right of recovery, under the peculiar facts that were alleged

But there are many authorities which sustain this character of suit. That of Foot v. Card, 58 Conn. 1, 18 Atl. 1027, is a leading one, and has taken a more advanced position than most of the others, although it has been frequently referred to by other courts. * Some authorities hold that the common law gives a married woman a cause of action, but by reason of her disability of coverture the right remains in abeyance while she is married. There are others in which her right to damages is regarded as belonging to her at common law, and hence she can recover under statutes enabling her to sue as a feme sole; and still others sustain her right to sue under statutes giving equal rights to husband and wife, irrespective of any substantive right existing at common law. #

[The judgment of the lower court was reversed because of certain errors in the rulings, and a new trial awarded.]

Nature of the Right of Consortium.

FENEFF v. NEW YORK CENTRAL & HUDSON RIVER RAILROAD COMPANY.

203 Mass. 278, 89 N. E. 436. 1909.

Action by Melinda Feneff against the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad Company. Verdict was returned in favor of defendant, and plaintiff brings exception. Overruled.

KNOWLTON, C. J. The plaintiff's husband was injured physically and mentally by the negligence of the defendants, and he has recovered full compensation for his injuries. Feneff v. Boston & Maine Railroad, 196 Mass. 575, 82 N. E. 705. The plaintiff sues for damages suffered by her from his injury, by reason of her relation to him as his wife. In her declaration she avers that, by reason of his disability, she has endured great suffering and anxiety, and has been obliged to assume heavy and arduous duties which she did not have to assume before the injury, and that she has lost the comfort, society, aid, and assistance of her husband. In her bill of exceptions she says that the action is "for the loss of consortium." This statement covers the case.

The right of consortium is a right growing out of the marital relation, which the husband and wife have, respectively, to enjoy the society and companionship and affection of each other in their life together. The right to the con

sortium of the other spouse seems to belong to husband and wife alike, and to rest upon the same reasons in favor of each. Since the removal of the wife's disability to sue this is now settled in most courts by a great weight of authority. Nolan v. Pearson, 191 Mass. 283, 77 N. E. 890, and cases cited. *

The wrong which may be redressed through such suits is one which has a direct tendency to deprive the husband or wife of the consortium of the other spouse. No case has been brought to our attention, and after an extended examination we have found none, in which an action for a loss of consortium alone has been maintained merely because of an injury to the person of the other spouse, for which the other has recovered, or is entitled to recover, full compensation in his own name, when the only effect upon the plaintiff's right of consortium is that, through the physical or mental disability of the other, the companionship is less satisfactory and valuable than before the injury. While there is no intentional wrong, the ordinary rule of damages goes no further in this respect than to allow pecuniary compensation for the impairment or injury directly done. When the injury is to the person of another, the impairment of ability to work and be helpful and render services of any kind is paid for in full to the person injured. Ordinarily the relation between him and others, whereby they will be detrimentally affected by the impairment of his physical or mental ability, makes the damage to them only remote and consequential, and not a ground of recovery against the wrongdoer.

*

Parent's Action for Seduction of Daughter.

GRINNELL v. WELLS.

7 Man. & Gr. 1033 (Eng.). 1844.

Case, for the seduction of the plaintiff's daughter.

TINDAL, C. J., now delivered the judgment of the court. The question in this case arises upon a motion in arrest of II-51

801

judgment, and is this-whether a father can maintain an action on the case for the seduction of his daughter, where he is unable to allege in the declaration the loss of her service by reason of the defendant's wrongful act.

The declaration in this case contains no allegation of the loss of the service of the daughter, but, instead thereof, alleges that the daughter was a poor person, maintaining herself by her labor and personal services, and not of sufficient ability to maintain herself otherwise; and, after stating that the defendant debauched her, and that she was delivered of a child, and her thereby becoming unable to work or maintain. herself, alleges, as the gravamen of the plaintiff, that he, being her father, and being of sufficient ability to maintain his said daughter, was, by means of the premises, forced and obliged to, and necessarily did, maintain his said daughter, at his own charges, and did necessarily pay large divers money, and incur divers debts in and about the maintaining and nursing, etc., of his said daughter, during the time she was unable to maintain herself. And the question arises-whether the want of the allegation of the loss of service is supplied by the substitution of the before-recited allegation.

The foundation of the action by a father to recover damages against the wrongdoer for the seduction of his daughter, has been uniformly placed, from the earliest time hitherto, not upon the seduction itself, which is the wrongful act of the defendant, but upon the loss of service of the daughter, in which service he is supposed to have a legal right or interest. ** It has therefore always been held that the loss of service must be proved at the trial, or the plaintiff must fail. It is the invasion of the legal right of the master to the services of his servant, that gives him the right of action for beating his servant; and it is the invasion of the same legal right, and no other, which gives the father the right of action against the seducer of his daughter. This distinction. is most clearly and pointedly put by the court in Robert Mary's Case.

*

*

We therefore think, for the reasons above given, the cause of action, as stated on this record, is insufficient, and that the rule for arresting the judgment must be made absolute.

Right of Widowed Mother to Recover for Loss of Child's

Services.

HORGAN v. PACIFIC MILLS.

158 Mass. 402, 33 N. E. 581. 1893.

Action by Bridget Horgan against the Pacific Mills, a corporation, to recover for the loss of services and expenses incurred in the case of her minor child, who was injured through defendant's negligence. Plaintiff had judgment on findings of a referee, and defendant appeals. Affirmed.

FIELD, C. J. The plaintiff's daughter, when injured, was eleven years old, and it appears that she, with her sisters, one older and two younger than herself, lived with their mother, who was a widow, as members of one family, and that the children were dependent for support on the mother, and rendered some service to her "in work about the house, and in tending a small shop, which was the front room of the tenement in which they lived." In consequence of the injury the plaintiff suffered loss of her daughter's services, and was put to expense in providing medical attendance for her, and to labor and trouble in nursing and taking care of her.

*

The tendency of modern decisions is to give to a widow left with minor children, who keeps the family together, and supports herself and them, with the aid of their services, very much the same control over them and their earnings during their minority, and to impose on her to the extent of her ability much the same civil responsibility for their education and maintenance as are given to and imposed on a father. We are of opinion that when a minor child lives with its mother, who is a widow, and the child is supported by the mother, and works for her as one of the family, the mother is entitled to recover for the loss of services of the child, and for labor performed and expenses reasonably incurred in the care and cure of the child, so far as they are the consequences of an injury to the child negligently caused by the defendant.

The finding of the court seems to be for the sum found by the auditor, with interest from the date of the writ. This, we think, is correct. Judgment affirmed.

Who May Sue for Seduction-Measure of Damages.

IRWIN v. DEARMAN.

11 East 23. 1809.

Damages ultra the mere loss of service having been given against the defendant for debauching and getting with child the adopted daughter and servant of the plaintiff, by which he lost her service, the court refused to set aside the inquisition.

LORD ELLENBOROUGH, C. J. This has always been con、 sidered as an action sui generis, where a person standing in the relation of a parent, or in loco parentis, is permitted to recover damages for an injury of this nature ultra the mere loss of service. But even in the case of an actual parent, the loss of service is the legal foundation of the action. And however difficult it may be to reconcile the giving of greater damages on the other ground, the practice is become inveterate and cannot now be shaken. And having been considered, in the case of Edmondson v. Machell, 2 Term Rep. 4, to extend to an aunt, as one standing in loco parentis, I think that this plaintiff, who had adopted and bred up the daughter of a friend and comrade from her infancy, seems to be equally entitled to maintain the action, on account of the loss of service to him aggravated by the injury done to the object on whom he had thus placed his affection.