blame lights upon the first thrower; the new direction and new force flow out of the first force. He laid it down as a principle, that every one who does an unlawful act is considered as the doer of all that follows. A person breaking a horse in Lincolns-Inn-Fields, hurt a man, and it was held that trespass would lie. In Leame v. Bray, 3 East Rep. 595, Lord Ellenborough said, "If I put in motion a dangerous thing, as if I let loose a dangerous animal, and leave to hazard what may happen, and mischief ensue, I am answerable in trespass;" and if one (he says) put an animal or carriage in motion, which causes an immediate injury to another, he is the actor, the causa causans. I will not say that ascending in a balloon is an unlawful act, for it is not so; but, it is certain, that the aeronaut has no control over its motion horizontally; he is at the sport of the winds, and is to descend when and how he can; his reaching the earth is a matter of hazard. He did descend on the premises of the plaintiff below, at a short distance from the place where he ascended. Now, if his descent, under such circumstances, would, ordinarily and naturally, draw a crowd of people about him, either from curiosity, or for the purpose of rescuing him from a perilous situation, all this he ought to have foreseen, and must be responsible for. Whether the crowd heard him call for help or not is immaterial; he had put himself in a situation to invite help, and they rushed forward, impelled, perhaps, by the double motive of rendering aid, and gratifying a curiosity which he had excited. Can it be doubted, that if the plaintiff in error had beckoned to the crowd to come to his assistance, that he would be liable for their trespass in entering the enclosure? I think not. In that case, they would have been co-trespassers, and we must consider the situation in which he placed himself, voluntarily and designedly, as equivalent to a direct request to the crowd to follow him. In the present case, he did call for help, and may have been heard by the crowd; he is, therefore, undoubtedly, liable for all the injury sustained. Judgment affirmed. CHAPTER II. NEGLIGENCE. Legal Duty. BLACK v. NEW YORK, N. H. & H. R. R. CO. 193 Mass. 448, 79 N. E. 797. 1907. [Black took the 9:23 p. m. train in Boston for Ashmont. He was in an intoxicated condition. On arrival at Ashmont, the conductor and brakeman took him off the car and led him to steps by which the walk was reached. There was evidence that they tried to stand him up, but his legs would sink from under him. They carried him to the steps and up as far as the sixth step of a flight of eleven, and then left him. He balanced himself there a minute and then fell backward, turning a somersault and striking on the back of his head. There was a railing to the steps but Black did not have hold of it. Action for personal injuries.] KNOWLTON, J. On this testimony the jury might find that the plaintiff was so intoxicated as to be incapable of standing or walking, or caring for himself in any way, and that the defendant's servants, knowing his condition, left him near the top of the steps, where they knew, or ought to have known, that he was in great danger of falling and being seriously injured. They were under no obligation to remove him from the car, or to provide for his safety after he left the car. But they voluntarily undertook to help him from the car, and they were bound to use ordinary care in what they did that might affect his safety. Not only in the act of removal, but in the place where they left him, it was their duty to have reasonable regard for his safety in view of his manifest condition. The jury might have found that they were negligent in leaving him on the steps where a fall would be likely to do him much harm. Moody v. Boston & Maine R. R., 189 Mass. 277, 75 N. E. 631. The defense rests principally upon the fact that the plaintiff was intoxicated, and was incapable of caring for himself after he was taken from the train, and therefore was not in the exercise of due care. If his voluntary intoxication was a direct and proximate cause of the injury, he cannot recover. The plaintiff contends that it was not a cause, but a mere condition, well known to the defendant's servants, and that their act was the direct and proximate cause of the injury, with which no other act or omission had any causal connection. The distinction here referred to is well recognized in law. Negligence of a plaintiff at the time of an injury caused by the negligence of another is no bar to his recovery from the other, unless it was a direct, contributing cause to the injury, as distinguished from a mere condition, in the absence of which the injury would not have occurred. ** The rule applies, in like manner, where the plaintiff's act is illegal as distinguished from negligent, so that the defendant's liability is only for wanton and reckless conduct to the plaintiff's injury. McKeon v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co., 183 Mass. 271, 67 N. E. 329, 97 Am. St. Rep. 437; Palmer v. Gordon, 173 Mass. 410, 53 N. E. 909, 73 Am. St. Rep. 302; Lovett v. Salem, etc., R. R. Co., 9 Allen, 557-563. In this latter class of cases, where the negligence is wanton and reckless to such a degree as to be in its nature a willful wrong, it is held that, although the plaintiff makes an averment of due care on his part, this means only due care in reference to the direct and proximate cause of the injury, and, such a gross wrong of the defendant being shown to be the cause, it prima facie so far excludes participation in it by the plaintiff, as to relieve him from the necessity of offering affirmative evidence of his care. Aiken v. Holyoke St. Ry. Co., 184 Mass. 269, 68 N. E. 238; Bjornquist v. Boston & Albany R. R. Co., 185 Mass. 130, 70 N. E. 53, 102 Am. St. Rep. 332; Banks v. Braman, 188 Mass. 367, 74 N. E. 594. The fundamental principle is the same in both classes of cases. It is that the plaintiff's condition, resulting from his prior negligence or wrong, is not a direct and proximate cause of the latter injury, inflicted by one who acts independently, with knowledge of this condition and in reference to it. The principle has been generally recognized, both in England and America. Davies v. Mann, 10 M. & W. 545; Radley v. London & N. W. Railway Co., L. R. 1 App. Cas. 754. The rule has often been applied in favor of plaintiffs whose intoxication prevented them from using care to protect themselves from the consequences of a subsequent act of negligence of another person, done with knowledge of their intoxication. The application of this rule sometimes gives rise to difficult questions. But in this connection the doctrine has been established that, when the plaintiff's negligence or wrongdoing has placed his person or property in a dangerous situation which is beyond his immediate control, and the defendant, having full knowledge of the dangerous situation, and full opportunity, by the exercise of reasonable care, to avoid any injury, nevertheless causes an injury, he is liable for the injury. This is because the plaintiff's former negligence is only remotely connected with the accident, while the defendant's conduct is the sole, direct and proximate cause of it. The question that we have been discussing was not considered in Holland v. West End St. Ry. Co., 155 Mass. 387, 29 N. E. 622. It does not appear that there was evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant in that case, or that anything was done in reference to the plaintiff with knowledge of his intoxication. * We are of opinion that the jury in the present case might have found that the plaintiff was free from any negligence that was a direct and proximate cause of the injury. Exceptions sustained. Duty of Maker or Vendor of Chattel. THOMAS v. WINCHESTER. 6 N. Y. 397. 1852. RUGGLES, C. J., delivered the opinion of the court. This is an action brought to recover damages from the defendant for negligently putting up, labeling and selling as and for the extract of dandelion, which is a simple and harmless medicine, a jar of the extract of belladonna, which is a deadly poison; by means of which the plaintiff, Mary Ann Thomas, to whom, being sick, a dose of dandelion was prescribed by a physician, and a portion of the contents of the jar was administered as and for the extract of dandelion, was greatly injured, etc. The facts proved were briefly these: Mrs. Thomas being in ill health, her physician prescribed for her a dose of dandelion. Her husband purchased what was believed to be the medicine prescribed at the store of Dr. Foord, a physician and druggist in Cazenovia, Madison County, where the plaintiffs reside. A small quantity of the medicine thus purchased was administered to Mrs. Thomas, on whom it produced very alarming effects; such as coldness of the surface and extremities, feebleness of circulation, spasms of the muscles, a giddiness of the head, dilation of the pupils of the eyes, and derangement of mind. She recovered, however, after some time, from its effects, although for a short time her life was thought to be in danger. The medicine administered was belladonna, and not dandelion. The jar from which it was taken was labeled, "1⁄2 lb. dandelion, prepared by A. Gilbert, No. 108 John street, N. Y. Jar 8 oz." It was sold for and believed by Dr. Foord to be the extract of dandelion as labeled. Dr. Foord purchased the article as the extract of dandelion from Jas. S. Aspinwall, a druggist at New York. Aspinwall bought it of the defendant as extract of dandelion, believing it to be such. The defendant was engaged at No. 108 John street, New York, in the manufacture and sale of certain vegetable extracts for medicinal purposes, and in the purchase and sale of others. The extracts manufactured by him were put up in jars for sale, and those which he purchased were put up by him in like The jars containing extracts manufactured by himself and those containing extracts purchased by him from others, were labeled alike. Both were labeled like the jar in question, as “prepared by A. Gilbert." Gilbert was a person employed by the defendant at a salary, as an assistant in his business. The jars were labeled in Gilbert's name because he had previously engaged in the same business on his own account at No. 108 John street, and probably because Gilbert's labels rendered the articles more salable. The extract contained in the jar sold to Aspinwall, and by him to Foord, was |