other stipulations simply provide that no action shall be commenced until certain things therein specified shall have been done; and the evident meaning of the whole contract is, that no action shall be commenced before the doing of these things, nor, in any event, after the lapse of six months. This construction gives full force and effect to every stipulation and provision in the policy, and does violence to none. But it is urged by counsel for appellee, that inasmuch as the company has secured itself against being sued immediately on the occurrence of the loss, it must be presumed not to have been the intention of the parties to suspend the remedy, and at the same time to provide for the running of the period of limitation. We are unable to perceive, however, how any such presumption can arise without in effect substituting another and different contract for the one made by the parties. It was but natural and reasonable for the insurance company to protect itself against the cost and annoyance of an action until it could have an opportunity to investigate the circumstances attending the fire by which the loss occurred, and ascertain its liability, and determine whether to replace the property or pay the loss, or to refuse to pay it, if satisfied of the unjustness of the claim; and appellee, having consented to such a stipulation, should not now, in our opinion, be heard to object that the company thereby waived or extended the limitation of time for bringing an action. It is proper to remark, in passing, that this policy differs essentially in the provision respecting the limitation of actions from most, if not all, of those in controversy in the cases cited by appellee. In most of those cases a period of sixty days was reserved after proof of loss, before the expiration of which no action could be commenced. And in the leading case of Steen v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315, 42 Am. Rep. 297, cited by appellee, Danforth, J., says: "No doubt the appellant could have stipulated that the time of the fire should be looked to as the event from the happening of which the limitation should run, but it would require distinct language to show that such was the intention of the parties. It is not used here. It is found in Schroeder v. Keystone Ins. Co., 2 Phila. 286, one of the cases cited by the appellant."

In the policy before us we have almost identically the same "distinct language" that was used in the policy in the Schroeder case, and it is impossible to give it any different construction from the one there adopted. The following cases

also support the view we take of this question: King v. Water

en Fire Ins. Co., 47 Hun, 1; Travelers Ins. Co. v. California Ins. Co., 1 N. D. 151; Bradley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. App. 7; Johnson v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 91 Ill. 92; 33 Am. Rep. 47; Fullam v. New York etc. Ins. Co., 7 Gray, 61; 66 Am. Dec. 462; Thompson v. Phonix Ins. Co., 25 Fed. Rep. 296; Virginia etc. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736; Tasker v. Kenton Ins. Co., 58 N. H. 469.

Holding, as we are constrained to do, that the action is barred by the lapse of time, it is not necessary to examine the other objections raised by appellant. The judgment of the court below is reversed, and the action dismissed.

DUNBAR, J., delivered a dissenting opinion, of which the following is synopsis: This contract must be construed with reference to all of its provisions, and especially must this provision be construed with reference to other provisions on the same subject. The provision in the policy that the company shall not be liable after a fire occurs until an examination is made of the loss, at such time or times as the company may require, is on the same subject as is the provision relied on by the appellants. The two provisions must be construed together. The time within which proof must be made is not limited, but the time shall be at such time as the company shall require, and the law will probably construe this to be a reasonable time. But another provision gives the company sixty days more after the receipt of the proof to make up its mind whether it will rebuild or pay the money. During these sixty days additional the company cannot be sued, and if at the end of that time it concludes not to pay at all, probably half the time allowed the insured has expired. The general rule as to limitation is, that it does not begin until after the right of action accrues. The central idea of the law is, that the party shall have the right during all the time within the statute to bring his action, and if anything occurs to prevent the exercise of this right, the statute in the mean time is not running. This provision of the statute is so universally acted upon that parties may well be supposed to have contracted for a shorter limitation with reference to conditions universally surrounding and attaching to statutes of limitation. The provision limiting the right of action to six months is inserted for the special benefit of the company, and is a restriction of the legal rights of the insured. If, therefore, there are any doubts as to its proper import, they should be resolved most strongly in favor of the insured, against whom it was intended to operate: Ames v. New York W. Ins. Co., 14 N. Y. 253; Mayor etc. v. Hamilton F. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 45; 100 Am. Dec. 400; Hay v. Star Fire Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 235; 33 Am. Rep. 607; Steen v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315; 42 Am. Rep. 297; Chandler v. St. Paul etc. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85; 18 Am. Rep. 385; Killips v. Putnam Ins. Co., 28 Wis. 472; 9 Am. Rep. 506; Martin v. State Ins. Co., 44 N. J. L. 485; 43 Am. Rep. 397; Ellis v. Council Bluffs Ins. Co., 64 Iowa, 507; Vette v. Clinton F. Ins. Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 668.

It is true that in many of the cases cited the language of the provision is within so many months "after the loss shall have occurred," but those cases cannot be distinguished in principle from those where the language employed

is so many months "from the time of the fire." It is true that in Steen v. Niagara F. Ins. Co., 89 N. Y. 315, 42 Am. Rep. 297, the court undertook incidentally to distinguish the language, but the attempt was a failure, and the courts, generally, in holding in favor of the view urged by appellee, have placed their decisions squarely upon the ground that all the conditions of the policy must be construed together, and that so construing them the intention was gathered that the limitation did not begin to run from the date of the loss, but at the time when the right to sue accrued: Vetle v. Clinton F. Ins. Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 668; Spare v. Home Mut. Ins. Co., 17 Fed. Rep. 568; Chandler v. St. Paul etc. Ins. Co., 21 Minn. 85; 18 Am. Rep. 385; Mayor v. Hamilton F. Ins. Co., 39 N. Y. 45; 100 Am. Dec. 400; Ellis v. Council Bluffs Ins Co., 64 Iowa, 507; Miller v. Hartford F. Ins. Co., 70 Iowa, 704; Hay v. Star Fire Ins. Co., 77 N. Y. 235; 33 Am. Rep. 607; Barber v. Fire etc. Ins. Co., 16 W. Va. 658; 37 Am. Rep. 800; 2 May on Insurance, sec. 479; Miz v. Ins. Co., 9 Hun, 397; Killips v. Putnam Ins. Co., 28 Wis. 472; 9 Am. Rep. 506; Murdock v. Franklin Ins. Co., 33 W. Va. 407. In Friezen v. Allemania F. Ins. Co., 30 Fed. Rep. 352, the policy provided, just as this one does, that the action to recover upon the policy should be commenced within six months after the fire occurred, with similar provisions with regard to the time of payment, and the court held that these provisions should all be construed together, and the six months limitation be reckoned, not from the occurrence of the fire, but from the time the loss was due and payable. The court said: "In any other construction, the insured's right of action might be barred before it had occurred." To the same effect is Case v. Sun Ins. Co., 83 Cal. 473. Other courts have held that the letter of the limitation clause must govern, and that the period begins from the loss: Johnson v. Humboldt Ins. Co., 91 Ill. 92; 33 Am. Rep. 47; Glass v. Walker, 66 Mo. 32; Fullam v. New York etc. Ins. Co., 7 Gray, 61;66 Am. Dec. 462; Bradley v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 28 Mo. App. 7. But I think the contention of the appellee is based both on the weight of authority and right reasoning. The courts must construe the contract so as to give force to all its provisions, if possible, and make them all operative and harmonious. The parties evidently intended that the statutory time of limitation should be shortened to six months. Under that provision, standing by itself, the insured would have had six months from the date of the fire, during any time of which he could have brought his action to recover his loss. But the company, for its own protection, imposed other conditions, having indirect reference to and modifying the provisions giving the party the right to sue any time within the six months; the subsequent condition of immunity from suit for a certain time must, therefore, have been made with reference to the first provision in relation to the limitation, and this provision must not be construed relatively in favor of the interests of one party, and independently against the inter ests of the other. The provisions depend one upon the other, and must be construed together. The parties understood that the company was not to be harassed with a suit until it had had ample opportunity to adjust the loss; and that the insured was to have the benefit, not of three months, or of four months, but of six months to bring his action.

The question, as to whether or not Meesman in his application made misrepresentations in regard to the ownership of the land, was raised by the pleadings, and went to the jury, who found for the plaintiff, under instructions which correctly stated the law. It was not a question of varying a written contract by parol testimony, but simply whether the insured or the agent of the company was responsible for certain answers to certain questions in the application. One or two other points were made, of trifling importance,

but even if errors were made, they were not sufficiently important to justify a reversal of the judgment, which should, therefore, be affirmed.

The weight of authority seems to sustain the dissenting opinion in this case. In addition to the cases cited to support the doctrine that the period of limitation commences to run from the date of the loss, are the following: Raymond v. Fish, 51 Conn. 80; 50 Am. Rep. 3, and note; Travelers Ins. Co. v. California Ins. Co., I N. D. 151; Virginia etc. Ins. Co. v. Wells, 83 Va. 736.

RITCHIE V. CARPENTER.

[2 WASHINGTON, 512]

SISTER STATE JUDGMENT, RECORD OF, ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE WITHOUT CERTIFICATE OF JUDGE THAT CLERK'S ATTESTATION IS IN DUE FORM. Under the code of Washington, the records and proceedings of courts of other states are admissible in evidence in that state without the certificate of the judge that the attestation of the clerk having charge of such records is in due form, as required by the act of Congress. CLERK OF COURT PRESUMED TO BE PROPER CUSTODIAN OF ITS RECORDS.

It will be presumed, without being certified or otherwise shown, that the clerk of a court of record who has attested its record offered in evidence is the proper custodian of its records. SEAL OF COURT ATTACHED TO CLERK'S CERTIFICATE SUFFICIENT. — In attesting the record of a foreign court, it is only necessary that the seal of the court be attached to the certificate of the clerk. It need not be attached to the record.

JUDGMENT, JOURNAL ENTRY OF, NEED NOT BE SIGNED BY JUDGE. — The signature of the judge to the journal entry of a judgment offered in evidence is not necessary to make it valid. VARIANCE BETWEEN PLEADING AND PROOF IMMATERIAL WHEN. - Where a complaint on a sister state judgment describes it as rendered for costs in the sum of $19.30, and the judgment offered in evidence, though similar in other respects to the one pleaded, was rendered for costs in the sum of $18.30, the variance is immaterial, it not appearing that the defendant was misled thereby. OBJECTIONS, WHAT NOT TENABLE IN ACTION ON SISTER STATE JUDGMENT.

Where an action is brought in Washington upon a judgment of a district court of Kansas, rendered in a case originally instituted before a justice of the peace, objections that the action in Kansas was instituted and carried on without any complaint having been filed, that there was no proof that the justice of the peace had any authority to certify the case to the district court, and that he did not in fact so certify it, cannot be raised in the action in Washington.

PRESUMPTION that Court of RECORD IS COURT OF GENERAL JURISDICTION. — Where an action is brought upon a judgment of a court of record of another state, it will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that such court is a court of record; and the recitals in the record of such court of the jurisdiction acquired over the defendant's person in that proceeding are prima facie evidence thereof.

PLEAS TO JURISDICTION MUST SET UP FACTS TENDING TO SHOW WANT OF IT. Pleas to the jurisdiction must be direct and certain, and set up the facts which go to show want of it.