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titled to full costs. Irwine v. Reddish, E. 3 G. 4. Page 796 33. The 19 G. 3. c. 70. s. 4. is confined to those suits in inferior courts where the proceedings are similar to those in the superior courts, and, therefore, does not extend to the case of a foreign attachment. Bulmer v. Marshall, T. 3 G. 4.

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34. Where a bailiff had written to an attorney for writs, which the latter sent without knowing any thing of the parties or circumstances, but the bailiff never represented him self or had been considered as an attorney, nor looked for any profit upon the law proceedings: Held, that this was not a case within the 22 G. 2. c. 46. s. 11.: but that it was a most improper practice, which the Court, in virtue of its general jurisdiction over attornies, would punish severely. Ex parte Whatton, T. 5 G. 4.

824 35. A bond was conditioned for the resignation of a living, which the defendant, when requested, had refused to resign: Held, that he being a wrong doer, the jury were not bound, in assessing the damages, to confine themselves to the diminution of the value of the advowson to the plaintiff by the defendant's life-interest, nor in estimating the annual proceeds to deduct the curate's stipend. Lord Sondes v. Fletcher, T. 3 G. 4. 835 36. A bill against an attorney was filed of Michaelmas term, and appeared by the memorandum to have been filed on the 28th of November: Held, that evidence was admissible to shew that it was actually filed on the 24th December : Held, also, that a demand and refusal is evidence of a prior conversion; and, therefore, where deeds were in defendant's possession prior to Michaelmas term, and the de

mand and refusal proved were on the day after that term, it was held that this was evidence of a conversion before the term. Wilton v. Girdlestone, T. 3 G. 4.

Page 847 37. The notice to the tenant in possession at the foot of the declaration in ejectment, need not be in the name of the plaintiff; but, if in the name of the lessor of the plaintiff, or even any other person, the Court will permit the rule for judgment against the casual ejector to be drawn up. Goodtitle dem. Duke of Norfolk v. Notitle, T. 3 G.4.

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38. Where a surety in a warrant of attorney, in order to discharge himself from his personal liability, paid part of the debt due to the creditor of a bankrupt, who had proved under the commission, and thereupon satisfaction was entered on the record: Held, that this did not fall within the 49 G. 3. c. 121. s. 8. as being a payment of part of a debt in discharge of the whole, and that consequently the bankrupt's certificate was no bar to an action by the surety to recover the money so paid by him. Soutten v. Soutten, T. 3 G. 4.

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39. In debt for use and occupation after judgment by default. Semble that a writ of enquiry is necessary before signing final judgment. Arden v. Connell, T. 3 G. 4. 885 40. Where a plaintiff had issued one writ against three defendants for separate causes of action, and after delivering three separate declarations de bene esse, entered one common appearance according to the statute for all the three defendants, and signed three interlocutory judgments as for want of plea: Held, that this was irregular, Cox v. Bucknell, T. 3 G. 4, :892 41. Where a plaintiff had been nonsuited at nisi prius on the ground

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of a trifling variance between the contract set out, and that proved, the Court granted a new trial with leave to amend the declaration, generally on payment of costs, with liberty to the defendant to plead de novo or demur. Williams v. Pratt, T. 3 G. 4. Page 896 42. Charges for holding the courts leet of a manor by the steward, are charges for business connected with his professional character of an attorney; and, therefore, are like conveyancing charges, taxable when found in a bill containing other taxable items. Luxmore, Gent., one. &c. v. Lethbridge, one, &c. T. 3 G. 4. 43. The Court will not grant a mandamus to a private trading corporation to permit a transfer of stock to be made in their books. Rex v. The London Assurance Company, T. 3 G. 4.

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899 44. Where a lord of a manor is indicted for a nuisance in not repairing the bank of a river, the Court will not compell him to allow the prosecutor, even though he is a tenant of the manor, to inspect the court rolls for the purpose of obtaining evidence in support of the prosecution. Rex v. The Earl of Cadogan, T. 3 G. 4. 902 45. No motion can be made to stay the proceedings in an action on a judgment pending a writ of error until bail have been put in and perfected. Abraham v. Pugh, T. 3 G. 4. 903

46. Where a plaintiff, shortly previous to making an affidavit of debt, had written a letter, stating that the defendant was a creditor of his, the Court interfered in a summary way to discharge the defendant out of custody, on affidavits denying the debt, the plaintiff not having denied the writing of such

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letter by him, or alleged that the debt due to him had arisen subsequently to it. Nizetich v. Bona

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cich, T. 3 G. 4. Page 904 47. Where a defendant, being previously in custody in execution for a debt, a detainer was lodged against him, but for too large a sum, and on this being discovered in a few hours, the plaintiff discontinued on payment of costs, and before the payment of costs lodged a fresh detainer: Held, that this second detainer was regular, and that it was not like the case of a fresh arrest, which cannot be made till the costs have been paid. White v. Gompertz, T. 3 G. 4. Where a cause stood in the paper below the last cause mentioned in the written list affixed at the outside of the court, and was tried, (being stated to be an undefended cause,) the counsel for the defendant objecting to it, and declining to appear: Held, that the trial was regular, and the Court refused a new trial, there being no affidavit of merits. Blackhurst v. Bulmer, T. 3 G.4. 907 Where a plaintiff carried on business abroad, and had no permanent residence in England, but was in England at the time of bringing the action, and it was sworn, had no intention of leaving the country: Held, that this was no sufficient answer to an application for security for costs, inasmuch as it was not distinctly sworn that he resided and intended to continue to reside here: Held, also, that it is no answer to such application, that the action is brought in pursuance of liberty reserved by the Vice-Chancellor, it not being brought by his direction. Oliva

49.

v. Johnson, T. 3 G. 4.

908

'PRIN

PRINCIPAL AND AGENT.

1. The owner of goods being indebted to a factor in an amount exceeding their value, consigned them to him for sale: the factor being also similarly indebted to I. S., sold the goods to him. The factor afterwards became bankrupt; and on a settlement of accounts between I. S. and the assignees, I. S. allowed credit to them for the price of the goods, and proved the residue of his claim against the estate: Held, that as the factor had a lien on the whole price of the goods, such settlement of accounts between the vendee and the assignees afforded a good answer to an action against the vendee for the price of the goods, brought either by or on the account of the original

owner.

By 47 G. 3. sess. 2. c. 28. s. 29., "All contracts for coals are to be fairly entered in a book to be kept by the factor, subscribed by the buyer; and a copy of such contract is to be delivered by the factor to the clerk of the market, within an hour after the close of the market." A factor having coals consigned to him for sale by A., sold the same, and entered the contract in his book as having been made for C., the master of the ship. It was not signed by the purchaser; but in the copy delivered to the clerk of the market, the purchaser's name, as well as that of the factor, was inserted: the factor had no authority to insert the name of the master in his contract, but it was a commou practice in the coal trade so to do. Query, whether, under the circumstances, an action might be brought in the name of C. for the

Hudson v.

price of the coals. Granger, M. 2 G. 4. Page 27 2. A power of attorney authorizing an agent to demand, sue for, recover, and receive, by all lawful ways and means whatsoever, all monies, debts, dues, whatsoever, and to give sufficient discharges, does not authorize him to indorse bills for his principal. An agent having money in his hands belonging to his principal, purchases with it a bill of exchange, which he indorses specially to his principal; the latter, at the time of the indorsement, was dead, but that fact was not known to the agent: Held, that the property in the bill passed to the administrator of the principal, and that he might, therefore, sue upon the bill in that character. Murray v. The East India Company, M. 2 G. 4.

3.

204

A. and B. having agreed to purchase cottons on their joint account, directed their brokers to purchase the same. These purchases having been made, warrants or orders for delivery were made out in the name of the brokers, and the cottons were left in their possession as the brokers of A. Immediately after the purchase B. paid A. one half the value. After considerable purchases had been made, the brokers were informed that B. had an interest in the goods purchased; A., after this, directed the brokers to procure him a loan on the security of the warrants, and C. advanced money by discounting bills drawn by A. upon the brokers, as a security for which the whole of the warrants were deposited with C. by the brokers. While they were so deposited, the brokers received directions, both from A. and B., to make a division of the goods held on their joint account, which they

did by appropriating specific war-
rants to each party, and which
division was approved of by both.
Before the bills became due, the
brokers were directed by A. to get
one-half renewed; which C. agreed
to do, and discounted fresh bills, 1.

PROMOTIONS, 438.

QUO WARRANTO. See PRACTICE, 8. Where, in an application for a and the brokers then left in the hands of C., as a security for the quo warranto against a constable, the affidavits in support of the rule money thus advanced, the warstated, that for fifty years back, rants belonging to B.; C., however, not then knowing that B. and as long as deponents could recollect, there had been a custom had any interest in them: Held, in the town to elect a constable in first, that the first pledge did not transfer to C. any interest in that a particular mode, but did not expart of the goods which belonged pressly state that they believed to B. Semble that a sale by one such custom to be immemorial: of two tenants in common of the Held, that it was not sufficient. whole property is a conversion as Rex v. Lane, H. 2 and 3 G. 4. to the share of one, and, consePage 488 quently, that trover is maintain- 2. An information in the notice of a able: Held, secondly, that after quo warranto may be granted at the partition had taken place, the common law, within the 9 Anne, tenancy in common, if it ever had c. 20., against a party, for exercisexisted, was determined, and that ing the office of a bailiff in the being so, the second pledge was borough of M., although it was Quære, the pledge of a specific chattel benot a corporate office. whether in such a case, the delonging to B., which the brokers had no authority to make; and that fendant may plead several mattrover was maintainable. Barton ters. Rex v. Highmore, E. 3 G. 4. 771 v. Williams, H. 2 G. 4. Page 395 4. A., a merchant in London, had been in the habit of selling goods

RATE.

to B., resident in the country, and See INCLOSURE ACT, 2. JUSTICES, 3.

of delivering them to a wharfinger in London, to be forwarded to B. by the first ship, In pursuance of a parol order from B. goods were delivered to and accepted by the wharfinger, to be forwarded in the usual manner: Held, that this not being an acceptance by the buyer, was not sufficient to take the case out of the 29 Car. 2. c. 3. s. 17. Hanson v. Armitage, H. 2 and 3 G. 4.

PRINTER.

See PLEADING, 15.

557

RECOGNIZANCE.
See PRACTICE, 19.

REGISTER ACT.

See DEED, 1.

RENT.

See POOR RATE, 1. LANDLORD
AND TENANT, 11.

RESIGNATION BOND.

See ADVOWSON,

RELEASE.

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RELEASE.

A deed, containing a general release of all debts, &c., recited that the releasee had previously agreed to pay to the releasor the sum of 40%., for the possession of certain premises, and that, "in consideration of the said sum of 401. being now so paid as hereinbefore is mentioned," and also in consideration of the sum of 10s. a-piece, well and truly paid to the said releasor and J. S., the receipt of which said several sums of money they did thereby acknowledge, release, &c. There was also a receipt for the sum of 40%. indorsed on the release. But it appeared on an action afterwards brought for this sum, that in fact it had never been paid: Held, that this deed of release was no estoppel, inasmuch as the general words of release were qualified by the recital, which stated only an agreement to pay, and not an actual payment of the sum of 40l. Lampon v. Corke, E. 3 G. 4. Page 606

REMOVAL, ORDER OF.

1. An order of removal was dated 1st August, 1814, and an order of suspension indorsed thereon, in consequence of the sickness of the pauper; and a copy of such order and indorsement was, in 1814, served upon the appellants, but the original order not produced at the time of serving such copy; and subsequently, in 1815, another part of the order and indorsement executed by the same justices, but bearing date in August, 1814, was served upon the appellants. The pauper was not removed till 1819, when an appeal. was duly entered: Held, that the

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Page 184 2. Where an order of removal has been executed, and by consent of the removing parish and the magistrates making it, it is superseded, and the paupers taken back, it is in the discretion of the sessions to enter an appeal against it or not, according as they may think that justice requires it, in order to compel the respondents to pay the costs of maintenance, &c. incurred by the appellants before the order was superseded. Rex v. The Justices of Norfolk, H. 2 and 3 G. 4.

SEA.

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The public have no common law right of bathing in the sea; and as incident thereto of crossing the sea-shore on foot, or with bathing machines for that purpose. Blundell v. Catterall, M. 2 G.4. 268

SETTLEMENT.

1. A pauper, being eighteen years of age, and residing with his father, was drawn as a militia man, and served for five years as a ballotted man. During his service, he several times, when on furlough, and, finally, after his discharge from the militia, returned to his father's house: Held, that by his so remaining separated from his father's family after twenty-one, he was emancipated, although the original separation was not voluntary on his part. Rex v. The Inhabitants of Hardwick, M. 2 G. 4.

176 2. During

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