plaintiffs' habits, conduct or character which might render them unfit or improper shopmates. It is not for the establishment of any system of shop work or rules directed to the curtailment or limitation of production or interference with reasonable industrial advancement. It is not aimed to prevent the highest efficiency of labor or the use of modern or economical machinery. It was not instituted to promote a closed shop or to compel anybody to join or to leave the union, nor primarily to cause the discharge or employment of any person or class of persons. If this results in any instance, it is incidental and not essential to the chief end. It does not go to the extent of interdicting the absolute and unqualified right of the individual to work, if he desires, contrary to the will or rules of a combination. It is not based upon objections to shop rules established for the reasonable protection of the rights of the employer or promotion of the good order or economical and efficient service of employees. It is not directed against the education of apprentices or those who are trying to learn the trade. It does not appear to be for the establishment or preservation of a monopoly, and this is not indicated by the framework of the bill. It is not directed against piece work as distinguished from day work, nor against any other method of employment where superior skill, dexterity or swiftness secure commensurately higher rewards than inefficiency, carelessness or slothfulness. It does not directly or immediately affect the general convenience, necessities or safety of the public. Its ostensible object is not used as a mask for any ulterior design. The direct and main purpose is to secure a change in a system of work which is claimed to be unjust in its practical operation. It is contended that this system in its final analysis resulted in an unequal distribution of the work of lasting in slack times, and thus affected the wages of the strikers, although it did not so operate when there was work enough to keep all the employees busy all the time. The finding of the superior court was in substance to this effect and it is supported by evidence. There is nothing to indicate that the strike was not undertaken in good faith against this system. An honest effort to better conditions of employment by laborers is lawful. The right of the plaintiffs to work upon such terms as they chose is incident to the freedom of the individual. That right could not be taken away or interfered with by the defendants unless it came into conflict with an equal or superior right of theirs. De Minico v. Craig, 207 Mass. 593, 94 N. E. 317. The right of one person to dispose of his labor freely is not superior to the same rights in others. The right of one to work under unsanitary conditions does not go to the extent of preventing others from striking in order to secure a mitigation of these conditions merely because such a strike may interfere Iwith the desire of the first to continue to work under those conditions. The same principle applies where a distribution of work discriminates between men of average capacity and gives an undue preference to one over another in times when there is a dearth of work. A system of giving out work which, under existing conditions, operates unjustly, is a condition of employment in which all workmen affected by it in a particular shop may have a legal interest. Nor is injury to the employer a reason why a strike to remedy such a condition should be enjoined. The right of the employer is no more absolute in respect to a condition of employment like this than it is as to hours of labor or rate of wages. It is not a subject as to which he is entitled to special protection against an orderly and otherwise lawful strike. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. E. 753. The conduct of these defendants, although directly affecting to their detriment the labor habits of the plaintiffs, appears to have sufficient justification in the fact that it is of a kind and for a purpose, which has a direct relation to the benefits of a more uniform distribution of work, and thus of wages, among equally skilled or competent workmen during dull seasons. Decree reversed. Bill dismissed. LEADING ILLUSTRATIVE CASES LAW OF TORTS PART IX EXTRA-HAZARDOUS OCCUPATIONS-ACTING AT PERIL-INSURING SAFETY MISCELLANEOUS CHAPTER I. ACTING AT PERIL-GENERAL PRINCIPLES. Assumption of Risk by a Servant. CROWN v. ORR. 140 N. Y. 450. 1893. Plaintiff, nineteen years old, was employed by defendant, and was injured by defendant's alleged negligence. Judgment on verdict for plaintiff. Appeal by defendant. Reversed. O'BRIEN, J. The relation of master and servant existed between the plaintiff and the defendant at the time the former received the personal injury for which he recovered damages. The question presented is whether, upon any view of the evidence, the result can be attributed to any fault or neglect on the part of the master. The rules of law in such cases are well settled, but it is not always easy to apply them to the varying facts in each particular case. The master does not insure the servant against all accidents and mishaps that may befall him in the business. The servant, when he enters into the relation, assumes not only all the risks incident to such employment, but all dangers which are obvious and apparent. The law imposes upon him the duty of self-protection, and always assumes that this instinct, so deeply rooted in human nature, will guard him against all risks and dangers incident to the employment or arising in the course of the business of which he has knowledge or the means of knowledge. If he voluntarily enters into or continues in the service without objection or complaint, having knowledge or the means of knowing the dangers involved, he is deemed to assume the risk and to waive any claim for damages against the master in case of personal injury to him. This principle applies to the plaintiff, although he was not at the time of full age. Like any other servant he took upon himself the ordinary risks of the service, and all dangers from the use of machinery which were known to him, or obvious to persons of ordinary intelligence. He is bound to take notice of the ordinary operation of familiar laws, and to govern himself accordingly, and if he fails to do so, the risk is his own. He is bound to use his eyes to see that which is open and apparent to any one so using them, and if he neglects to do so he cannot charge the consequences upon the master. The liability of the master for injuries to the servant received in the service is based upon his personal negligence, and the evidence must establish some personal fault or neglect of duty on his part, or what is equivalent thereto, in order to justify a verdict, and he is entitled to the presumption that he has performed his duty until the contrary is made to appear. * On the 10th of December, 1890, plaintiff, who was then about 19 years old, and in the employ of the defendant, lost his hand and part of the arm by coming in contact with the knives of a planing machine. No complaint was made that the machine was in any respect defective or unsuitable for the purpose for which it was used, or that the place where the plaintiff was directed to work was in any respect unsafe. The only omission of duty charged against the master in the complaint, or at least that is now urged, is that the plaintiff was ignorant of the use of machinery, and the defendant neglected to give proper instructions to him in this regard, or cause them to be given. When the accident occurred, the plaintiff had been at work in the shop about three weeks. His duty was to stand a few feet from the machine and take off the dressed lumber after it had passed through the planer. He was not required to operate or handle the machine itself, but was cautioned * * The plaintiff in its place He says that against meddling with its operation. testifies that on the day of the accident the man in charge ordered him to place a hood made of tin in front of the knives of the planer. while attempting to put it in place his hand was caught by the knives, and in this way the injury was sustained. Assuming that the verdict has determined conclusively that the foreman ordered the plaintiff to hang this hood in place, in front of the knives of the planer, does this charge the master with personal negligence? The plaintiff had been at work in front of his machine for three weeks, and during that time had full opportunity to observe the manner of handling this hood and placing it upon the machine. He had the same opportunity of informing himself with respect to any danger attending such an act as the master had. There was nothing in the operation that called for any special instructions, and he asked for none. It was not negligence to direct a young man 19 years of age, who had seen the machine in operation for three weeks, to perform such a duty, even without instructions, especially when he asked for none and gave no sign that he was not entirely familiar with the method by which the order could be properly obeyed. This was one of the risks which he assumed when he entered the defendant's service. * It is admitted that proper instructions were given him to perform his work with safety, and if it be true, as the plaintiff testifies, that on the occasion in question he was directed to perform another, and specially dangerous service, without sufficient instruction, that fault was not that of the master, but that of a co-servant. The judgment, therefore, should be re versed. * * Assumption of Risk by a Trespasser. RYAN v. TOWAR. 128 Mich. 463, 87 N. W. 645. 1901. HOOKER, J. The Brice Manufacturing Company is an existing corporation, which formerly carried on business at Marquette. Its plant has been shut down for some years. Among other structures, it owned a small pump-house, located upon |