Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

CHAPTER II.

TRESPASS TO THE PERSON-PHYSICAL INJURY
RESULTING FROM FRIGHT.

51

11. Enhancement of damages for fright and injured feelings in cases of personal tort.-It is universally held that, when the defendant is found guilty of a tort to the person, such as a violation of the plaintiff's right of personal security,50 or of liberty, or of reputation,52 the jury is authorized to take into account, in the assessment of damages, the injury the plaintiff has sustained on account of wounded feelings or mental anguish. Again, where the solicitation of a woman to an immoral act has amounted to more than words and assumed the character of a technical trespass, the jury may likewise take into account, in assessing the damages for the trespass, her mental distress as well as any physical illness that may have resulted from the illegal conduct of the defendant.53 And, generally, damages for an admitted tort to a person may be enhanced by proof of mental anguish and nervous shock caused by fright induced by the defendant's misconduct."

54

50 Kline v. Kline, 158 Ind. 602, 64 N. E. 9.

51 Young v. Gormley, 120 Ia. 372, 94 N. W. 922.

52 Swift v. Dickerman, 31 Conn. 285.

53 Newell v. Whitcher, 53 Vt. 589.

54 Melone v. Sierra Railway Co., 151 Cal. 113, 91 Pac. 522, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

12. Physical injury induced by fright.-Fright may be the cause of subsequent bodily ailment; and such fright may have been caused by a wilful or wanton tort or by negligence on the part of the defendant. In cases of wilful or wanton tort, it is generally agreed that there may be recovery for whatever bodily injury is traceable to the fright. In cases of negligence, some courts go to the length of denying any and all recovery for bodily injury or ailment resulting from fright. Many jurisdictions, however, differentiate the cases of bodily ailment arising from fright into those where there has been, together with the fright, a contemporaneous impact on the body, and those where there has not been such contemporaneous bodily impact. Most of such jurisdictions allow recovery for the physical injury resulting from fright where there has been a contemporaneous impact on the body, however slight the impact may be. A large number of courts refuse recovery where the bodily injury results from fright or nervous shock alone without contemporaneous impact. The grounds of decision, on which courts denying recovery for bodily injury resulting from fright alone proceed, are based on one of three theories. The first theory goes on the principle that because there can be no recovery for mere fright, there can be no recovery for the consequences of fright. The second theory is that physical injury resulting from fright caused by the negligence of the defendant is not the proximate result of the act of negligence. The third theory holds that recovery must be de

nied for bodily injury resulting from fright on grounds of expediency, or public policy, because of the danger of encouraging fictitious or speculative claims.

13. Same subject-Where the fright results from a wilful or wanton tort.-It is usually conceded that there is a right to recover damages for physical injury which has resulted from fright, where the fright was caused by the wilful and deliberate tort of the defendant, or where, as in practical jokes, the defendant's acts are brought under the same head of liability. Thus, where the plaintiff, due to an assault that involved no direct physical hurt, became the victim of maniacal insanity, with illusions and hallucinations, resulting solely from the fright induced by the assault, she was allowed to recover damages.55 A trespasser was held liable who entered the house of a woman in her husband's absence, and flourished a whip at her and addressed her with threats and abusive language, causing fright which brought on illness and miscarriage.56 One who stealthily entered a woman's house in the nighttime, thereby committing a trespass on the husband's property, was held liable in damages to the woman for the nervous prostration which was the consequence of the fright given to her.57 The defendant, as a practical joke, represented to a woman that her husband had lost both legs in a railway accident. She suffered a violent shock to her ner

55 Williams v. Underhill, 71 N. Y. Supp. 291.
56 Brownback v. Frailey, 78 Ill. App. 262.
57 Watson v. Dilts, 116 Iowa 249, 89 N. W. 1068.

vous system, entailing weeks of illness and suffering. She was held entitled to recover damages on the theory that the defendant was guilty as of a wilful tort.5

58

14. Same subject-Where the fright results from negligence, together with impact on the body. It is the general view of the courts that if there is any impact on the body of the plaintiff, however slight, he may recover for physical injuries, even though they result from the fright which he suffered at the time of the impact, rather than from the bodily impact itself. Thus, a passenger in a railway collision is thrown against a seat, and, although not hurt by the impact, is allowed to recover for nervous shock ending in paralysis.59 A woman is struck on the temple by an incandescent lamp globe, causing nothing more than a slight bruise. She is allowed to recover damages for a miscarriage which results from the fright and shock received at the time of the blow.60 The situation is held to be a case of bodily impact sufficient to maintain an action, where a man is thrown out of a wagon, or is compelled to jump out, even though no external evidence of injury is found, and the only harm done consists of a nervous shock caused by fright. A railway bridge fell as the plaintiff was passing under it. The court held that no recovery could be had for injuries due

61

58 Wilkinson v. Downton, L. R. (1897) 2 Q. B. 57 (Eng.). See also Green v. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 Atl. 688, LEADING ILLUstrative Cases. 59 Homans v. Boston El. R. Co., 180 Mass. 456, 62 N. E. 737.

60 Jones v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 48 N. Y. Supp. 914.

61 Warren v. Boston & M. R. Co., 163 Mass. 484, 40 N. E. 895; Armour & Co. v. Kollmeyer, 161 Fed. 78.

to fright alone, but that, if she received any direct physical injuries, as by being hit on the neck by something, or if dust from the falling debris went into her eyes, all the resultant effects to her system due to the accident are recoverable."

62

15. Same subject—Where the fright results from negligence, without impact on the body.—(1) Grounds for allowing recovery. In discussing the subject of liability for physical illness induced by fright resulting from negligence without bodily impact, we meet with conflict in the authorities. Some jurisdictions hold that recovery may be had for illness, nervous derangement, or physical pain, resulting directly from fright or mental anguish caused by the defendant's wrongdoing. This is subject to the proviso, "that the defendant would have been liable, had his misconduct caused the derangement, sickness or pain, without the intervention of the fright or mental disturbance. In order to bring a case within the foregoing proviso, the plaintiff must show, not only that defendant's conduct was wrongful towards some one, but that it was a breach of duty owing to him by the defendant."64

63

In the English case of Dulieu v. White, just cited, Kennedy, J., says: "First of all, it is argued, fright caused by negligence is not in itself a cause of action, -ergo, none of its consequences can give a cause of action. With all respect to the learned

*

62 Porter v. Delaware L. & W. R. Co., 73 N. J. L. 405, 63 Atl. 860. 63 Dulieu v. White & Sons, (1901) 2 K. B. 669 (Eng.); Green v. Shoemaker & Co., 111 Md. 69, 73 Atl. 688, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES.

64 Burdick, Tort Liability for Mental Disturbance and Nervous Shock, 5 Columbia Law Review 179.

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »