1822. DUNK against HUNTER. demise for 21 years. If it does, then the allegation in the avowry is made out in evidence. Iu the case of Morgan v. Bissell (a), the rule is laid down thus, that although there are words of present demise, yet if you collect on the face of the instrument, the intent of the parties to give a future lease, it shall be considered an agreement only. It is clear in this case, that the memorandum of agreement was not intended to operate as a present demise. We cannot ascertain from the language of the instrument, when the term was to commence. There are no words of demise, nor any words from which a warranty of title may be implied, as would be the case if the word "grant" had been inserted. The meaning of the parties seems to have been, that if the defendant entered before the 11th February, the term was to commence from the period of such entry. Upon the whole, therefore, it seems to me, that the parties contemplated the execution of a future lease. Then, if this was not an actual demise for 21 years, the party did not at all events hold at the annual rent of €31., and if so, the plaintiff by law could not distrain, the rent not being fixed. If a person bargains for a lease for 21 years, the rent is estimated upon an average for the whole term, and it may be of no benefit to the party whatever for the first year of his occupation. Here, the rent of 637. is estimated on the terms of there being a lease granted, and at the time when the distress was made, no lease was granted, and no payment of rent had taken place. I think, therefore, that the plaintiff did not hold the premises at any specific rent, and that the defendant's only remedy was by an action for use and (a) 5 Taunt. 65. Occu occupation, in which the amount of the rent would be a question to be left to the jury. This rule, therefore, must be made absolute. HOLROYD J. I am of opinion that the defendant was not entitled to distrain. This did not operate as a present demise, but was a mere agreement to let in future, and by a different instrument. And there is nothing to shew, that it was the intention of the defendant to part with the premises until that instrument was executed. It is clear, that an agreement to grant a lease does not amount to a letting. Besides, in this case, there are subsequent words relative to the introduction of a clause for purchasing, which shew, that the letting was to be by a particular instrument containing such a clause. And in addition to this, the stipulation as to the payment of 50%. upon entry, is quite inconsistent with this being an actual demise. For if it were an actual demise, the tenant would have had a right to enter immediately without paying that sum. I think, therefore, that the defendant was not entitled to distrain, and that the rule must be made absolute. BEST J. concurred. Rule absolute. 1822. DUNK against HUNTER. 1822. I. S. being the master of the workhouse, appointed by, and receiving orders from, the guardians of the poor of the parish of W. bought provisions from 4. B. one of such guardians: Held, that A. B. was liable to the penalty of 100, imposed by the 55 G. 3. c. 137. s. 6. WEST against ANDREWS. DEBT on 55 G. 3. c. 137. s. 6. for a penalty of 100%. Declaration stated, that defendant, on 1st June, 1820, was overseer of the poor of Westhamperett, in Sussex, and during the time he was overseer, furnished and supplied in his own name, goods and provisions for the support of the poor. The second count described him as a person in whose hands the collection of the rates was. Plea general issue. At the trial before Burrough J., at the last assizes for the county of Sussex, it appeared that defendant was one of the guardians of the poor for the parish, and that the poor-house there was under their controul, being managed by one Griffiths, who was the master of the poor-house appointed by the guardians, and receiving his orders from them. Griffiths provided for the poor, having a contract at so much per head, and found all the meat, &c. In the year 1820, he bought of the defendant, then being such guardian of the poor, four live sheep for the use of the poor, and paid him for them. The learned Judge thought this not a case within the act, and directed a non-suit. Gurney having in last Michaelmas term obtained a rule nisi for a new trial. Marryat shewed cause. Here, the defendant did not supply the sheep to the parish, and had therefore no claim on the parish. His claim was solely on Griffiths, who had a standing contract with the parish, and full liberty to buy from whom he pleased. The object of the the act was, to prevent overseers from availing themselves of their situation, to force their goods on the parish. In Proctor v. Manwaring (a), and Pope v. Backhouse (b), the articles were supplied to the individuals receiving relief. Here, that was not the case. If any complaint was made of the provisions supplied, it would be made not to the defendant alone, but to the whole body of guardians. Gurney and Merewether, contrà. The case falls within the words and mischief intended to be remedied by the act. If this be allowed, one guardian may supply meat, another flour, &c.; and then, although complaint might be made to the general body, yet they would be all interested not to do justice. ABBOTT C. J. I am of opinion, that this is a case within the act of parliament. Here the defendant has made a bargain for the supply of provisions with a third person, who has the contract for providing for the poor, and whom the defendant, in conjunction with others, appoints to his situation, and whose conduct it is his duty to superintend. Under these circumstances, it seems to me, that all the mischief which was contemplated by the legislature would arise, if we were to hold that it was lawful. I am therefore clearly of opinion, that the defendant's case falls both within the words and spirit of the act of parliament, and that the rule for a new trial must therefore be made absolute. Rule absolute. 1822. WEST against ANDREWS. 1822. An issue having satisfy the court GURNEY and Others against LANGLANDS. been directed to REIGNED issue directed by the Court of King's Bench, to try whether the supposed signature of Thomas Gurney the plaintiff, to a certain warrant of as to the forgery of a signature to a warrant of attorney, a ver dict was found, establishing the genuineness of it, upon evi dence satisfactory to the the cause, and to the court upon his report of it. In the course of the trial, an inspector of franks, who had never seen the party write, was called to attorney, dated 16th April, 1821, was forged. At the trial before Wood B., at the last assizes for Surrey, the plaintiff, in support of the affirmative of the issue, tendered the evidence of Joseph Hume, inspector of judge who tried franks at the post-office, who stated, that he was unacquainted with the plaintiff's hand-writing, and was then asked the following question: "From your knowledge of hand-writing, do you believe the hand-writing in question to be a genuine signature, or an imitation." This question was objected to, and the objection allowed prove, from his by the learned Judge, who stated in his report the following reasons: "When a witness has seen another write, or has, by receiving notes or letters from him, become acquainted with his hand-writing, he has a ground of forming a belief as to it. But where, as in this case, he acknowledges that he had not any previous acquaintance whatever with the hand-writing of the plaintiff, he could not, as I conceived, have any the ground that foundation for his opinion or belief, whether the signa knowledge of not genuine, but an imitation; this evidence having been rejected, the court re fused to disturb the verdict, on such evidence, even if admis sible, was entitled to very little weight, and that the issue being to satisfy the court, a new trial ought not ture in question was genuine or only an imitation; for he had never seen or had any knowledge of that of which it was supposed to be an imitation. There is no general known standard by which hand-writing can to be granted, unless for the rejection of evidence which might reasonably have altered the verdict. Quære, if such evidence be admissible at all. upon |