pregnant, but her condition was not known to the employees of the company, who so carelessly assisted her off the train that she fell and suffered a miscarriage. The defendant was held liable for this form of injury. Nor need the defendant have been able to foresee just what individual would be injured by his wrong. Thus, one who negligently allowed his horse to run away would be liable to one whom the horse struck whether he knew the person was at hand or not.18 In Burk v. Creamery Package Mfg. Co.,19 the defendant delivered to one Riedel a jug which was supposed to contain buttermilk, but which instead contained sulphuric acid. Burk asked Riedel for a drink of buttermilk, drank from the jug, and died from the poison. The defendant was held liable for the death. 8. Second exception.-When the defendant has acted criminally, particularly if the crime was one of some magnitude, or if his act, though not criminal, was consciously wrongful, the disposition of the courts is not to inquire so carefully as usual as to whether the harmful result was foreseeable or not. The proper explanation of this attitude seems to be that public policy requires here a stricter rule and the law therefore withdraws a limitation on liability which it affords when the defendant's act is merely negligent or without wrongful intent. Then, too, the wilful wrong-doer more frequently actually contemplates or is in a position where he ought to contem 18 Griggs v. Fleckenstein, 14 Minn. 81. 19 126 Iowa 730, 102 N. W. 793. plate the results of his acts, even those relatively remote, but it would be a difficult matter to prove his exact state of mind if proof had to be furnished.20 Thus, in Wyant v. Crouse,21 the defendant was held liable for the spread of a fire in a blacksmith's shop, which he lighted and cared for carefully enough, but which he started to keep himself warm after breaking into the shop. The same principle will also serve to explain some cases falling under the first exception. 9. Third exception.-Likewise, when one's act is in violation of a statute, he is often held liable for results which were not foreseeable. In Salisbury v. Herchenroder,22 an ordinance prohibited the hanging of signs across a public street. The defendant hung his sign in violation of the ordinance. It was blown down by a gale so unusual as not to be foreseeable, and, in falling, it jerked a bolt across the street through the plaintiff's window. This being the kind of a harm that the ordinance was passed to prevent, consequently the defendant was held liable. But for the violation of the ordinance, the fact that the gale was extraordinary would have relieved him from liability. Statutes occasionally state that one who violates them shall be responsible for "all damages" which shall ensue. The meaning of any given statute is a matter of construction, but the courts in such cases 20 See also §§ 27 to 30. Any doubts might well be resolved in favor of the unintentional wrong-doer and against the wilful wrong-doer. 21 127 Mich. 158, 86 N. W. 527. 22 106 Mass. 458. usually dispense with the requirement that the damage must have been foreseeable, and allow it to be recovered so long as the violation of the statute had a material part in the harmful result.23 Thus, in Eten v. Luyster the defendants pulled down a stable under summary process, but wrongfully. The statute required such a wrong-doer to pay all damages occasioned by his act. The plaintiff had placed $2,000 in cash in the feed box and this was lost. The defendants were held liable for it, although they had no intimation that the money was in the stable. 10. Fourth exception.-When the results were not such that they would ordinarily be reasonably foreseeable, yet if the defendant in the particular case did actually foresee them and desired them to happen, he is liable for them.25 A man certainly should not escape responsibility for an evil which he foresaw, which he sought to produce and did produce, on the ground that a reasonable person would not have been as far-sighted as he actually was. There are few actual decisions upon this point, but there are a number of dicta, and legal authors assert the proposition with confidence.26 11. Difficulty of stating rules. While the foregoing rules and exceptions are often applied by the courts, one who is familiar with the cases soon realizes that the multitude of odd or possible situations 23 See Davis v. Standish, 26 Hun 608 (N. Y.). 24 60 N. Y. 252. 25 Perhaps this should not be stated as an exception to the negative rule of 86, but rather as a specific application of the affirmative rule of § 5. 28 See 88 27 to 30 for fuller discussion. that arise precludes any great degree of positiveness in laying down definite rules of legal cause. Each case turns so largely on its own peculiar facts that the authorities are useful not so much to solve the general theory of legal cause, as to furnish illustrations of what in particular situations is and what is not too remote a harm for recovery.27 The fundamental difficulty is that the subject is too complex to admit of a simple solution by a few rules, but different problems require different methods of approach. A further difficulty is that the courts have not been perfectly clear in seeing this or frank in saying so. We often find a court which adopts the "probable consequence" rule, saying in another decision that the defendant is liable for all the "natural and proximate consequences" of his act, apparently without recognizing that the two tests stated approach the problem from exactly opposite points of view, and mean widely different things. 12. Same subject.-If the result is both proximate and foreseeable, or neither proximate nor foreseeable, the outcome will be the same under each rule. But when a result is (1) proximate though not foreseeable, or (2) foreseeable but not proximate, the two rules conflict and the question is, which shall be applied? In the first situation, the courts usually first apply the probable consequence rule, but when the result reached is deemed unsatisfactory, reject it unless it is confirmed by the natural and proximate rule. Whether the result be deemed satisfactory or 27 Dubuque Wood and Coal Ass'n v. Dubuque, 30 Iowa 176, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. not depends much on individual opinion and judgment, and on an intuitive legal sense. It must be admitted that there is much conflict in the authorities. While the foregoing will not reconcile the decisions, yet it serves to explain them. In the second situation the courts should apply the probable consequence rule, but the decisions are not harmonious.28 13. Natural and proximate rule.-This rule may be roughly termed the "hind-sight" rule. Instead of putting itself in the position of the wrong-doer at the time he did the wrongful act and inquiring whether he then might have foreseen the harmful result, the court puts itself in the position of the one who is harmed, viewing the injury after it has occurred, and asks whether it now appears that the result flowed from the defendant's act naturally and proximately, with no intervening factor to break the chain of causation. In other words, instead looking at the matter prospectively, the court looks at it retrospectively. In general, the word "natural" means "without unusual departure from the ordinary course of nature." To say that the defendant's act is the proximate cause means that in some way the influence of his act predominates over other influences, or at least is of equal importance in producing the result. 14. Direct results.-If the defendant's act set in motion a physical force which, before it comes to rest, produces a harmful result without any other inter 28 See §§ 27 to 30. |