and the bankrupt is to attend the commissioners, and to be free from arrest during the 42 days, provided that he is not in custody at the time of his surrender. Now, if the commissioners receive a complete disclosure of his effects at the first or second meeting, the bankrupt will not be compellable to make any further disclosure, and, consequently, the last examination may be completed_at the first or second meeting. It follows, therefore, that his last examination may be taken on either of those days, Considering then the 49 G. 3. c. 121. s. 13., with reference to the provisions of the 5 G. 2. c. 30. s. 6., I think we are warranted in construing the words "last examination" to mean the complete disclosure and discovery of the estate and effects of the bankrupt made from time to time; and whatever separate attendances are necessary for the purpose of making a full disclosure, constitute together the last examination. BEST J. I think, also, that the words last examination do not mean the examination which may take place on the last day of meeting, but the full and final disclosure of the bankrupt's estate and effects upon any of the days appointed for that purpose, and that the commissioners may bring him before them at any time appointed for that purpose. Judgment for the defendant. 1822. SPENCE against JONES. 1822. Friday, A. covenanted that he would, from time to time, at the request of B., AMORY against BRODRICK. COVENANT upon a deed made between the defendant Brodrick, one Rawlins, and the plaintiff, whereby after reciting that Joshua Rowe, by bond of the 5th December, 1814, became bound to the defendant, Brodrick, in 8000l., conditioned for payment of 4000l., and that bring in respect the bond had become forfeited by non-payment; and that Rawlins had contracted with Brodrick, the defend avow and con firm all actions that B. should of a bond, of which A. was the obligor, ing the same. Declaration commenced an nction in the name of A., against the obligee of the bond, and that without releas- ant, for the purchase of the bond, and the principal and interest due thereon, for 1700l.; and that Rawlins was stated, that B. indebted to Amory, the plaintiff, in 17007., for money advanced and paid; and that Rawlins had agreed to assign the bond absolutely to Amory; it was witnessed, that in pursuance of the agreement, and for the considerations therein mentioned, he, Brodrick, at the request, and by the direction and appointment of Rawlins, assigned to Amory the bond and all monies due, or to become due thereon. Covenant by Brodrick, that he would not accept, take, or receive any of the principal monies and interest thereby intended to be reason whereof bargained and sold, or make void the indenture, or the plaintiff was hindered from any power or authority thereby given, or in pur.... Secovering the suance thereof to be given; and that he would from principal and interest, his time to time, at the request of the plaintiff, avow, A. did not, although often requested so to do, avow and justify the said action, but, on the contrary hereof, executed a release to the obligee of all actions, bonds, &c., by costs, and other expenses: Upon special demurrer to ratify, and confirm all such actions, &c. as the plaintiff should lawfully make, take, bring, &c. in respect of the was held, first, said premises without being nonsuited, or otherwise re this breach, it that the aver ment of request was unnecessary, and that it therefore required no venue, inasmuch as it appeared that the defendant had, by executing the release, disabled himself from bringing any action upon the bond. Secondly, that it was no ground of demurrer to the whole breach, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover the special damage. leasing leasing the same, except with the special consent of the plaintiff. The plaintiff averred, that after the making of the indenture, he, on 12th May, 1821, commenced an action in the name of Brodrick against Rowe, upon the bond, to recover the principal and interest; yet, that the defendant, not regarding his covenant, did not, nor would, (although he was afterwards, to wit, on the day and year last aforesaid, requested by the plaintiff so to do,) avow, justify, and maintain, ratify or confirm the said action so commenced; but, on the contrary thereof, after the making of the said indenture, to wit, on the 6th day of March, 1821, &c. at, &c. the defendant did execute to Rowe a general release of all actions, bills, bonds, &c. By reason whereof, the plaintiff was hindered from recovering the principal money and interest made payable by the bond, and in proceeding in the action so commenced by him, and had also been deprived of the means of recovering the costs incurred by the action, and had sustained costs in endeavouring by rule of Court to set aside the release. Demurrer to this breach of the declaration, and the causes assigned were; first, that there was no venue to the allegation of request in the declaration; and, secondly, that, by that breach, the plaintiff sought to recover damages which he was not entitled by law to recover, Gaselee, in support of the demurrer. By this deed, the defendant covenants, at the request of the plaintiff, to avow, justify, and maintain all actions brought by him. Lowe v. Kirby (a), Pecke v. Mithwolde (b), Banks v. Thwaites (c), and Back v. Owen (d), are authorities 1822. AMORY against BRODRICK. to 1822. AMORY against BRODRICK. to shew, that a special allegation of request is necessary; and if it be a substantial allegation, it ought to have had a venue. [Bayley J., the substantial breach begins by the words, "but on the contrary thereof." In Harris v. Mantle (a), the breach assigned was, that the defendant had not used the premises in a good and husbandlike manner, but, on the contrary thereof, had committed waste. The defendant pleaded, that he had not committed any waste, but used the premises in a good and husbandlike manner; and it was held, that the plaintiff was not at liberty to shew that the defendant had not managed the farm in a husbandlike manner.] The plea there was, that he had not committed waste, and upon that issue, he could only prove waste. [Bayley J. The plea applied to both parts of the breach, and then the question was, what was the substantial part of the breach.] Secondly, the breach is bad, because the costs of the action and the application to set aside the release are alleged as grounds of special damage, and non constat, that he would have obtained those costs in the action, and Sutton v. Johnson (b) is an authority to shew, that that would be good ground of error, or in arrest of judgment. Chitty, contrà, was stopped by the Court. ABBOTT C. J. I am of opinion, that the first cause of demurrer assigned is not sufficient. A party is only bound to allege the request, where the object of that request is to oblige another person to do something. Here the defendant, by executing the release to R., has (a) 3 T. R. 307. (b) 1 T. R. 495, 510. disabled disabled himself from supporting any action whatever, and that is the substantial part of the breach, and a request is wholly unnecessary. As to the second cause of demurrer, it is sufficient to say, that it is no good ground of demurrer to the whole breach, that the consequential damages are not recoverable. The plaintiff is entitled to recover some damage, and that is sufficient to support the breach. BAYLEY J. The case of Duffield v. Scott (a) is an authority to shew that the last ground of demurrer cannot be supported. That was an action of debt on bond conditioned for the performance of covenants: upon oyer of the bond and of the deed there appeared to be a covenant by the testator to indemnify the plaintiff against all debts which his wife should, during separation, contract, and against the payment of alimony, and all costs which the plaintiff should be put to by his wife's contracts, debts, &c. The breach assigned in the replication, was, that A. B. had brought an action against the plaintiff for a debt which his wife had contracted during separation, and had recovered judgment for the debt and costs, and that the plaintiff was obliged to pay the same, and to incur expences in the defence of the suit; yet that the defendant did not indemnify the plaintiff for the costs so paid by him, or for his expenses. Upon demurrer it was argued, that the replication could not be supported, because the plaintiff had assigned a breach for the non-payment of a gross sum, part of which the defendant was not bound to pay; because, in order to entitle plaintiff to recover the costs (a) 5 T. R. 574. 1822. Амовк against BRODRICK. and |