1822. The KING The Justices of had jurisdiction, and that they ought to have heard the appeal. This rule must be absolute. Rule absolute. Jessopp and Brodrick were to have supported the rule. Tuesday, A certificate to FOXALL against BANKS and Another. deprivalo HUTCHINSON, on a prior day in this term, obtained a rule nisi, calling on the plaintiff's at tiff of costs may be indorsed on the postea after costs have been taxed, and although attorney was present and did not object to such taxation. torney to produce the postea in this case, before Wood B., in order that he might certify, to deprive the plain the defendants' tiff of his costs. The case, which was an action of trespass, was tried at the last assizes for Surry, before Wood B., when a verdict was found for the plaintiff, damages one farthing. The Judge, at the trial, intimated his intention of considering whether he should certify or not. It appeared by the affidavit, that the costs had been regularly taxed, and that the taxation had been attended by the clerk of the defendants' attorney, and that no objection was then made. Subsequently to this, a summons was taken out before Wood B., to shew cause why the postea should not be produced, and a certificate endorsed thereon. This summons was attended by the parties, and the learned Judge then expressed his intention to certify, but the plaintiff's attorney refused to produce the postea for that purpose, Turton shewed cause, and contended,. that the application for a certificate came too late, after the costs had been taxed, Per Per Curiam. The application was in time, for a certificate may at any time be indorsed on the postea. Let the rule be made absolute, and with costs. Rule absolute, with costs. 1822. FOXALL against BANKS. CHAPPELL against ASHLEY. a ANDREWS moved for a rule nisi to discharge Tuesday, February 12th. When a deexecution for a particular debt under 300, although the aggregate of the fendant is in that debts for which he is in execu but was that the second and third clauses of the 33 G. 3. c. 5. must be construed together, and that, inasmuch as the defendant could not be entitled to the relief given by the second clause, he ought not to be subjected to the compulsory power in the third. ABBOTT C. J. I am of opinion that the defendant is not entitled to this rule. The act of parliament is a remedial one for the benefit of the creditor; and I think that it is competent for any one creditor whose debt does not amount to 3007. to avail himself of this clause in the act, and to compel the defendant to assign his property, whatever may be the whole amount of the debts for which the defendant is in execution. Rule refused. liable, at the instance of the particular cre ditor, to be brought up under the com pulsory clause act, 33G.3.c. 5. in the lords' 1822. Tuesday, A clerk to an during the term for which he was bound, the office of sur of taxes under the crown: Held, In the Matter of TAYLOR, Gent. one, &c. attorney held, E. ALDERSON, in last Michaelmas term, obtained a rule nisi for striking this person off the roll of attorneys of this court, upon the ground that he had not duly served his time as a clerk to an attorney. It appeared upon the affidavits, that during the whole time for which he was bound, he had been surveyor of taxes for the wapentake of Claro, and the borough and liberty of Ripon, in the county of York; for which purpose he occupied an office, where the business relating to the proper business taxes was conducted. The affidavits in answer admitted this fact, but stated that the business of the office did that he could not, within 28 G. 2. c. 46. s. 8 & 10., be considered as serving his whole time and term in the of an attorney, and that he ought not to be admitted on the roll, and that having not occupy more than one-eighth of his time, and that during all the remaining portion, he was employed in he ought to be learning his profession as an attorney. struck off. Scarlett and Littledale shewed cause, and contended that this was no more than if the time employed by him as surveyor of taxes had been allowed to him by the consent of his master for the acquisition of any other useful information, or for amusement; and that substantially he had served the full time required by law. E. Alderson contrà referred to 22 G. 2. c. 46. s. 8., by which every person who shall be bound to serve any attorney shall, during the whole time and term of service, continue and be actually employed by such attorney in the proper business, practice, or employment of an attorney; and by section 10., before he can be admitted, he he must make an affidavit that he has actually and really served during the said whole term of five years. Here there were two inconsistent employments, and, therefore, he could not possibly have served the whole time and term. Per Curiam. It is very important that we should require these provisions to be strictly complied with. Here the party having an employment under the crown during the whole time, could not, with propriety, have made the requisite affidavit. And, therefore, however much we may regret it, we think it our duty to make this rule absolute. 1822. In the Matter of Rule absolute. REX against the Justices of SURREY. COWLEY had obtained a rule nisi for a mandamus Tuesday, Where a statute giving reason gives an appeal, to the justices of Surrey to enter continuances, and the appellant hear the appeal of Andrew Barnet against a conviction able notice to for gaming under 12 G. 2. c. 28. convicted on the 6th November last, and entered into the other par The defendant was recognizances to appeal against it to the next quarter ties; such notice need not be in writing, but a verbal notice, if rea time, is suffi sessions. It was sworn on the one side, and denied by sonable as to the other, that at the time of entering into recog- cient. nizances, his attorney gave a verbal notice to the informer of his intention to appeal. The defendant attended in order to prosecute his appeal at the last January sessions, when, there having been no notice of appeal in writing, the Court refused to hear the appeal. The 5th section of the act giving the ap peal 1822. The KING against The Justices of SURREY. peal states, that" persons aggrieved may appeal, giving reasonable notice to the prosecutor, and entering into recognizances, &c." Turton shewed cause, and contended that the ses sions were to judge what was a reasonable notice of appeal, and they were of opinion that it must be a notice in writing. Cowley and Adolphus contrá, stopped by the Court. ABBOTT C. J. We are of opinion, that where a statute requires reasonable notice to be given, it does not necessarily mean that the notice should be in writing, but only that as to time or number of days it should be reasonable. Here, however, as the fact is disputed, we shall only grant a mandamus to the justices, commanding them to examine whether reasonable verbal notice has been given, and, in that case, to enter continuances, and hear the appeal. Rule accordingly. Tuesday, In trespass the Court will, upon a proper case being made JOHNSON against BIRLEY and Others. LITTLEDALE, on a former day in this term, obtained a rule nisi, calling on the plaintiff's attorney for it, require to disclose the place of residence and occupation of the plaintiff's attorney to give the plaintiff to the defendants, and for staying the pro to the defend ants informa. tion as to the place of abode and occupation of the plaintiff. And where the alleged assault was stated to have taken place, at a meeting at which many thousand people were present, and the defendants did not know, and could not find out, after diligent enquiry, who the plaintiff was, the Court thought it a proper case for their requiring such information to be given. ceedings |