class of dealers it saw fit to name. The two things are not the same, but antagonistic." 36. Same subject-Martell v. White.-A wisely judicious view is expressed by Mr. Justice Hammond on the question whether combination tends to make competition unfair: "Nothing need be said in support of the general right to compete. To what extent combination may be allowed in competition is a matter about which there is as yet much conflict, but it is possible that in a more advanced stage of the discussion, the day may come when it will be more clearly seen and will more distinctly appear in the adjudications of the courts than as yet has been the case, that the proposition that what one man lawfully can do, any number of men, acting together by combined agreement, lawfully may do, is to be received with newly disclosed qualifications arising out of the changed conditions of civilized life and of the increased facility and power of organized combination, and that the difference between the power of individuals acting each according to his preference, and that of an organized and extensive combination, may be so great in its effect upon public and private interests as to cease to be one of degree and to reach the dignity of a difference in kind."' 64 37. Strikes-Definition.-There is more or less diversity in the definitions given to a strike, according as the person defining lays stress upon the one or the other of the two elements that go to make up the definition. These elements are, first, a ceasing from work, but not from employment; and, second, 64 Martell v. White, 185 Mass. 255, 69 N. E. 1085. 'compulsion to extort from the employers the concession desired. The definition in Worcester's Dictionary is: "To cease from work in order to extort higher wages as workmen"; in Webster's Dictionary: "To quit work in a body, or by combination, in order to compel their employers to raise their wages"; in Bouvier's Law Dictionary: "A combined effort of workmen to obtain higher wages or other concessions from their employers by stopping work at a preconcerted time"; in Black's Law Dictionary: "The act of a party of workmen employed by the same master, in stopping work all together at a preconcerted time, and refusing to continue, until higher wages or shorter time or some other concession is granted to them by the employer." 38. Same subject-Legality of strikes.-Laborers have a conceded right to organize as labor unions to promote their common welfare. From this it is likewise conceded that they have, as a union, the right to strike. But is also generally held that some strikes by employees may be illegal. "If it be true that workingmen may combine with a view, among other things, to getting as much as they can for their labor, just as capital may combine with a view to getting the greatest possible return, it must be true that when combined, they have the same liberty that combined capital has, to support their interests by argument, persuasion, and the bestowal or refusal of those advantages which they otherwise lawfully control." 65"Workingmen have the right to organize for the purpose of securing higher wages, shorter 65 Holmes, J., in Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 44 N. E. 1077. hours of labor, or improving their relations with their employers. They have the right to strike (that is, to cease working in a body by prearrangement until a grievance is redressed), provided the object is not to gratify malice, or inflict injury upon others, but to secure better terms of employment for themselves. A peaceable and orderly strike, not to harm others, but to improve their own condition, is not a violation of law." 66 39. Same subject-Legality of purpose of strike a question of law. The legality of a strike depends upon the purpose for which the combination is formed, or, the purpose for which the employees strike. And the determination of the question whether the purpose for which a strike is called is a justification, is, it is held, a question of law for the court to decide. "To justify interference with the rights of others, the strikers must in good faith strike for a purpose which the court decides to be a legal justification for such interference. To make a strike a legal strike it is necessary that the strikers should have acted in good faith in striking for a purpose which the court holds to have been a legal purpose for a strike, but it is not necessary that they should have been in the right in instituting a strike for that purpose. On the other hand, a strike is not a strike for a legal purpose because the strikers struck in good faith for a purpose which they thought was a sufficient justification for a strike. 66 Vann, J., in National Protective Association v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369; Minasian v. Osborne, 210 Mass. 250, 96 N. E. 1036, LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES. As we have already said, to make a strike a legal strike the purpose of the strike must be one which the court as matter of law decides is a legal purpose of a strike, and the strikers must have acted in good faith in striking for such a purpose. 9967 40. Same subject-The sympathetic strike.—A so-called sympathetic strike has been described as "a strike not to forward the common interests of the strikers, but to forward the interests of an individual employee in respect to a grievance between him and his employer where no contract of employment exists."68 The strike in this case was against the open shop, and it was construed by the majority of the court to be in the nature of a sympathetic strike, unjustifiable, and relief was given to the employers against the strikers. The case of Pickett v. Walsh 69 embraced both the direct strike and the sympathetic strike. It involved no controversy between the employers and employees, but arose out of an internal conflict within the ranks of labor itself. In this case persons engaged in the trade of brick pointing were denied relief against a strike by bricklayers for the purpose of themselves obtaining such work of pointing; but they were allowed relief against a strike by bricklayers employed by an employer with whom the bricklayers had no dispute, the purpose of the latter, or sympathetic, strike being to force the employer to force 67 DeMinico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N. E. 317. 68 Reynolds v. Davis, 198 Mass. 294, 84 N. E. 457. Mr. Justice Knowlton dissented, because from his view of the facts he did not consider that there was here a "purely sympathetic strike." 69 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753. the other employer to yield to the demand of his employees. The court decided: "Organized labor's right to coercion and compulsion is limited to strikes against persons with whom the organization has a trade dispute, or, to put it in another way, we are of opinion that a strike against A, with whom the strikers have no trade dispute, to compel A to force B to yield to the strikers' demands, is an unjustifiable interference with the right of A to pursue his calling as he thinks best." 41. Same subject-Illegal accompaniments of strikes. It may be taken as an accepted rule of law that the simple strike is legal. It is seldom, however, that a strike case comes before a court which is not attended by other factors, such as boycotting, picketing, disorder, or intimidation. Indeed, a strike rarely seems capable of effecting its purpose unless it is accompanied by the very elements that will expose it to the censure of the law. A lawful weapon is very readily converted into an unlawful one. 42. Boycott-Definition.-The term boycott is of very recent origin, dating back only to about the year 1880. Definitions which have been given to it are deduced largely from its practical workings. We here state several of such definitions.. "A combination to harm one person by coercing others to harm him."71 "A combination of many to cause a loss to one person by coercing others, against their 70 The history of the term boycott may be found in State v. Glidden, 55 Conn. 46, 8 Atl. 890, and in Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620. 71 American Federation of Labor v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 33 App. Cas. (D. C.) 83. |