will, to withdraw from him their beneficial business intercourse, through threats that, unless those others do so, the many will cause similar loss to them.' "A combination to injure or destroy the trade, business or occupation of another, by threatening injury to the trade, business, or occupation of those who have business relations with him."'73 "The exclusion of the employer from all communication with former customers and material men by threats of similar exclusion to the latter if dealings are continued. "' 74 "A combination to cause loss to one person by coercing others against their will, to withdraw from him their beneficial business intercourse, by threats that unless these others do so, the combination will cause similar loss to them, or by the use of such means as the infliction of bodily harm on them, or such intimidation as will put them in fear of bodily harm.” 75

43. Same subject-Primary boycott.-For the purposes of clear understanding, we should distinguish between a boycott as defined above and what has sometimes been called a "primary boycott." We meet with the situation of a primary boycott, when the members of a union, acting by agreement among themselves and for their common interest, cease to patronize a person against whom the concert of action is directed. Such action is regarded as en

72 Toledo, etc., R. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed. 730.

73 Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo. 421, 114 S. W. 997.

74 Moores v. Bricklayers' Union, 10 Oh. Dec. (Reprint) 665, 23 Oh. W. L. B. 48.

75 Martin, The Modern Law of Labor Unions, p. 103.

76 Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324, should be studied carefully in this connection.

tirely lawful. Labor organizations, it is said, have a right to withhold patronage from one who does not give fair compensation for labor." A combination between persons merely to regulate their own conduct and affairs is held a lawful combination, even though others may be indirectly affected thereby.78 If an employer of labor refuses to employ union men, the union may say that its members will not patronize him. There is, then, a close analogy between the so-called primary boycott and the justifiable strike. In the former, patronage is withheld for the purpose of effecting the object of the combination, while in the latter labor is similarly withheld to accomplish the desired end.

79

44. Same subject-Methods pursued in boycotts. -In the so-called primary boycott the dispute is confined to two parties, the combination and the person against whom the boycott is directed. In the boycott, or boycott proper, or what is sometimes called the "secondary boycott," 80 the object of the combination is to coerce a third party, who has no interest in the dispute, by threats of injury to him, in order to compel the person against whom the combination is directed to accede to its demands. The usual methods adopted in such a boycott against an employer of labor are: First, coercing workmen to quit his employment, or not to enter his employment, in order to deprive him of the labor that is essential for the conduct of his business. Second, the coercing

77 People v. Radt, 71 N. Y. Supp. 846.

78 Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663.

79 Casey v. Cincinnati Typographical Union, 45 Fed. 135.

so Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324.

of his customers, actual or prospective, to withhold their patronage. Third, the coercing of dealers in materials or products, necessary to a person's business, not to sell to him.81

45. Same subject-Coercing workmen not to work.-A combination to injure a person's business by preventing workmen in his service from continuing to work for him, or by preventing workmen not in his service but willing to accept employment from him from doing so, by the use of force, violence, or intimidation, is an actionable wrong.82 Intimidation is regarded as unlawful as violence, and wherever the circumstances are such as to carry a threatening intimation for the purpose of preventing laborers from working, intimidation will be found.83

46. Same subject-Coercing customers to withhold patronage.-A combination of workmen formed for the purpose of coercing the customers, actual or prospective, of a person against whom the combination is directed, to withhold their patronage from him, is generally held to be an unlawful conspiracy. The coercion may take the form of threatening the customers that, if they do not join in the boycott, their business will be injured by loss of patronage to them. This threat may be merely that the patronage at the disposal of members of the combination will be withdrawn from such customers, or the threat

81 Martin, The Modern Law of Labor Unions, p. 111.

82 Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324; My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13; Reinecke Coal Min. Co. v. Wood, 112 Fed. 477.

83 George Jonas Glass Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n, 72 N. J. Eq. 653, 66 Atl. 953; Allis-Chalmers Co. v. Iron Molders' Union, 150 Fed. 155.

may be that like coercion will be brought to bear on persons not in the combination to have them withhold their patronage from such customers. The great weight of authority holds that all such boycotts are unlawful. The principle underlying these decisions is that organized labor's right of coercion by strikes and boycotts is limited to strikes and boycotts against those with whom the combination has a trade dispute.84 There are, however, a few strongly expressed opinions, which take a different position. According to these views, a combination of workmen having a trade dispute with their employer may not only boycott him, but may threaten others that if they do not also boycott him, by withholding their patronage, they will in turn be boycotted. A few decisions hold that even such secondary boycotts may be legal.85

47 Same subject-Coercing material men not to sell to boycotted person.-Where a combination, having declared a boycott against a certain person, threatens to cause strikes against persons dealing in materials, or to boycott them, if they sell their materials to the boycotted person, such combination, it is held, is liable for an actionable wrong. The English case of Temperton v. Russell 86 and the Ohio

84 Wilson v. Hey, 232 Ill. 389, 83 N. E. 928; My Maryland Lodge v. Adt, 100 Md. 238, 59 Atl. 721; Beck v. Railway Teamsters' Union, 118 Mich. 497, 77 N. W. 13; Gray v. Building Trades Council, 91 Minn. 171, 97 N. W. 663; Barr v. Essex Trades Council, 53 N. J. Eq. 101, 30 Atl. 881; Crump v. Commonwealth, 84 Va. 927, 6 S. E. 620; Rocky Mountain Bell Telephone Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 156 Fed. 809.

85 Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal. 70, 103 Pac. 324; on this point consult also Lindsay & Co. v. Montana Federation of Labor, 37 Mont. 264, 96 Pac. 127.

8G (1893) 1 Q. B. 715 (Eng.).

case of Moores v. Bricklayers' Union 7 are cases in point. In the Ohio case a labor union became involved in a trade dispute with one Parker, and declared a boycott against him. In order to bring Parker to terms, the union notified material men that any one selling to him would in turn be boycotted. Moores, the plaintiff, persisted in selling to Parker. Thereupon the union notified all plaintiff's customers and probable customers that none of its members would work Moores' material. The effect was to interfere seriously with plaintiff's business. Taft, J., said: "The dealings between Parker Bros. and their material men, or between such material men and their customers, had not the remotest natural connection, either with defendants' wages or their other terms of employment. There was no competition or possible contractual relation between plaintiffs and defendants, where their interests were naturally opposed. The right of the plaintiffs to sell their material was not one which, in its exercise, brought them into legitimate conflict with the right of defendants to dispose of their labor as they chose. The conflict was brought about by the effort of defendants to use plaintiffs' right of trade to injure Parker Bros., and upon failure of this, to use plaintiffs' customers' right of trade to injure plaintiffs. Such effort cannot be in the bona fide exercise of trade, is without just cause, and is, therefore, malicious."

48. Picketing-Definition-Legality.-While the majority of courts take the view that picketing is

87 10 Oh. Dec. (Reprint) 665, 23 Oh. W. L. B. 48.