discarded, and the American soldiers, who from the first were exasperated by every form of Malay treachery and a total disregard of the rules of civilized warfare and of the restraints of honor as understood by themselves, had now no means of recognizing the foes who were the heroes of the native communities, and often the most forward in their offers of loyalty and services. This made the Americans more relentless and increased their contempt for the Filipino character, which in turn made the Filipinos more bitter in their hatred for the Americans, whom they despised for the drunkenness and debauchery in which some indulged, and more ardent and united in their alleged struggle for national liberty. The army of Trias in the

of schools, their open activity was commendable. At the same time they were exacting contributions and supplies and recruiting men for the Philippine forces and sending all possible military information to the Filipino leaders. Wherever in any part of the islands a group of insurgents was active all contiguous towns contributed to its support, and without their aid it could not subsist. The towns, therefore, although in American occupation and having a municipal organization established and controlled by the American military commanders, were the bases for all military activities of the insurgents, not only furnishing supplies for the flying columns of guerrillas, but affording secure

south was still intact, and was only broken up by the campaign of Gen. Bates, in which Gen. Schwan's column got in the rear of the rebels and shut them off when Gen. Wheaton advanced in January, 1900. The policy of the United States Government, which was loyally carried out by the commanders in the Philippines, forbade a resort to the retaliatory measures usually adopted to check the treacherous conduct of an irregular foe. Punishment was not visited on the villages and towns, in which it was attempted to institute municipal government under American auspices. While the guerrilla warfare was at its height most of the towns throughout the archipelago, under the advice and control of the military authorities, organized municipal governments, for which kind of local administration the people evinced such intelligent capacity as to encourage the expectation of rapid progress in the art of self-government when the larger political administrations could be organized. The presidentes and other town officials installed by the military authorities after the people had signified their choice readily subscribed to the obligation of exclusive fidelity to the sovereign power of the United States, and outwardly they complied with all due forms of decorum and loyalty. They acted openly in behalf of the Americans, yet secretly they aided the insurgents. They even appeared zealous for the success of the institutions introduced by the Americans. In all matters touching the peace of the town, the regulation of markets, the building of roads, streets, and bridges, and the institution

places of refuge. This was true of all parts of the archipelago excepting the part of Mindanao occupied by Moros and the Jolo_group. The Moros were in no way subject to Tagalog influence, and while hostility to Americans ran high in Luzon and the other islands they appeared to be satisfied with American control and anxious to maintain existing conditions. The success of the guerrilla system depended upon unity of action among the native population. How such unity was brought about, the American officers could not understand. How the officials installed by the Americans and other Filipinos who professed with apparent sincerity to believe American sovereignty to be beneficial and necessary were influenced to aid the insurgents, was inexplicable. Intimidation accounted for the situation to some extent, and captured correspondence revealed the efforts of the insurgent leaders to intimidate and control the people. Fear, however, could not be the only motive, and Gen. MacAr thur thought it more probable that the adhesive principle came from ethnological homogeneity, which induces men to respond for a time to the appeals of consanguineous leadership even when such action is opposed to their own interest and convictions of expediency. He tried to ascertain by inquiries among the various social classes what were the definite aspirations of the insurgents. The leaders themselves seemed to have no expectation of founding a stable independent Philippine republic except with the support of the military and naval power of the United States

to preserve and defend it. Their desires, as far as they are based on patriotic ideals and not on personal ambition, greed, and love of power, are compatible with the American policy, as conceived by Gen. MacArthur, which must result in planting republican institutions throughout the archipelago accompanied by the safeguards of personal, political, and religious liberty which are possible only under the auspices of the Constitution of the United States, so that in its ultimate form the archipelago shall assume the appearance of one or more self-supporting commonwealths, with a population attached to their institutions and capable of maintaining them, even in the improbable event of the withdrawal of the creative power. At present and for many years to come the necessity of a large American military and naval force is apparent. Education is the means required for bringing about political enlightenment. Considerable progress has been made, and, considering the circumstances, the results are surprising. The almost universal aspiration for education and the specific desire to learn the English language must be regarded as an involuntary expression of friendship and of confidence in American motives and ultimate aims.

The people are intelligent, generous, and flexible, and will probably yield quickly to political tuition when thoroughly informed of American institutions and purposes.

The maintenance of a great many widely scattered garrisons, with consequent increase in the perils and hardships of the soldiers and in the cost of administration, transport, and supply, was rendered expedient because the insurgent Tagalogs deliberately adopted the policy of murdering all their countrymen who were friendly to the United States. As rapidly as the American troops occupied territory the policy was followed of inviting inhabitants to return to their peaceful vocations and of aiding them in the reestablishment of their local government, and the protection of the United States was promised. To render efficient protection to peaceful and unarmed Filipinos who submitted it was necessary to maintain the American forces in the Philippines at almost the same strength as was required when Aguinaldo had a large and well-armed army in the field. The actual power of resistance possessed by the insurgents decreased rapidly as the Americans extended the posts, until their military activity was little more than a form of brigandage, but the influence that they exercised over the sympathies or fears of the people diminished

more desperate and ruthless, the people at large more well disposed and willing to accept American rule, and the officers better acquainted with the people and able to distinguish between those who were active in the rebellion and those whom they blackmailed and intimidated. Houses and barrios, or small villages, from which troops were fired upon or which harbored and hid ladrones or insurrectos who were being pursued were destroyed, and hostile natives who were caught redhanded were no longer released after a few days, but were kept confined in great military prisons. The search for arms was so actively and thoroughly pursued that the natives turned in not only bolos, but rifles. The mountain barracks that the insurgents had built as storehouses and shelters in the rainy season were sought out and destroyed, as well as their watchtowers and lookouts, and in these quests quantities of rice, sugar, clothing, and ammunition were captured. To every insurgent who surrendered his rifle $30 was given. The barbarities practiced by the insurgents to obtain contributions when their influence began to wane alienated the sympathies of most of their peaceful adherents. In the early

slowly. The ladrones, or robbers, who crop up in the islands always in troublous times, took advantage of the rebellion and worked in harmony with the insurrectos, who supplied them with arms. A more stringent way of proceeding was adopted later, when the guerrilla war became

part of the war the Kalipunan, their secret society, had strong branches in every town, was active even in Manila, and in the interior controlled the whole population. Eleven of the officials at the head of the administration in the province of Tarlac were arrested and condemned for conspiring with

insurgent leaders, and presidentes of the villages had frequently to be deposed. The insurgents were strong enough to harass the garrisons daily. The generals led strong expeditions through the country, established posts, and the more the soldiers came into contact with the people and were able to protect the pacificos, the less formidable became the resistance. In the early spring campaigns were conducted under Gen. Hughes in Panay and under Gen. Bates and Gen. Kobbe in southeastern Luzon, attended by many sharp battles. Gradually, as the army occupied the islands and spread out into small garrisons, the number engaged descended the scale from brigades to regiments, to battalions, to companies, to squads, and while the number of actions increased, the number of casualties diminished. Thus in February, 1899, the first month of the rebellion, there were 64 engagements, in which 66 officers and men were killed and 360 wounded; in the second month 80 were killed and 563 wounded in 61 actions; and in June, when operations grew slack on account of the weather, 32 were killed and 135 wounded in 32 actions. In December, 1899, there were 75 actions, in which 19 were killed and 81 wounded; in January, 1900, when, besides desultory actions in the north, a regular campaign was proceeding in the southern provinces of Luzon, in 114 actions 41 Americans were killed and 131 wounded; in February, 30 were killed and 70 wounded in 104 actions; in March, 21 were killed and 62 wounded in 103 actions; in April, 38 were killed and 67 wounded in 121 actions; in May, 28 were killed and 66 wounded in 108 actions; in June, 25 were killed and 56 wounded in 131 actions. The conflict at this point had descended to bushwhacking and brigandage. The distribution of troops in 300 posts dispelled hostility and improved the temper of the people, who had been originally aroused by absurd falsehoods of the leaders, such as the statement that the United States Government meant to place them on reservations, where they would die out like the American redmen. Insurgents who did not surrender after defeat divided into small guerrilla bands or became ladrones. The mass of the people longed for peace and were willing to accept the government of the United States. Nearly all the prominent generals and politicians of the insurrection were either captured in these months or voluntarily surrendered and took the oath of allegiance to the United States. The policy of leniency and the promise of amnesty in duced them to surrender. The small bodies of insurgents remaining under arms fled to mountain fastnesses, whence they issued for night attacks, usually harmless, or to ambush small American detachments, or to collect contributions or recruit among the people, whom they terrorized by cutting out tongues, cutting off limbs, or burying alive, and by their murders and robberies. They made themselves detestable, and still they maintained a surveillance over the people, even in garrisoned towns, and whoever gave information to the Americans usually risked his life.

In June the Filipino leaders plotted an uprising against the authorities in Manila, a general massacre of Americans and of the natives serving or friendly to the Government, and the seizure of arms and ammunition to re-equip the insurgent forces. Inhuman conduct marked the guerrilla campaign from the beginning on the part of the insurgents. When one of their camps was at tacked in January they tried to strike terror into the breasts of the Americans by leading out 5 prisoners and shooting them. Their military power, even as a guerrilla force, was broken before

the rainy season began. Yet their reign of terror continued, and the acts of vengeance and rapine that they committed on the amigos, the friends of the Americans, necessitated constant vigilance and activity on the part of the troops.

On June 21, 1900, by direction of the President, a proclamation was issued by Gen. MacArthur granting amnesty to all insurgents who made submission. Many of the leaders took advantage of it, and large numbers of insurgents delivered up their arms.

Aguinaldo and the other leaders who still held out were watching the trend of public opinion in the United States. When they found that the leaders of one of the great political parties seemed ready to commit the fate of the Philippine Islands into their care, and that whereas before only a group of independent politicians and publicists in the United States befriended them, they had a prospect of making terms with the United States Government to suit themselves if the presidential election should be won by that party, they were spurred to a supreme effort. When the issue was once raised in American politics fresh disturbances broke out, not in Luzon alone, but in Leyte, Panay, Samar, Cebu, and other islands where the Tagalogs had introduced their doctrines and authority in the early days of the rebellion. In central and northern Luzon, which American troops had first occupied in force, the natives had learned to trust Americans and to desire a settled state of affairs under their government. They could not be stirred up anew to any extent. Some of the principal members of Aguinaldo's former government, such as Buencamino, the Secretary of State in the Malolos administration, Mabini, and Paterno, and some of his best generals were now co-operating heartily with the Americans, and telling the natives to submit. Of the generals, Pio del Pilar, Macabulos, Catalino, Garcia, and others had surrendered or been captured. It was in southern Luzon and the Visayas that the hostilities broke out anew. The departure of two regiments for China, and the prospective return to America of the volunteers forming half the army of occupa tion in a few months, encouraged the insurgent leaders in the belief that they could by holding out have matters go in any way they would. The inclination of the people not actively engaged in the rebellion to embrace the American cause was checked by the revival of terrorism. The presi dentes and municipal councilors appointed in towns where local self-government was being introduced under American auspices were in some instances murdered even in central Luzon. The army of 65,000 men could not guard against such reprisals. The men formerly identified with the Philippine Republic and prominent Filipinos who preceded them in the expression of American sympathies were no longer safe in Manila. Many of them went away to Hong-Kong. The high prices of food-40 to 75 cents a pound in gold for meat. and rice double the normal price had much to do with the discontent. In Spanish times the Government came into competition with the venders when meat sold for more than 10 cents a pound. All northern Luzon, except in Nueva Ecija and Bulucan, was practically free from insurgents in August, and the people were planting and asking for municipal government. In southern Luzon insurrectionary bands were dodging from one mountain refuge to another, as also in Samar, Leyte, and parts of Panay; but in Negros, Cebu, Romblon, Masbate, Sibuyan, Tablas, Bohol, and other Vi sayan islands there was little disturbance. In Mindanao ladrones made the country dangerous near the old Tagalog penal settlement of Cagayan