recovery can be had for interference with a relation arising from contract, some cases hold that it is necessary to show that special damage has resulted from such interference; 29 while there are other cases that hold that the fact that actual damage may not be ascertainable does not defeat the right to recover at least nominal damages.30 29 Bowen v. Hall, 6 Q. B. D. 333 (Eng); Temperton v. Russell, (1893) 1 Q. B. 715 (Eng.); Passaic Print Works v. Ely & Walker Dry Goods Co., 105 Fed. 163. 30 Chipley v. Atkinson, 23 Fla. 206, 1 So. 934. CHAPTER III. INTERFERENCE WITH BUSINESS OR EMPLOYMENT. 11. General ground for immunity from interference with business or employment.-Rules of law, but newly formulated, governing the right of a person not to be interfered with in the exercise of his trade or business or in the disposal of his labor, would seem to be merely instances of the principle which has been thus stated: "At common law there was a cause of action whenever one person did damage to another wilfully and intentionally, and without just cause or excuse." The same doctrine has been expressed in these words: "It has been considered that, prima facie, the intentional infliction of temporal harm is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substantive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justification if the defendant is to escape. 9932 12. Right of non-interference formulated.-Applying these principles to the matter under consideration we are justified in stating as an accepted legal doctrine that intentional interference with rights of business or employment is prima facie a tort and that, unless justification be shown, an action will lie. It should be clearly understood from the outset, that we are here dealing with relative rights, 31 Bowen, L. J., in Skinner v. Shew (1893), 1 Ch. 413 (Eng.). 32 Holmes, J., in Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U. S. 194. not with absolute rights; that regard for the rights of one side must be met by regard for the rights of the other side; that in every controversy there are, for example, the right of the plaintiffs to be protected, let us say, in the exercise of their trade, the right of the defendants to carry on their business or to dispose of their labor, and with it all the right of the rest of the community to have their peace and comfort, the social and industrial order, preserved. 13. Authoritative statements of the character of the right."Every person has a right under the law, as between himself and his fellow-subjects, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor or his own capital according to his own will. It follows that every other person is subject to the correlative duty arising therefrom, and is prohibited from any obstruction to the fullest exercise of this right which can be made compatible with the exercise of similar rights by others." 33 "I think the right to employ their labor as they will is a right both recognized by the law and sufficiently guarded by its provisions to make any undue interference with that right an actionable wrong. 1934 "He that hinders another in his trade or livelihood is liable to an action for so hindering him.” 35 14. Same subject. "It seems a rather fine distinction to say that, where a defendant maliciously induces a person not to carry out a contract already made with the plaintiff and so injures the plaintiff, 33 Erle, Law Relating to Trade Unions, p. 12. 34 Halsbury, L. C., in Allen v. Flood (1898), A. C. 1 (Eng.). 35 Holt, C. J., in Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East 575 (Eng.). it is actionable, but where he injures the plaintiff by maliciously preventing a person from entering into a contract with the plaintiff, which he would otherwise have entered into, it is not actionable." 36 "Every man has a right under the law, as between himself and others, to full freedom in disposing of his own labor or capital according to his own will, and any one who invades that right without lawful cause or justification commits a legal wrong, and, if followed by an injury caused in consequence thereof, the one whose right is thus invaded has a legal ground of action for such wrong. 937 The underlying right in this particular case under consideration, which seems to be coming into general recognition as the subject of protection by courts of equity, through the instrumentality of an injunction, appears to be the right to enjoy a certain free and natural condition of the labor market, which, in a recent case in the House of Lords, was referred to, in the language of Lord Ellenborough, as a 'probable expectancy.' 999 38 15. Questions involved. The first question, where complaint is made of an alleged interference with business or employment, is whether the interference was legally a wrong, whether, among the several competing rights, there was such undue interference with the plaintiff's rights as to give him a prima facie ground of action. If this question be decided in the affirmative, the next question is whether there 36 Lord Esher, M. R., in Temperton v. Russell, (1893) 1 Q. B. 715 (Eng.). 37 Doremus v. Hennessy, 176 Ill. 608, 52 N. E. 924. 38 See, for an illuminating discussion, the fuller statement by Stevenson, V. C., in Jersey City Printing Co. v. Cassidy, 63 N. J. Eq. 759, 53 Atl. 230, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. was legal justification. There are still two other questions that are frequently involved and serve greatly to complicate the solution of the problem. These are, first, the question of malice, and, second, the question of conspiracy or combination. 16. Justification. "The theory of justification consists in a proper adjustment and compromise between the two competing rights that are equally protected in law. It has been already observed that the enjoyment by a particular individual of the right of freedom, as to how he should bestow his capital and labor, is not absolute, but qualified by the existence of equal rights in the other members, to such an extent as to be made compatible with an equally free enjoyment of these rights by the rest of the community. In fact, every case of justification reduces itself to the question, how far the rights of an individual can be so circumscribed in accordance with a general law of freedom, as to leave an equal scope for the free enjoyment of the competing rights of his fellow men. Let us take, for instance, the ordinary case of two rival traders, bidding against each other for the custom of the country. It is clear, what is gain to one is loss to the other. Both are equally protected in the enjoyment of the right of freedom to dispose of their capital and labor in the way they may think best. If, in the course of this competition, one of them is put out of the field, he is purposely made to suffer damage by the other. The inquiry, which we are now concerned with, is to find out the principle which should determine the limit of the rights of the rival competitors, and the |