1821. LAWRENCE against ABERDEIN. and popular sense, as importing death arising from natural and not from violent causes. And that being so, there must be judgment for the plaintiff. BEST J. I am of the same opinion. At the time when this policy was effected, this country was at peace with all the world, and there was not any probability of the vessel being captured by enemies. Capture by pirates on the voyage insured was equally improbable, and a loss by barratry was not very likely to happen. If the underwriters are not liable for the loss in question, they can hardly be liable in any case, for there is not any other species of loss arising from the destruction of the animals, of which death may not be considered the immediate cause. If the ship was even sunk or burnt, death would be the immediate cause of the destruction of the animals, and consequently, according to the construction contended for, such a case would fall within the exception as a loss by mortality. The exception is introduced into the policy by the underwriters. If they had intended to exonerate themselves in every case of death occasioned by a peril of the sea, they should have used words apt and proper to express that intention. They might have stipulated, that they would not be liable for the death of the animals unless the ship were stranded or lost, and then they would not have been liable for the loss that has occurred in this case. They have only stipulated, that they will not be liable for loss by mortality. That word, in its ordinary and popular sense, signifies death arising from natural causes, and not from violence. I think, therefore, that the underwriters must be taken to have intended to exempt themselves, by this exception, from that species of loss which occur red red in Tatham v. Hodgson, viz. a loss of which death was the proximate cause, and the perils of the sea the remote cause. Here the injury done to the animals arose directly and immediately from the violence of the tempest, or in other words, from the perils of the sea. For these reasons, I am of opinion, that the plaintiff is entitled to the judgment of the Court. Judgment for the plaintiff. 1821. LAWRENCE against ABERDEIN. LONGRIDGE and Others against DORVILLE and Monday, Another. DECLARATION alleged, "that before the making of the promise, &c. a certain ship, called the Carolina Matilda, had then lately in a certain place, (to wit,) in the River Thames, (to wit,) at, &c. run foul of a certain October 29th. The giving up tuted to try a question re a suit, insti specting which the law is doubtful, is a good consider stipulated sum; and, therefore, having on board where a ship, other ship called the Zenobia, whereby the said last- ation for a promentioned ship had received great damage. And the mise to pay a said last-mentioned ship having received such damage, in consequence of being so run foul of as aforesaid, the plaintiffs, being the agents in that behalf of one- Symonds, the owner of the Zenobia, and the defendants, being the agents in that behalf of the owners of the a pilot required by law, ran foul of another ves sel, and proceedings were instituted by the owners of the latter to compel the owners of the former to make good the damage, and the former vessel was detained until bail was given, and pending such proceedings, the agents of the owners of the vessel detained agreed, on the owners of the damaged vessel renouncing all claims on the other vessel, and on their proving the amount of the damage done, to indemnify them, and to pay a stipulated sum by way of damages: Held, that there being contradictory decisions as to the point, whether ship owners were liable for an injury done while their ship was under the controul of the pilot required by law, there was a sufficient consideration to sustain the promise made by the agents of the owners of the detained vessel to pay the stipulated damages. 1821. LONGRIDGE against DORVILLE. Carolina Matilda, the former, as such agents, detained the Carolina Matilda, till the owners of the said lastmentioned ship should have made good to them the damage so done to the Zenobia?" It then stated, "that in consequence of such detention, the defendants undertook that they would, on the plaintiffs renouncing all claims on the Carolina Matilda, and on proving the amount of the damages sustained by the Zenobia, indemnify the plaintiffs for any sum not exceeding 1807., the exact amount to be ascertained when the said latter ship should have been repaired;" and then alleged, that, in consequence of such undertaking, the plaintiffs did renounce all claim on the Carolina Matilda, and did permit and allow her to proceed on her voyage, and that the Zenobia had been repaired, and that the amount of such repairs was ascertained There were also the common counts, and the defendants pleaded the general issue. The cause was tried before Abbott C. J. at the sittings after Easter term, 1820, when a verdict was found for the plaintiffs, subject to the opinion of this Court upon the following case: The Norwegian ship, called the Carolina Matilda, on her voyage to Norway, in sailing down the river Thames in November last, ran foul of the ship called the Zenobia, then lying at anchor, and in consequence of which, the latter ship sustained considerable damage. The plaintiffs, acting as the agents of Mr. R. Symonds, the owner of the Zenobia, instituted a proceeding in the High Court of Admiralty against the ship Carolina Matilda, to compel her owners to make good the damages sustained by the Zenobia, in conse quence of being so run foul of Process was issued against the Carolina Matilda, under which she was arrested arrested at Gravesend on the 22d November last, and on Puller, for the plaintiff. It is not necessary to consider the question, whether the owners of the Carolina are liable for the damage done to the Zenobia, under the circumstances of the case; for the defendants have made themselves liable by an express promise, founded upon a good consideration. The plaintiffs agree to release the ship, which they might otherwise have detained until 1821. LONGRIDGE against DORVILLE. 1821. LONGRIDGE against DORVILLE. bail was given; and the defendants agree to pay a stipulated sum by way of damage; waiving all question as to the legal liability of the owners. That might be considered as doubtful, there having been contradictory decisions. (a) The defendants, or their principals, therefore, have obtained a benefit by the immediate release of the ship; and that constitutes a good consideration for the promise laid in the declaration. F. Pollock, contrà. There is no sufficient consideration for the promise in the declaration, because the plaintiffs had no ground for instituting the suit in the Admiralty Court against the Carolina. The question whether the defendants are liable upon their undertaking, must depend upon this, whether the owners were liable for the injury, the ship at the time having on board a pilot, as required by the act of parliament. If they were not liable, the plaintiff had no right to institute the suit in the Admiralty Court; and the forbearance of a suit, where a party is not liable, is not a good consideration. Tooley v. Windham (b) and King v. Hobbs (c) are authorities in point. ABBOTT C. J. I am of opinion, that there is a sufficient consideration in this case to sustain the promise, without enquiring whether the owners of the ship are liable, under the circumstances of the case. It appears that a suit had been instituted by the plaintiffs in the Court of Admiralty against the Carolina Matilda, to compel her owners to make good the damage done by (a) Neptune the Second, Dodson, Adm. R. 467. 7 Taunt. 309. (b) Cro. Eliz. 206. (c) Yelverton. 25. Ritchie v. Bowsfield, her |