antiquity. The first Statute of Laborers (23 Edw. III, c. 2), of the year 1349, made it a criminal offense for a servant to leave his service before the end of his term, or for any person to receive or keep a servant who had so left. The courts, after the passage of this act, took the statute as founding a right in the master and gave an action for knowingly enticing servants away from their employment and for knowingly harboring servants who had left their employment." This statute was repealed in 1563, but the class of civil actions which had arisen under it had become firmly established and was not disturbed when the statute itself was repealed. It has been settled law, then, for centuries, that a third person who wilfully and knowingly entices a servant from his employment is liable in damages to the master or employer.18

17 See the opinion of Coleridge, J., in Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216 (Eng.), 75 E. C. L. 216, for a full discussion of the older authorities. 18 Hart v. Aldridge, Cowper 54 (Eng.); Gunter v. Astor, 4 J. B. Moore 12 (Eng.); Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216 (Eng.), 75 E. C. L. 216, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES; Jones & Peter v. Blocker, 43 Ga. 331; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1; Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N. H. 456, 22 Am. Rep. 475; Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601, 16 Am. Rep. 780.

CHAPTER II.

INTERFERENCE WITH CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS.

7. The right to non-interference with contractual relations-The case of Lumley v. Gye.—It is the settled law in England and in most jurisdictions in the United States that the relation established by a contract between two persons gives rise to a legal right as against all the world, and that the invasion of such right by a stranger to the relation renders him liable for damage resulting from his interference. The leading case is Lumley v. Gye,1o decided by the Court of Queen's Bench in 1853. The plaintiff, as manager of a theatre, had contracted with an opera singer to sing during a certain period in the plaintiff's theatre and nowhere else. The defendant, a rival theatrical manager, knowing of the existence of this contract, and, as the declaration alleged, "maliciously intending to injure the plaintiff," enticed and procured the opera singer to leave the plaintiff's employment. It was held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover. Coleridge, J., dissented, taking the view that interference with service or contract was confined by the law of England to cases of apprentices and menial servants. The majority, while holding that the right extended at least to all cases of personal service, and that the case of the opera singer fell within this category, intimated that

19 2 El. & Bl. 216 (Eng.), 75 E. C. L. 216, LEADING Illustrative Cases.

the principle involved extended to all cases of interference with contractual relations of whatever kind. The broader doctrine suggested in Lumley v. Gye was explicitly accepted by the Court of Appeal in 1881, in the case of Bowen v. Hall,20 and confirmed and placed beyond all doubt, in 1901, in the case of Quinn v. Leathem,21 wherein Lord Macnaghten said: "I have no hesitation in saying that I think the decision [in Lumley v. Gye] was right the ground that a violation of legal right committed knowingly is a cause of action, and that it is a violation of legal right to interfere with contractual relations recognized by law, if there be no sufficient justification for the interference.'

* * *

on

8. Kinds of contracts included.-The doctrine of Lumley v. Gye is generally followed in America. Under this doctrine an employer whose employees have been induced by a third person to break their contract of employment, may maintain an action against such third person.22 An employee, likewise, has a right of action against a third person who maliciously procures his discharge or the breach of his contract of employment.23 And not merely con

20 6 Q. B. D. 333 (Eng.).

21 (1901) A. C. 495 (Eng.).

22 Employing Printers' Club v. Doctor Blosser Co., 122 Ga. 509, 50 S. E. 353; Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N. E. 924; Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Johnston Harvester Co. v. Meinhardt, 9 Abb. New Cas. 393 (N. Y.); Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601, 16 Am. Rep. 780; McCutchin v. Taylor, 11 Lea 259 (Tenn.); J. S. Brown Hardware Co. v. Indiana Stove Works, 96 Tex. 453, 73 S. W. 800.

23 London Guarantee & Accident Co. v. Horn, 206 Ill. 493, 69 N. E. 526; Hollenbeck v. Ristine, 114 Iowa 358, 86 N. W. 377; Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 934; Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 166, 38 Atl. 96; Lucke v. Clothing Cutters' and Trimmers' Assembly, 77 Md. 396, 26 Atl. 505;

tracts of employment, but contracts of a wide variety have been held to come within the protection of the rule under consideration.24 Some jurisdictions adopt generally the line of argument of Coleridge, J., in Lumley v. Gye, and restrict the rule giving an action for inducing a breach of contract to contracts for personal service between master and servant.25 But it is universally agreed, even in the jurisdictions of narrowest construction, that the party injured may have a right of action, whatever the contract, in cases where the breach is procured by fraud, deceit, Moran v. Dunphy, 177 Mass. 485, 59 N. E. 125; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603; Holder v. Cannon Mfg. Co., 135 N. C. 392, 47 S. E. 481.

24 The following are some of the instances of contracts that have been held to come within the rule: Temperton v. Russell, (1893) 1 Q. B. 715 (Eng.), (contract to supply building materials); Angle v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co., 151 U. S. 1, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES (contract for construction of railroad); Nashville, etc., R. Co. v. McConnell, 82 Fed. 65 (contract with carrier of passengers); Heath v. American Book Co., 97 Fed. 533 (contract by state for purchase of school books); Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N. E. 924 (contract between laundry agent and laundries); Morehouse v. Terrill, 111 Ill. App. 460 (contract for purchase of farm); Jackson v. Stanfield, 137 Ind. 592, 36 N. E. 345 (contract for sale of goods); Beekman v. Marsters, 195 Mass. 205, 80 N. E. 817 (contract as hotel agent); Morgan v. Andrews, 107 Mich. 33, 64 N. W. 869 (contract for construction of machine); Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881 (contracts of advertisers with newspapers); Mealey v. Bemidji Lumber Co., 118 Minn. 427, 136 N. W. 1090 (contract to cut, haul and bank logs); Schonwald v. Ragains, 32 Okl. 223, 122 Pac. 203 (contracts to purchase ice); Rice v. Manley, 66 N. Y. 82 (contract for purchase of goods); Jones v. Stanly, 76 N. C. 355 (contract for transportation of goods); Raymond v. Yarrington, 96 Tex. 443, 73 S. W. 800 (agency for sale of goods); West Virginia Transportation Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 50 W. Va. 611, 40 S. E. 591 (contract for transportation of oil by pipe line); Martens v. Reilly, 109 Wis. 464, 84 N. W. 840 (lease of real property).

25 Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 592; Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121, 15 S. W. 57; Bourlier v. McCauley, 91 Ky. 135, 15 S. W. 60; Kline v. Eubanks, 109 La. 241, 33 So. 211; Wolf and Sons v. New Orleans Tailor Made Pants Co., 113 La. 388, 37 So. 2; Heywood v. Tillson, 75 Me. 225, 46 Am. Rep. 373; Glencoe Land & Gravel Co. v. Hudson Bros. Commission Co., 138 Mo. 439, 40 S. W. 93; McCann v. Wolff, 28 Mo. App. 447.

slander, nuisance, or other wrong actionable in itself.26

9. The meaning of "malice."-The declaration in Lumley v. Gye alleged that the wrong complained of was done maliciously. Lord Herschell in the case of Allen v. Flood,27 said: "A study of the case of Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 75 E. C. L. 216, has satisfied me that in that case the majority of the court regarded the circumstance that what the defendant procured was a breach of contract as the essence of the cause of action. It is true that the word 'maliciously' was to be found in the declaration, the validity of which was then under consideration; but I do not think that the learned judges regarded the allegation as involving the necessity of proving an evil motive on the part of the defendant, but merely as implying that the defendant had wilfully and knowingly procured a breach of contract." There is some variety of opinion as to the sense in which malice should be taken, and considerable confusion of mind on the subject, but in general it comes down to what is believed to be the better view, namely, that malice means intentional interference with a contractual relation without legal justification.28

10. Damages recoverable. On the question, whether actual damage must be shown before a

28 Boyson v. Thorn, 98 Cal. 578, 33 Pac. 592; Chambers v. Baldwin, 91 Ky. 121, 15 S. W. 57; Perkins v. Pendleton, 90 Me. 166, 38 Atl. 96; Raycroft v. Tayntor, 68 Vt. 219, 35 Atl. 53.

27 (1898) A. C. 1 (Eng.), at p. 121.

28 Walker v. Cronin, 107 Mass. 555; Berry v. Donovan, 188 Mass. 353, 74 N. E. 603; Haskins v. Royster, 70 N. C. 601, 16 Am. Rep. 780; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881.