1821. Doɛ dem. statute, by which it is enacted, that every deed or conveyance that shall, after the 29th September, 1709, be made and executed, shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against any subsequent purchaser, or mortgagee, for valuable consideration, unless a memorial thereof be registered before the registering of the memorial of the deed or conveyance, under which such subsequent purchaser or mortgagee shall claim. Now it is impossible, that plainer words could be used, and I think, that, sitting in a court of law, we are bound to give effect to them, and that we cannot say, that this deed is not fraudulent and void within the meaning of this act, because, possibly it may turn out upon examination, that the defendant is entitled to some relief in equity. If there be any such ground, a court of equity may interfere, and this case shews clearly how inconvenient it would be, if this court were to enter into any equitable considerations. For here, it is clear, that the lessor of the plaintiff had at all events a lien on the instrument of conveyance. What effect that might have on a court of equity, I cannot say, but I think it at least is a fit matter for its consideration. We however, in a court of law, must give effect to the words of the act. BAYLEY J. I am of the same opinion. The words of the statute are, that such deeds or conveyances shall be adjudged fraudulent and void against every subsequent purchaser for valuable consideration. It is to be observed, that the words "bonâ fide purchaser" are not used. I think, therefore, that we are bound in a court of law to give effect to these words. That seems to have been the opinion of the Judges in the cases cited, although they thought that a court of equity would, in some some cases, interfere to relieve the party. It is so laid down by Lord Hardwicke, in Le Neve v. Le Neve, and the words of Lord Mansfield, in Doe v. Routledge (a), are these, "Equity says, if the party knew of the unregistered deed, his registered deed shall not set it aside, because he has that notice which the act of parliament intended he should have." He therefore puts it as a case in which equity would interfere; and the circumstances of this case shew the propriety of our adhering to the words of the act; for I am by no means clear that we should not work great injustice, if we were to decide in favour of the defendant. BEST J. (b) The words of this statute are quite clear, and in the absence of any case, I should think the plaintiff entitled to judgment. But it seems to me, that the case of Le Nepe v. Le Neve, in which Lord Hardwicke considers the party under these circumstances as entitled to relief in equity, is an authority to shew, that at law he is without defence. (a) Cowp. 712. Judgment for the lessor of the plaintiff. (b) Holroyd J. absent at Chambers. 1821. Doɛ dem. GOODE and BENNION against HARRISON. (In Error.) Friday, WRIT of error from the Court of Common Pleas, Where an in fant held him at Lancaster. The original action was brought self out as in by Harrison against Goode and Bennion, as partners, to I. S., and con partnership with tinued to act as such till within a short period of his coming of age; but there was no proof of his doing any act as a partner after twenty-one: Held, that it was his duty to notify his disaffirmance of the partnership on arriving at twenty-one; and as he had neglected to do so, that he was responsible to persons who had trusted I. S. with goods, subsequently to the infant's attaining twenty-one, on the credit of the partnership. L 2 recover recover the amount of a certain bill of exchange for 1877. 12s. There were also other counts for goods sold and delivered. The only question made was as to the liability of Bennion. At the trial, at the Lancaster Summer assizes, 1819, before Bayley J., the counsel for the defendant, Bennion, tendered a bill of exceptions to the learned Judge's direction to the jury, which bill of exceptions stated the following facts, viz. that upon the trial the counsel for Harrison, to maintain their issue, gave in evidence that John Goode and Bennion, in April, 1818, called upon one James Fair, a broker, at Manchester; that Goode introduced Bennion to Fair as a friend of his from Liverpool, and said, "We want goods:" that Fair went with them to Harrison and other houses in Manchester, and introduced them to Harrison as the firm of Goode and Bennion : that they bought goods of Harrison to the amount of 130%., and from several different other persons fifteen parcels, to the amount altogether of 1500l., and Fair transmitted copies of the invoices of the goods, directed to Goode and Bennion, Liverpool, some of which were made out to the firm of Goode and Bennion, others to John Goode and T. Bennion: that some of the original invoices were seen by them in Fair's counting-house, and the goods were forwarded to the address of Goode and Bennion, and remittances came back that when Goode and Bennion were in Manchester, in April, 1818, Goode, in the hearing of Bennion, said, that if the goods they then bought would answer the purpose, in a very short time they would have 500 pieces of one sort and 500 of another sort: that after this Fair corresponded with the firm of Goode and Bennion: that in April, 1818, Goode and Bennion had a counting-house in Li : verpool; ver pool; that the name of Goode appeared on the private door, and remained there till August, 1819, but the name of Bennion did not appear at all on the : counting-house that Goode had been some time in the counting-house before this transaction of Goode and Bennion, but had not shipped goods before: that in the beginning of January, 1819, Fair received a letter, in the hand-writing of Goode, ordering goods, of which the following is a copy: "Liverpool, January 4th, 1819. My dear Sir, Though we have not yet received the promised detained accounts from America, we are anxious that all the opportunity of cheap purchasing may not go past. We, therefore, authorize you, if the terms are about the same, to purchase for N York, from 300l. to 500%. of the most saleable articles, to secure which more fully, we wish the greatest extent of credit mentioned in your letter. I am, for G. and B., very respectfully, yours, John Goode." That Fair, in consequence thereof, bought goods from Harrison to the amount of 1871. 12s., having no reason to suppose that the connection between Goode and Bennion was put an end to, and forwarded the goods, and also a bill of parcels for the same, to the direction of Goode and Bennion, and that on the 16th January, 1819, Harrison drew a bill of exchange for the amount of those goods upon Goode and Bennion, which bill of exchange the said John Goode accepted in the name of Goode and Bennion, and which was the bill of exchange mentioned in the first count of the declaration: that Fair did not see Bennion from the time of his being in Manchester, in April, 1818, till the month of February, 1819, at which time Bennion asked Fair for the acccount current of Goode and Bennion L 3 1821. GOODE against HARRISON. Bennion for goods bought when he and Goode came be the counsel learned in the law for the said Thomas Bennion, in order to support the issue on his part, gave in evidence, that Bennion was born on the 29th May, 1797. And he also further gave in evidence by one Riley, that the said Riley was five months in the employ of Goode, previously, and at the time of the first purchase, and that he kept the books, and that Bennion was never a partner with Goode to the knowledge of Riley. Riley further proved, that he went to Barbadoes |