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1822.

The KING against The Inhabit. ants of WILMINGTON.

still continues to reside. Whilst the
Whilst the pauper followed
the business of mole-catching at Crayford, he used
occasionally to visit his father both at Poplar and at
Bow, and once slept at the father's house in Poplar, but
he did not receive any maintenance or assistance what-
soever from his father. After the father had occupied the
house at Bow for rather more than a year, the pauper,
who was then about 19 years of age, married his present
wife. The question for the opinion of the Court was,
whether the pauper before his marriage was emanci-
pated by his earning his own livelihood, in the manner
before mentioned, in the parish of Crayford.

Bolland, in support of the order of sessions, contended, that the pauper was emancipated at the time when the father gained his settlement at Bow. And he relied on the case of Eastwoodhey v. Westwoodhey (a), and Lord Kenyon's judgment in Rex v. Offchurch (b), and Rex v. Walpole St. Peter's. (c)

Berens contrà, was stopped by the Court.

ABBOTT C. J. It is of importance to lay down so general rule for the guidance of magistrates on this subject of emancipation, and the best which I can suggest is this, that during the minority of a child there can be no emancipation, unless he marries, and so becomes himself the head of a family, or contracts some other relation, so as wholly and permanently to exclude the parental control. I say nothing about his acquiring a settlement of his own, because that does not, as it seems

(a) i Str. 438. (5) 3 T. R. 114.

(c) Burr. S. C. 638.

to

to me, properly fall under this head. There can bế, however, no question, that in that case he is only removeable to his own acquired settlement. Here, the pauper was under 21, and had neither married nor contracted any such relation as I have described, at the time when his father acquired the settlement at Bow. He was therefore not emancipated, and the order of sessions is wrong.

Order of sessions quashed. (a)

(a) See Rex v. Witton cum Twambrookes, 3 T. R. 355.

1822.

The KING against The Inhabit

ants of WILMINGTON.

The KING against RIDGWAY.

THIS was an appeal to the quarter sessions of the
peace for the county of Lancaster, against the fol-
lowing conviction, for an offence under the statute
39 and 40 G. 3. c. 106. s. 4.
Be it remembered, that on the
1821, T. H., &c. are convicted before us, R. P. and

Lancaster, to wit.

19th day of March,

S. W., Esquires, two of his majesty's justices of the peace for the county of Lancaster, of having, on the 10th of March, in the year aforesaid, and within the space of three calendar months next before this present 19th day of March, in the year aforesaid, at Great Bolton, in the county of Lancaster, attended a meeting of journeymen and workmen, then and there had and held, for purpose of maintaining, supporting, continuing, carrying on a combination, for a purpose, by the

the

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Where the seshearing the merits, quashed a conviction under 39 & 40 G.3. c. 106. s. 4.

sions, without

for a defect in

form, the court

of King's Bench will,

upon a removal of the order by certiorari, quash

the order of

sessions, if they are of opinion that there is no defect in form,

and send the

case back to be

heard upon the merits. It

was stated in

and

that defendants

such conviction sta- had attended a meeting for carrying on a combination of journeymen, for the purpose of obtaining an advance of wages: Held, that this expression was synonymous with the words of the act, which prohibits combinations to obtain an advance of wages, and that the conviction was sufficient.

M m 2

tute

1822.

The KING against RIDGWAY.

tute in such case made and provided, and hereinafter next mentioned, declared to be illegal, to wit, A combination of journeymen and workmen in the business of bleaching, for the purpose of obtaining an advance of wages in that business, contrary to the statute made in the 39th and 40th years of the reign of his late majesty, King George the Third, intituled, &c. When the appeal came on to be heard, several objections were taken by the counsel for the appellants to the form of the conviction. And the Sessions, without hearing any evidence on the merits, made an order for quashing the conviction, subject to the opinion of this Court as to its sufficiency in point of form.

J. Williams and Denman, in support of the order of sessions. Even supposing the sessions wrong, there is no precedent which can be found, where this Court have ever interfered after the sessions have quashed a conviction. This is like moving for a new trial after an acquittal for a misdemeanour, owing to a misdirection on the part of the Judge, which is never allowed. The cases in which this has been done before, are Rex v. Allen (a), Rex v. Cook (b), and Rex v. Redfearne. (c) But all those cases were reserved on facts, and in the two latter, the convictions had been affirmed by the sessions. Here too the act on which this conviction proceeds, has fixed a limited time within which the charge must be preferred, which affords an additional argument against reserving a case on a mere point of form, and after long delay in the court above, again trying the merits at the sessions. But supposing this not to be

(a) 15 East, 545.

(b) 3 T. R. 519. (c) 4 T. R. 275. well

of

well founded as a preliminary objection, then the conviction is defective in form. It only states, that the parties convicted, attended a meeting for the purpose maintaining, supporting, continuing, and carrying on a combination for a purpose by the statute declared to be illegal, viz. a combination for the purpose of obtaining an advance of wages. Now this does not follow the words of the act 39 and 40 G. 3. c. 106., the third section of which, in describing the combinations thereby made illegal, calls them combinations to obtain an advance of wages. Now, a combination for the purpose of obtaining, is not necessarily a combination to obtain. For the former would include combinations for an idle, foolish, and irrelevant purpose, but the latter could only mean such as are likely or calculated to obtain the end. And this was the opinion of Lord Ellenborough in Rex v. Nield and Others (a), where he says, "It is not enough that the agreement should be for the purpose of controlling, that is, with intent to control, but it must be entered into for controlling, that is, for effecting that object." That is precisely in point with the present The safest way in these cases is, to follow exactly the words of the statute.

case.

Scarlett, Coltman, and Starkie, contrà, were stopped by the Court.

ABBOTT C. J. I am of opinion, that in this case, the order of sessions is wrong and must be quashed. This order is brought before us by certiorari, and that being so, we find that the original conviction has been quashed

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1822.

The KING

against RIDGWAY.

1822.

The KING against RIDGWAY.

by the sessions for informality. It is then our duty to examine it, and if we cannot see any informality in it, to quash the order of sessions. But in so doing, we ought not to deprive the party of his appeal on the merits, and therefore, we shall, after quashing the order of sessions, send the case back to them to enter continuances and hear the appeal, Then is there any informality? No man entertains greater respect for the opinion of Lord Ellenborough than I do, but I own that the observation quoted from Rex v. Nield and Others is not satisfactory to my mind. He seems to have considered the word purpose as synonymous with the word intent, and to have thought that an agreement with intent to control might not be an agreement to control. But looking at this act of parliament, I am of opinion, that a combination for the purpose of obtaining, and a combination to ob tain an advance of wages, are the same. The third section expressly prohibits combinations to obtain an advance of wages, or to lessen the time of work, or to decrease the quantity, or for any other purpose contrary to the act. That shews, that the legislature in using the word "purpose" in this act, meant it to be synonymous not with "intent," but with "object." The same observation is deducible from the words of the fourth section. I think, therefore, that there is no difference in the sense of the words used in this conviction and the words of the act of parliament, and if so, the conviction is sufficient.

BAYLEY J. I am of the same opinion. The very words of the statute need not be used in the conviction, it is sufficient if the words used are equivalent with the words of the act. Now, here the words "for the pur

pose

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