Upon these facts, the jury were told in effect, by two instructions, when taken together, that if the conductor retained the wrong coupon the passenger would have the right to rely on his act, and would be entitled to use the other end on the return trip, but that without an explanation he had no right to be carried, and that upon his refusal to pay his fare the conductor would be justified in ejecting him. Held, that there was no error. Pennsylvania Čo. v. Bray, 125 Ind. 229. Mistake by Agent in Selling Ticket-Ejection of Passenger-Damages.—A party purchasing a railroad ticket has a right to rely upon the agent of the company to give him a proper ticket when called and paid for, and, no particular circumstances intervening, there is no duty upon the party purchasing to examine the same and any mistake which may occur, is chargeable to the railroad company, and not to the person receiving or purchasing the ticket. Accordingly, where a passenger is given a ticket to the wrong place, but has his baggage checked to his destination, he may recover for his expulsion by the conductor, who is informed of this circumstance and of his inability to pay the fare. For his expulsion in such case at a way station, the passenger may recover additional damages under Code Ga., Sec. 3066, allowing such where there are aggravating circumstances. Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Dougherty (Ga. Dec. 20, 1890), 12 S. E. Rep. 747. Expulsion of Passenger for Failure to Pay Fare-Right to Rely on Con. ductor's Statement as to Amount he Would be Required to Pay.-Where a passenger enters a railroad train at a flag station and is told by the conductor that he will pay four cents per mile to the next station where tickets are sold, or that he can get off the train there and board it again and ride the rest of the way for three cents per mile (the regular rate), the passenger has a right to rely upon such statements, and if he gets off at the station in question but fails in his attempt to get a ticket owing to the absence of the agent, and boards the train again and is ejected for his failure to pay four cents per mile for the remainder of the way, the railroad company is liable for damages. The fact that the conductor showed the passenger his rule book containing a notice of the Georgia Railroad Commission which provides that "the regulation of the railroads as to passengers without tickets is a matter of police, with which the commission will only interfere upon complaint of abuse; an extra charge of more than one cent per mile, full fare, or one-half cent, half fare, is regarded as excessive, unless such extra charges would fall below the minimum above given," is not notice as to the conductor's authority to make such representations to the passenger. Georgia R. & B. Co. v. Murden (Ga., Dec. 23, 1890) 12 S. E. Rep. 630. Scalper's Ticket Conditioned to be Void if Transferred-Right to Collect Fare. In Drummond v. Southern Pacific Co. (Utah, Feb. 3, 1891), 25 Pac. Rep. 733, the plaintiff attempted to ride upon a ticket purchased by him from a ticket broker. The ticket so purchased contained a condition that it would be void if presented by any other than the original holder, and that if so presented it would be taken up and full fare collected. The plaintiff purchased this ticket on the assurance of an unauthorized agent of the company that it would be honored. This class of tickets were usually signed by the original purchaser, but the one in question was not. When plaintiff presented his ticket, the conductor refused to accept it and compelled him to pay his fare. Held, that the plaintiff had no cause of action against the company, and the fact that the ticket was not signed was of no moment, since by accepting it the original purchaser was bound by its terms. The court said: "The question is, was it the duty of the defendant to honor these tickets although presented by persons other than the original purchasers? They were through tickets, and were sold for a less price than the local fare; and the purchasers agreed not to sell them, and the ticket stated on their face that they were non-transferable. The purchaser, when he bought these tickets, knew that he had no right to ride part way upon them, and sell them for the rest of the way; and the plaintiff knew, by the terms of the tickets, that he had no right to buy them; but, anxious to ride to his destination for less than the regular fare, he considered the matter, and bought on the opinion of a man wholly unauthorized to bind the defendant company. And his suspicions should have been aroused by the conduct of the pretended agent, because, if the tickets were entitled to be honored on their merits, a letter to the conductor was unnecessary, and, if not, the officious letter of the pretended agent would be unavailing, and this ought to have suggested to him that the tickets would be dishonored unless by the influence of this letter the conductors would be induced to neglect their duty. This class of contract tickets is valid, and common carriers are authorized to enforce them. Post v. Chicago, etc., R. Co., 14 Neb. 110, 9 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 345; Elmore v. Sands, 54 N. Y. 512; Boston & M. R. Co. v. Chipman, 146 Mass. 107, 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 336; Hill v. Boston, H. T. & W. R. Co., 144 Mass. 284, 28 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 87; Cody v. Central Pac. R. Co., 4 Sawy. (U. S.) 114. 64 But it is contended that the ticket agent at Blue Rapids, Kan., sold without requiring the purchaser to sign the contract. We think this makes no difference. He took them at a less price than the regular fare. The terms of the contract are set out in full, and we think, by accepting the ticket without signing, he accepted the terms of the contract, and was bound by them. Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Read, 37 Ill. 484, 485; Gulf C. & S. F. R. Co. v. McGowan, 65 Tex. 640, 26 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 274; Mosher 7. St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co., 127 U. S. 391, 34 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 339. The court instructed the jury in opposition to these views, and in that regard his instructions are erroneous. We also think there is no evidence in the record to support the verdict." Commutation Ticket Issued to Members of Partnership-Endorsement of Name-Proof of Existence of Partnership.-When a person claiming the right to travel on a train of a railroad company as a passenger holding a commutation ticket issued by the agent of the company, on the alleged ground that he is one of the members of the partnership named on the face of the ticket, he must show the conductor that his name appears indorsed thereon, in compliance with the conditions specified in the contract on the reverse of the ticket. In case the conductor of the train should decline to recognize his right to thus use the commutation ticket, and should eject the holder, and damages are judicially claimed therefor, the legal obligation is imposed on the claimant to establish by a clear preponderance of proof, if denied, that there existed such a partnership at the time, and that he was one of its members. Granier v. Louisiana W. R. R. Co. (La. July Term, 1890), 8 S. Rep. 614. Ticket "via Direct Line"-Authority of Ticket Agent-Meaningless Condition. When a railway company intrust an agent with the sale of their tickets, they clothe him with the apparent authority to explain to the purchasers of such tickets the purport or effect of any condition or provision thereon, which would be unintelligible without such explanation, and also their rights under such tickets, having regard to such provision or condition. And where such an agent sold a ticket "via direct line" between two places, and there were three different routes between the places operaated by the company, none of them being direct, and one of which was shorter than the others, and the agent in selling the ticket gave the purchaser to understand that he might travel under the ticket by any one of the three lines, and in doing so by one of the longer routes, he was forci47 A. & E. R. Cas.-31 bly ejected from the train for declining to pay an extra fare: Held, that the provision "via direct line" was unintelligible without explanation and that the company were bound by the representation of their agent in relation thereto Held, also, that the words "via direct line" were inapplicable to the contract and must be struck out in construing it. Dancey v. Grand Trunk R. Co., 20 Ont. 603. WARDWELL V. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL R. Co. (Minnesota Supreme Court, July 7, 1891.) Passenger-Payment of Fare-Mistake of Conductor-Expulsion.-Plaintiff, without a ticket, though he had full opportunity to procure one, boarded defendant's train at Faribault, to go to Owatonna, and, when he told the fare collector where he was going, the latter told him the fare was 50 cents, which he paid. This was more than the ticket fare, but 6 cents less than the train fare. Before the train arrived at Walcott, the first station at which the train was to stop, the collector informed plaintiff of his error in the amount of the fare, and required him to pay the 6 cents, which plaintiff refused, and the collector told him unless he paid it, he must leave the train. On arrival at Walcott, where the train stopped, the plaintiff persisting in his refusal, the collector put him off, and then returned him the 50 cents, less the fare from Faribault to Walcott. Held, that the collector, on discovering the mistake, might, within a reasonable time, require plaintiff to pay the other 6 cents. Also that, notwithstanding his first refusal, the plaintiff might, at any time before the arrival at Walcott, still pay the 6 cents, and secure the ight to be carried to Owatonna. Also that the collector's retention of the 50 cents till the arrival at Walcott was not a waiver of the right to require payment of the 6 cents. Qualifying Du Laurans v. Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 49, (Gil. 29.) Also that the company had a right to be paid the fare from Faribault to Walcott, and the collector might retain it out of the 50 cents. Overruling De Laurans v. Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 49, (Gil. 29.) Also that the collector could not retain the entire amount, and also put plaintiff off, but could put him off only upon first returning to him the 50 cents, less the fare to Walcott, and, having put him off before doing so, the expulsion was wrongful. APPEAL from Steele District Court. F. W. Root, (W. H. Norris, of counsel), for appellant. GILFILLAN, C. J.-The plaintiff, without procuring a ticket, though he had full opportunity to do so, boarded a passenger train of defendant at Faribault to go to Owatonna. The ticket fare was 46, the train fare 56, cents. Soon after the train started the fare collector came to plaint iff, and asked him where he was going, and, on being told to Case stated Owatonna, said the fare was 50 cents, which plaintiff then paid him. A few minutes after, and before the train reached Walcott, the first station from Faribault, the collector came again to plaintiff, and told him he had made an error in the amount of the fare, and insisted that he should pay the other 6 cents, and, on plaintiff refusing, told him unless he paid it he would put him off the train. Plaintiff still refused, and on the arrival of the train at Walcott, plaintiff persisting in his refusal, the collector put him off, and, after he was off, returned to him the difference between the 50 cents and the fare from Faribault to Walcott. Assuming (what, in view of the defendant's regulations posted up might correct in its passenger stations and passenger cars, can mistake. hardly be assumed) that the collector had author Collector Betention of money by col lector not waiver. ity to accept for the fare any less than the 56 cents, and waive the company's right to full train fare, the receipt by the collector, through mistake for the full fare, of less than the fare, did not amount to such waiver. The collector had a right, on discovering the mistake, to require the plaintiff, certainly within a reasonable time, on informing him of the error, to pay the remainder of the train fare, just as any one on discovering a mistake in payment may, within a reasonable time, require its correction. And it was the duty of the plaintiff, on being informed of the error, to pay the remainder of the full train fare, as demanded by the collector. Nor was the collector's retention of the money paid him by plaintiff (still assuming his authority to waive any part of the train fare) until the arrival of the train at Walcott, and while the question whether the plaintiff would pay the remaining 6 cents or leave the train was an open one, (for, notwithstanding his previous refusal, the plaintiff might, until the arrival at Walcott, where the train was to stop without regard to his matter, still pay and secure the right to go to his intended destination,) such a waiver, and especially as the collector insisted on payment of full train fare, and informed plaintiff that he must pay or leave the train. The rule laid down in Du Laurans v. Railroad Co., 15 Minn. 49, (Gil. 29.) to the effect that when a passenger tenders in good faith, on the train, the ticket fare as full fare to his place of destination, and the conductor takes and retains it, he thereby waives the right to require the passenger to still pay the difference between the ticket and train fare, is (assuming the conductor's authority to waive it) undoubtedly correct as applied to a case where, from the circumstances attending the tender, receipt, and retention of the money, the passenger is justified in the belief that it was accepted in full for his fare to the place of his destination. Thus, if the conductor should receive and retain it without demanding more, till the train had passed the place at which he must exercise or abandon the right to eject the passenger for non-payment, the latter would have the right to assume that the amount paid was satisfactory. But it cannot corretly be applied to a case like this. It would be equivalent to the proposition that the collector waived payment while insisting upon it, a proposition contradicting itself. Collector might retain proper fare for distance travelled. Collector should have returned expulsion. To determine whether he would pay the difference demanded or persist in his refusal and leave the train, the plaintiff had until the train stopped at a place where he might be put off. So long as he had that election, the collector might retain the amount paid him to abide it. As soon as it was made, to-wit, when plaintiff finally refused at Walcott, the right of the collector to retain the entire sum paid ceased, except he chose to retain it for the very purpose for which it was paid him; that is, for the full fare to Owatonna. He could not retain the entire sum, and also eject the plaintiff. As precedent to the right to ex pel him from the train, he should have returned to plaintiff what he was entitled to of the money, and until he did that he had no right to put him off. It is true he returned it to him immediately after the expulsion. But the wrong had then already been committed, money before and could not be repaired by doing what ought to have been done before the expulsion. We have said the collector ought to have returned to him what he was entitled to of the money, (not the whole of the money,) because we hold that where a passenger refuses to pay the fare rightfully demanded of him to his place of intended destination, and the carrier puts him off at a proper place, because of such refusal, the carrier has a right to paid the proper fare for carrying him to that place, and to retain it out of any money the passenger may have paid on account of fare. This is contrary to what was decided (the court being divided upon it) in the Du Laurans Case. The reasons given for the decision in that case were that the pas senger does not intend to make a contract to be carried to the place short of his intended destination, where he is put off, and that the carrying the passenger in that case to the place where he was put off was no benefit, but, on the contrary, a detriment to him. When, under circumstances that imply a request, a railroad company carries a passenger from one point to another, it is no concern of the company, as affecting its rights to compensation, that it is or is not to the advan tage of the passenger to be carried to and left at the latter be |