State ex rel. Marinette, T. & W. R. Co. vs. Tomahawk Common Council. into the city charter. It applies wholly to matter untouched by the charter, and the provisions of the general law and the statute, not being inconsistent, may well subsist and be executed together; for we think that the provisions of the charter, relied on by the defendant, cannot properly be considered as a restriction of the power of the city to issue bonds in exchange for the stock of a railway company, under the general law. The charter provisions are that "the common. council shall have authority, by ordinances, resolutions, or by-laws, to manage and regulate the finances," and "to adopt all legal and requisite measures for levying taxes and assessments, general and special" (Laws of 1891, ch. 58 [City Charter], subch. V, sec. 12); that "the common council of said city shall, by proper resolution, levy all taxes to be raised in said city, itemizing the amount so as to show the amount raised for general and special purposes" (sec. 15, subch. V); that, "in addition to the amount of taxes for general city purposes, special taxes may be levied for the purchase of fire engines, cemetery grounds, public squares, and lands for railway purposes, including depots, switch yards, side tracks, and such other purposes as are of public utility; but no such tax shall be levied, unless the same shall first be recommended by the common council, and afterward submitted to a vote of the people, and approved by them," etc. (subch. IV, sec. 11). This provision seems to limit and explain the one which follows, and to show that it extends only to debts or liabilities of any kind, name, or nature, for general municipal purposes, namely, that "no debt shall be contracted against the city, or certificate of indebtedness be drawn upon the city treasury, unless the same shall be authorized by a majority of all the members-elect of the common council," etc.; "provided, that the common council shall not, in any case, or under any pretext, or for any purpose whatever, contract debts or liabilities of any kind, name, or nature, exceeding the amounts which it is authorized by the provisions of this act to levy State ex rel. Marinette, T. & W. R. Co. vs. Tomahawk Common Council. for the current year." Subch. IX, sec. 3. By subch. XIII, sec. 19, the common council has authority "to issue bonds of said city for such public improvements as shall be duly authorized by said common council by ordinance," adopted by a vote of three fourths of its members, but not to exceed five per cent. of the assessed valuation, etc.; the issuing of the bonds to be submitted to and approved by a vote of the people. This is an affirmative statute merely, and does not prevent the city from exchanging its bonds for stock of the railroad company, up to the prescribed limit, should a valid contract therefor be made under the general law. It is a provision to secure public city improvements. The construction and effect of these various provisions of the charter is to be arrived at by considering them together and in their relation to municipal purposes and the ordinary administration of the affairs of the municipality. The case of Perrin v. New London, 67 Wis. 416, is much relied on by the respondent as showing the invalidity of the contract in question, but we think that the cases are distinguishable. In Perrin v. New London, 67 Wis. 417, the charter declared that said village should have no power, except when specially authorized thereunto by law, to borrow money, etc., "nor shall said village incur any debt or liability, in any year, greater than the amount of tax allowed by this act to be raised in said village in the year in which such debt or liability was incurred." In 1872, when the bonds there in suit were issued, the charter conferred no authority upon the village, or its trustees, to raise money by taxation to pay such bonds in that or any other year, and the special act of 1867 (ch. 93, P. & L. Laws of 1867), under which the bonds in suit were issued, contained no provision for levying a tax to pay the principal of the bonds, but only annual interest thereon. The limitation in that case was on the power of the corporate body, and the court proceeded upon the theory that the bonds would be void unless there State ex rel. Marinette, T. & W. R. Co. vs. Tomahawk Common Council. was in the charter, or in the special act, authority to levy a tax to pay them. Here we think that by the fair construction of sec. 3, subch. IX, ch. 58, Laws of 1891, relied on, the limitation was only upon the common council, in contracting debts for ordinary municipal purposes. The section provides, in substance and effect: (1) That no such debt shall be contracted, unless authorized by a majority of all the members-elect of the common council, the vote to be entered by ayes and nays; and (2) the proviso to the section limits. the power of the common council, so that it should not "in any case, or under any pretext, or for any purpose whatever, contract debts or liabilities of any kind, name, or nature, exceeding the amounts which it is authorized by the provisions of this act to levy for the current year," showing that the entire section is a restraint only on the common council. The provision in the charter for issuing bonds, not to exceed five per cent. of the assessed valuation, for public improvements, and in the manner stated by subch. XIII, sec. 19, shows that the first limitation was not absolute, but was to have only the force and meaning already stated. Consequently, the power of the city, under the general law, by consent of its resident taxpayers, to make the contract in question, as well as the power of the city to issue bonds for public improvements, still remained, notwithstanding the provisions of sec. 3, subch. IX. In Perrin v. New London, supra, the prohibition was unqualified, and its broad general meaning was neither explained, modified, nor controlled by other provisions, as here, in the same or other sections of the charter. The proper rule of construction in such cases is recognized in Perrin v. New London, and in Quincy v. Cooke, 107 U. S. 549, and Quincy v. Jackson, 113 U. S. 332-336. The appli cation and meaning of sec. 3 of subch. IX of the city charter, for the reasons indicated, must be restricted to debts for strictly municipal purposes., 3. The constitutional amendment to sec. 3, art. XI, pro State ex rel. Marinette, T. & W. R. Co. vs. Tomahawk Common Council. viding that "no city shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner, or for any purpose, to any amount, including existing indebtedness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebtedness," was a sufficient limitation of the amount of indebtedness that might be contracted so as to satisfy the provisions of sec. 3, art. XI; but the power and duty of the legislature remained to impose still other restrictions or regulations, and several such have been imposed by the general law under consideration. R. S. secs. 942-947. Whether the power of the municipal corporation to tax, to borrow money, to contract debts, and lend its credit, has been sufficiently restricted, is understood to be a question within the discretion of the legislature; and its action in the premises is not reviewable in the courts. Bank of Rome v. Rome, 18 N. Y. 38. Some of the provisions in the city charter which have been considered are restrictions on the power of the city, in these respects, as to debts of a strictly municipal character. 4. The proposition submitted to the resident taxpayers, and accepted by the signatures of a majority of them, the statute declares, "shall be deemed obligatory as a mutual agreement on such company and on such municipality; and the common council of such municipality shall, as soon as may be, cause subscription to be made on the books of such company for such stock or bonds thereof as were proposed to be issued, and shall provide by ordinance or resolution for issuing such bonds of the municipality, in accordance with such agreement, by the proper officers, and the deposit of the same in escrow, if it be so agreed;" and it had been so agreed in this case. "But no such bonds shall be delivered, or be valid if delivered, until the road, to aid in the construction of which such bonds were voted, shall have been completed and in operation by the passage State ex rel. Marinette, T. & W. R. Co. vs. Tomahawk Common Council. of cars continuously from one terminus to such point as such company shall have agreed to construct the same, in consideration thereof." [R. S. sec. 948.] By the amendment to sec. 3, art. XI, of the constitution, it is provided that "any city incurring any indebtedness" as stated, in such amount, "shall, before doing so, provide for the collection of a direct annual tax, sufficient to pay the interest on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the principal thereof within twenty years from the time of contracting the same." The contract is one for creating an indebtedness on the part of the municipality, upon conditions precedent, namely, the completion of the road and the legal capacity of the city at that time to become indebted on the bonds held in escrow. The phrases "incurring such indebtedness," and "incurring any indebtedness as aforesaid," manifestly refer to the time when the contract is performed by the act of the company and it is entitled to the delivery of the bonds; and they must receive such construction as will be consistent with the nature of the transaction and effectuate the intention of the parties. To incur an indebtedness is to become liable for or subject to an indebtedness. The incurring of the indebtedness in the present case consists of several steps or proceedings, under the statute, resulting in the putting of bonds in escrow which are not to be delivered, or be valid if delivered, until the road is completed as stipulated. This is evidently the point at which the indebtedness is legally consummate. In Keystone Lumber Co. v. Bayfield, 94 Wis. 491, it was held that no tax could be levied to pay interest on bonds held in escrow, to be delivered in aid of a railroad at its completion, but which had not been completed. Interest could not accrue on bonds until they should become legal obligations for the payment of the sum named therein, and it must logically follow that the time of the accruing of the indebtedness is the time stipulated for the delivery of the bonds. We think, therefore, that by the |