in favour of the defendant, and may be considered in The costs of main vidès for the expenses of the trial. ABBOTT C. J. I am of opinion, that the city of Bath is liable to contribute to the county-rate, and that in this case, our judgement should be for the crown. The question depends on the construction to be put upon the (a) 2 Str. 1154. 1822. The KING against CLARKE, 55 G. 3. 1822. The KING against CLARKE, 55 G. 3. c. 51. s. 1., by which a power is given to the justices of the county, to tax every parish, township and other place, whether parochial or extra parochial, within the respective limits of their commissions. The first question, therefore, which arises, is whether the city of Bath be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the justices of the county of Somerset. Now, it appears from the statement of the case, that they alone have the power of trying felonies committed within the city. It is, therefore, clear, that Bath is within the limits of their jurisdiction. Then comes the proviso, which states, that the act shall not give any jurisdiction to the justices of the county over any places situate within the limits of any liberties or franchises having a separate jurisdiction. Then is the city of Bath a franchise, having a separate jurisdiction?" I think that these words must mean, "having a separate jurisdiction coextensive with that possessed by the county justices." Here it is clear, that the justices of Bath have no such jurisdiction for their jurisdiction is by the charter of Elizabeth confined to such trespasses, offences, defects and articles, which do or may belong to the office of a justice of the peace. It is clear from these words, that it does not extend to felony, and therefore, is not coextensive with that of the county justices. Then, if so, the case does not fall within that part of the proviso ; but the proviso goes further, and speaks of places which before the act were "subject to rates in the nature of county rates, or which were exempt from the rates of the county, either in the whole, or in part, under some grant, charter, or local act of parliament." Now it is clear from the case, that the city of Bath, previously to the 55 G. 3. was not subject to any rate in the nature of a county rate, nor do I find it stated, that it was legally exempted exempted by any grant, charter, or local act of parliament. Upon the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, that the city of Bath does not fall within the proviso. Nor does the 24th section, as it seems to me, carry the case any further, for that clause only applies to such franchises as have commissions of the peace within themselves, and are not subject to the jurisdiction of the commission of the peace for the counties in which they lie. Here, the city of Bath was, in my opinion, subject to that jurisdiction, and our judgment, therefore, must be for the crown. BAYLEY J. I am of the same opinion. The county rate is appropriated to certain specific purposes, and the object of the statute 55 G. 3. c. 51. being to have a fair and equal rate, it seems to me, that all ought to contribute to it who derive a benefit from it. Now, one of the purposes of the rate is to maintain felons in gaol, and, in this case, persons imprisoned for felonies committed within the city of Bath, are maintained out of the county rate for Somersetshire, and according to justice, therefore, the city of Bath ought to contribute. The first question is, whether Bath be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the county magistrates. Now primâ facie their jurisdiction is co-extensive with the county, and if they are excluded from any franchise to a limited extent, they still continue to have jurisdiction there, so far as they are not expressly excluded. From the statement of the case, it is clear, that the county justices have a jurisdiction within the city of Bath, as far as the trial of felonies there committed. Then does Bath come within the proviso? I think not. The separate jurisdictions there mentioned, mean such as are coextensive with all the purposes for which the county VOL. V. Y y rate 1822. The KING against CLARKE. 1822. The KING against CLARKE. rate is payable, and extend to all the crimes over which the county magistrates have jurisdiction. But that is not the case here. There ought, therefore, to be judgment for the crown. HOLROYD J. Concurred. (a) Judgment for crown. (a) Best J. was in the Bail Court. Tuesday, May 7th. DOWNES against RICHARDSON and Others, Assignees of the Estate and Effects of EBENEZER THOMPSON, a Bankrupt. Three persons. THIS was a feigned issue directed by the Vice Chanjoined as draw er, acceptor, and first in cellor, to try the question, whether Ebenezer dorser, in mak- Thompson, before and at the time of his bankruptcy, ing an accommodation bill; and it was af terwards issued for value to J.S. Previously to its being so is sued, its date was indebted to the plaintiff upon a bill of exchange, bearing date the 16th of March, 1818, drawn by one Rains upon, and accepted by the bankrupt for 1000l., payable to Rains's order, six months after date, and indorsed by him to the plaintiff. At the trial before Abbott C. J. at the London adjourned sittings after Hilary term, 1820, a verdict was found for the plaintiff, informed of it, subject to the opinion of the Court on the following had been alter ed: Held, that the acceptor, having assented to the alteration when he was it was no an swer to an action on the bill against him, that the bill had been so case: The bill of exchange appeared to bear date the 16th March, 1818, and purported to be indorsed by one Joseph Lachlan, as well as by J. S. Rains, and the sigthe drawer and natures of Rains as drawer and indorser, of E. Thompson first indorser, altered without the consent of and that a fresh as acceptor, and of J. Lachlan as indorser of the bill, stamp was not necessary in consequence of such alteration, the bill having been altered before it was issued in point of law. An accommodation bill is not issued until it is in the hands of some person who is entitled to treat it as a security available in law. were were proved to be of the hand-writing of those parties respectively. Rains, Thompson, and Lachlan had been some time before the drawing of this bill, concerned together in bill transactions; Rains being generally the drawer. The bills to which they were parties, were chiefly for the accommodation of Rains, but not solely; Lachlan and Thompson had also some accommodation from them. As the bills became due, Rains was to draw and provide for them, for the bills accepted by Lachlan, he was to draw on Lachlan, and for the bills accepted by Thompson, he was to draw on Thompson. When the bills became due, Rains provided for them by redrawing. The bill in question, was drawn, accepted, and indorsed in the course of these dealings. The body of the bill was written by one James Sims, who was employed to assist Rains in his cash transactions; Sims was not employed by Lachlan or Thompson. It had been agreed between the parties, that they would not accept bills unless they came through Sims. The bills were sometimes accepted in blank. After they were sometimes in the filled up and accepted, they were custody of Sims, and sometimes Sims handed them to Rains, and either Rains or Sims, as the case might be, handed them to one Becher, a commissioned agent or broker, for the purpose of their being delivered out to the world, and Becher usually purchased goods with them. The bill in question was filled up and dated by Sims, on the 6th March, 1818, and was then accepted by Thompson, and indorsed by Rains and Lachlan. On the 9th March, Sims wrote and delivered to Thompson and Lachlan written statements, mentioning the particulars of the bill, and that it would fall due on the 9th September following. The bill at that time was Y y 2 dated 1822. DOWNES against RICHARDSON, |