to the plaintiff the said several sums of money, defendant, before his bankruptcy, accepted a bill of exchange, drawn by the plaintiff, for and in payment of one of the said several sums of money in which he was so indebted as aforesaid; and that he had accepted each of the several bills of exchange for which the action was brought, in payment of one other of the said several sums of money in which he so stood indebted as aforesaid. The plea then stated, that defendant had duly become bankrupt, and that the bills of exchange mentioned in the declaration were proveable under the commission; and that the plaintiffs, being creditors for the amount of the money comprised in all the several bills, proved the amount of one bill only under the commission, and thereby made their election to take the benefit of the commission, not only with respect to the debt so proved, but also as to the bills and debts mentioned in the declaration: Held, upon demurrer, that this plea could not be supported first, because the proof of a debt. under the commission of bankruptcy cannot be pleaded in bar to an action at law brought for the same debt; secondly, that the election of the creditor to take the benefit of the commission is confined by the 49 G. 3. c. 121. s. 14. to the debt actually proved, and does not extend to distinct debts ejusdem generis due at the same time. Harley and Another v. Greenwood, M. 2 G. 4. Page 95 5. The giving up a suit, instituted to try a question respecting which the law is doubtful, is a good consideration for a promise to pay a stipulated sum; and, therefore, where a ship, having on board a pilot required by law, ran foul of

another vessel, and proceedings were instituted by the owners of the latter, to compel the owners of the former to make good the damage, and the former vessel was detained until bail was given, and pending such proceedings, the agents of the owners of the vessel detained agreed, on the owners of the damaged vessel renouncing all claims on the other vessel, and on their proving the amount of the damage done, to indemnify them, and to pay a stipulated sum by way of damage: Held, that there being contradictory decisions as to the point, whether ship owners were liable for an injury done while their ship was under the controul of the pilot required by law, there was a sufficient consideration to sustain the promise made by the agents of the owners of the detained vessel, to pay the stipulated damages. Longridge and Others v. Dorville and Another, M. 2 G. 4. Page 117 Where in an action on a policy of insurance on ship in the usual form, for twelve months, at sea and in port, the loss averred was as follows; that the ship having arrived at the harbour of St. J., and discharged her cargo, it became necessary to place her, and she was accordingly placed, in a graving dock, there to be repaired, and near to a certain wharf in the graving dock; and that whilst she was there, by the violence of the wind and weather, she was thrown over on her side, whereby she struck the ground with great violence, and was bilged, &c.: Held, that this was a loss within the general words of the policy," all other perils, losses, and misfortunes, &c., for which the underwriters were liable: Held, also, that the above facts, with the additional circumstance of there being two or three feet water in the graving

graving dock when the accident happened, did not amount to a loss by perils of the sea. Phillips v.. Barber, M. 2 G. 4. Page 116

7. The condition of a bond, after reciting that defendant and J. S. had delivered and indorsed to the plaintiff a bill of exchange, drawn by J. S. and accepted by A. B., was, that defendant and J. S., or either of them, their heirs, &c. should pay or cause to be paid, to the plaintiff, his executors, &c. the sum secured by the bill, within one month after it should become due and payable, in case it should not be then paid by the acceptor, to the plaintiff, his executors, &c. according to the tenor of the said bill, together with interest from the time the bill became due: Held, that to an action on this bond, it was not a good plea, that the bill, when due, had not been presented for payment to the acceptor, or that due notice of its dishonour had not been given to the defendant and J. S., or either of them. Murray v. King, M. 2 G.4.

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8. It is not any defence at law to an action on a bond against a surety, that by a parol agreement time has been given to the principal. Davey and Others, v. Prendergrass, M. 2 G. 4. 187 9. Assumpsit will lie upon a bill of exchange against a trading corporation, whose power of drawing and accepting bills is recognized by statute.

In an action by an administrator upon a bill of exchange, payable to the testator, but accepted after his death, it was held, that the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of granting the letters of administration, and not from the time the bills become due, there being no cause of action until there is a party capable of suing.

10.

An agent having money in his hands belonging to his principal, purchases with it a bill of exchange, which he indorses specially to his principal; the latter, at the time of the indorsement, was dead, but that fact was not known to the agent: Held, that the property in the bill passed to the administrator of the principal, and that he might therefore sue upon the bill in that character: Held, also, that the administrator was only entitled to recover interest upon bills accepted after the death of the testator, from the time of demand of payment made by the administrator, and not from the time the bills became due.

Where the declaration stated the drawing of certain bills of exchange, and their acceptance after the death of the intestate, the granting of the letters of administration to the plaintiff, the defendant's liability, &c.; and the defendant pleaded that the cause of action did not accrue within six years, to which the plaintiff replied generally, that it did accrue within. six years: It was held, that the replication was good. Murray, v. The East India Company, M. 2 G. 4. Page 204 In trespass, the first count of the declaration stated, that the defendant assaulted and imprisoned plaintiff; and, during such imprisonment, struck, pulled, and pushed him about. Justification, that defendant arrested plaintiff under process of court; and that plaintiff, whilst in custody, having conducted himself in a violent manner, defendant necessarily, and to prevent his escape, struck, &c.: Held, that this latter part of the justification not being proved, the plaintiff was entitled to judgment; and that it was not necessary to new assign the battery by the defendant :

Held,

Held, also, the second count of the declaration (which omitted the battery) having been justified by proof of the writ and warrant, and arrest under them, the plaintiff, although one assault only was proved, was still entitled to judgment, having proved the trespasses, as laid in the first count. Phillips v. Howgate, M. 2 G. 4. Page 220 11. Where the plaintiffs were creditors and defendants debtors to T. and Co., and, by consent of all parties, an arrangement was made that defendants should pay to plaintiffs the debt due from them to T. and Co.: Held, that as the demand of T. and Co. on defendants was for money had and received, the plaintiffs were entitled to recover, on a count for money had and received, against the defendants. Wilson v. Coupland, M. 2 G. 4.

228 12. The condition of a bond, after reciting that A. B. and C. had filed a bill in equity against E. and D., was, that the obligor should pay all such costs as the Court of Chancery should award to the defendants on the hearing of the cause: Held, by three justices (Abbott C. J. dubitante) that the death of E., before any costs awarded, could not be pleaded in discharge of the bond. Kipling v. Turner. M. 2 G. 4. 261

13. In order to constitute the offence of keeping a setting dog, within the 5 and 6 Anne, c. 14. s. 4., the dog must be kept for the purpose of killing and destroying game; and, therefore, where it appeared that, at the time when the alleged offence was charged to have been committed, the dog was tied up, and never went out into the field with its master; this was held not to be an offence within the statute. Hayward v. Horner, H. 2 and 3 G. 4.

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14. J. S. being the master of the workhouse, appointed by, and receiving orders from the guardians of the poor of the parish of W., bought provisions from A. B., one of such guardians: Held, that A. B. was liable to the penalty of 100%, imposed by the 55 G. 3. c. 137. s.6. West v. Andrews, H. 2 G.4.

Page 328 15. A printer cannot recover for labour or materials used in printing any work, unless he affixes his name to it, pursuant to the 39 G. 3. c. 79. s. 27. Bensley v. Bignold, H. 2 and 3 G. 4.

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17 Where judgment of nonsuit bad been given in an action brought against an infant, it is no ground of error that the infant had appeared by attorney, Bird v. Pegg, H. 2 and 3 G. 4.

418 18. Declaration stated that defendant covenanted to obey, abide by, and perform an award, and that he would not prevent the arbitrators from making their award. It then stated that the arbitrators made their award, and thereby directed the defendant to pay a certain sum therein mentioned; and alleged as a breach of the covevenant, that the defendant did not pay the sum awarded. Plea, that before the award, defendant, by deed, revoked the authority of the arbitrators, of which revocation they had notice: Held, upon demurrer, that defendant was entitled to judgment, although it appeared by the plea, that he had been guilty of a breach of the covenant to abide by the award by revoking the authority of the arbitrators, the plaintiff being entitled to re

cover damages only in respect of the cause of action stated in his *declaration, and not in respect of a cause of action disclosed in the plea.

The second count of the declaration stated the deed of reference, and then averred that defendant did, before the making of the award, hinder and prevent the arbitrators from making their award in this; that the defendant, by a certain deed in writing, signed and sealed by him, after reciting, as is therein recited, did revoke the authority: Held, upon demurrer that this was an alligation, not of the mere legal effect of the deed, but of the fact of revocation, and, that it was unnecessary to state that the arbitrators had notice of the revocation, that being necessarily implied in the averment, that the defendant had revoked the authority. Marsh (v. Bulteel, H. 2 and 3 G. 4.

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Page 507 19. The contractors for making a navigable canal, having with the permission of the owner of the soil, erected a dam of earth and wood upon his close, across a stream there, for the purpose of completing their work, have a possession sufficient to entitle them to maintain trespass against a wrongdoer. Dyson and Another v. Collick, E. 3 G. 4. 20. Where a libellous paragaph, as proved, contained two references, by which it appeared to be in fact the language of a third person, speaking of the plaintiff's conduct, and the declaration in setting it out had omitted those references : Held, that these omissions altered the sense of the remainder, and that the variance was fatal. Cariwright v. Wright, E. 3 G. 4. 615 21. To an action on bill of exchange, the defendant pleaded non-asump

part, a tender. Replication, that after the cause of action accrued, and before the tender, the plaintiff demanded the sum tendered: Held, that this issue would only be supported by proof of the demand of the precise sum tendered. Rivers v. Griffiths, E. 3 G. 4. Page 630

22. An action lies for the malicious prosecutiou of a bad indictment for perjury: Held, also, that a count stating that defendant had maliciously indicted plaintiff for wilful and corrupt perjury, is good after verdict, although the count did not set out any indictment. Pippett v. Hearn, E. 3 G. 4. 634 23. A petition addressed by a creditor of an officer in the army to the secretary at war, bonâ fide and with a view of obtaining, through his interference, the payment of a debt due; and containing a statement of facts, which, though derogatory to the officer's character, i the creditor believed to be true, is not a malicious libel for which an action is maintainable. In such an action, even upon the general issue, evidence may be received to shew that the writer bona fide believed the facts stated in the petition to be true. Fairman v. Ives, E. 3 G. 4. -642 24. A count stating that defendant had and received to the use of the plaintiff a certain sum of money, to be paid by the defendant to the: plaintiff upon request; and the nonpayment upon request, and that the defendant converted and disposed thereof to his own use, is bad upon demurrer. Orton v. Butler, E. 3 G. 4. 171 652 25. In an original writ the defendant was described as T. B., of G., in the county of N., upon a writ of error, brought to reverse the outlawry; the error assigned was, that

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time of the original writ, of or conversant in C. aforesaid, and that there was not any town, hamlet, or place of the name of C. in that county. Plea to this assignment of errors, that plaintiff prosecuted his writ with intent to declare upon a bond made by the defendant, by which he was described as T. B. of C. in the county of N.: Held, that this was an estoppel. Bonner v. Wilkinson, E. 3 G. 4. Page 682 26. A. covenanted that he would, from time to time, at the request of B., avow and confirm all actions that B. should bring in respect of a bond, of which A. was the obligee, without releasing the same. Declaration stated, that B. commenced an action in the name of A., against the obligor of the bond, and that A. did not, although often requested so to do, avow and justify the said action, but, on the contrary thereof, executed a release to the obligor of all actions, bonds, &c., by reason whereof the plaintiff was hindered from recovering the principal and interest, his costs, and other expenses: Upon special demurrer to this breach, it was held, first, that the averment of request was unnecessary, and that it therefore required no venue, inasmuch as it appeared that the defendant had, by executing the release, disabled himself from bringing any action upon the bond. Secondly, that it was no ground of demurrer to the whole breach, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the special damage. Amory v. Broderick, E. 3 G. 4. 712 27. Debt on a bond given to plaintiff, as treasurer of a friendly society. Plea, that the rules of the society had not been confirmed at the quarter sessions, pursuant to 33 G. 3. c. 54. Held, upon demurrer, that 13

the plea was bad, the bond being a good bond at common law. Jones v. Woollam, E. 3 G. 4. Page 769 28. A plaintiff paid into his own bankers a cheque of 250l. drawn upon them by a third person, which they received without any objection; and in the course of the same day the drawer of the cheque paid in a sum of money, part of which he particularly appropriated, leaving a balance unappropriated of 2371. The bankers, who were then creditors of the drawers to a large amount, wrote on the next morning to the plaintiff stating, that the cheque was not paid, but that they would keep it in the hope of there being money to pay it; and on that day a further unappropriated balance was paid in, making altogether a sum exceeding the plaintiff's cheque: Held, that under these circumstances, the plaintiff might maintain money had and received against the bankers, and that the latter, being his agents for receipt of the money, could not appropriate the balance to the payment either of their own general account against the drawer, or of two cheques presented on the same day, but subsequently to that of the plaintiff, and paid by them. Kilsby v. Williams, T. and Others, 3 G. 4.

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29. Declaration for tithes bargained and sold. Plea, that before the exhibiting of the plaintiff's bill, the defendant paid to the plaintiff a sum of money, parcel, &c. in discharge and satisfaction of the promises in the declaration mentioned, and that plaintiff accepted the same in satisfaction and discharge of the promises. Replication, that before the exhibiting of the bill, the plaintiff had sued out a latitat, and that the defendant did not, before the plaintiff

sued