1 applicant may remain a prisoner for life, if the present construction of the commissioners is right. Per Curiam. We cannot interfere; the acts of a minor are not necessarily void but voidable only, and a minor may execute a deed for his own benefit. This woman cannot comply with the conditions of the act, and the commissioners have it not, therefore, in their power to discharge her; she is now in prison with her husband, who ought to pay this debt himself, and has not sworn to his incapacity so to do. The court in which the action was originally brought, may order her discharge, if they think proper; but we have no power; and we do not think that the commissioners of the Insolvent Debtor's court have misconstrued the act of parliament, in deciding, that a married woman who has no property to assign, who cannot execute a warrant of attorney, and comply with the other conditions, is not entitled to her discharge. Rule refused. 1822. Ex parte The KING against The Justices of FLINTSHIRE. Monday, May 20th, sessions for PARKE, in last Michaelmas term, obtained a rule An order of nisi for a certiorari, to remove an order of Sessions levying and of the county of Flint, dated 12th July last, for levy- treasurer of the paying to the ing and paying into the hands of the treasurer of that county, a sum county 2001. 5s., to enable him to pay that sum, in part- to reimburse payment of the claim of Messrs. Sankey. It appeared for an antethat, by a former order of Sessions, the treasurer had been empowered to borrow from Messrs. Sankey, to enable him certain persons cedent debt, although such debt had been who incurred for county purwere poses, is bad. 1822. The KING against The Justices of were bankers, the sum of 1000l., for carrying on the public works within the county, to be repaid by instalments. This money had been advanced, from time to FLINTSHIRE. time, in 1817 and 1818, and repaid in account, but further advances being made, the balance remaining due to the bank was 4477, in part-payment of which this order was made. The affidavits on the other side stated, that the whole money had been, in fact, laid out for county purposes. The Court, (after hearing Scarlett, Littledale, and D. F. Jones against, and Parke in support of the rule,) made the rule absolute; observing, that this was a rate to reimburse persons for a debt previously contracted, which was clearly bad, inasmuch as the justices had no right, except by following the provisions of particular acts of parliament, which had not been done here, to anticipate the county rates, and so to make the expense ultimately fall on different persons from those who were by law liable at the time it was incurred. Writ of certiorari granted. Monday, In trespass against customhouse officers for taking plaintiff's goods, LAUGHER against BREFITT and Another. TRESPASS against the defendants, who were custom-house officers, for breaking and entering the plaintiff's warehouse, and seizing and taking a quantity returned in a of verdigrise belonging to the plaintiff, on pretence of which had been deteriorated state before action brought, a verdict was found for plaintiff, for the difference in price between the value of the goods at the time of the seizure, and the time when they were returned. The judge certified that there was probable cause for the seizure: Held, that the plaintiff was not precluded by the 28 G. 3. c. 37. s. 24. from taking out execution for the damages found by the jury. its being French verdigrise, that had not paid duty. Second count, for taking the verdigrise. Plea, not guilty. At the trial, before Abbott C. J. at the London sittings after last Hilary term, it was admitted on the part of the defendants, that the verdigrise in question was of English manufacture, and, therefore, not liable to the payment of any duty. It appeared, however, that it was a very close imitation of French verdigrise; the paper, also, in which it was packed, and the string round the packages, being similar to the paper and string in which French verdigrise was usually packed. The defendants kept the verdigrise six weeks in their custody, and delivered it to the plaintiff before the action was brought, but in a damaged state, and it was. sold by the plaintiff before the trial, The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff, on the second count, for 73l. 15s. 8d., the plaintiff being precluded from recovering on the first, by the terms of his notice of action; and the Lord Chief Justice certified, under the 28 G. 3. c. 37. s. 24., that there was probable cause for the seizure. By that statute it is enacted, "That in case any action shall be commenced against any person on account of the seizing of any goods forfeited by virtue of the revenue acts, and a verdict shall be given against the defendants; if the Judge before whom such action shall be tried shall certify that there was a probable cause for such seizure, then the plaintiff, besides the thing so seized, or the value thereof, shall not be entitled to above 24. damages, nor to any costs of suit." The plaintiff having entered up his judgment for the damages obtained at the trial, the Solicitor-General obtained a rule for setting aside that judgment, and for entering 1822, LAUGHER against BREFITT. 1822. LAUGHER against BREFITT. entering up judgment for the plaintiff for 2d. damages only. Marryat and Eykyn now shewed cause. By the very words of the statute the plaintiff is expressly entitled to recover the thing seized, or the value thereof. The verdigrise itself could only have been recovered in an action of detinue. The damages in the present action are the difference between the value of the verdigrise at the time of seizure and the time when it was returned. The plaintiff was not obliged to take it back in a deteriorated state; but he might have brought an action for its entire value at the time of seizure. In Baldwin v. Tankard (a) it was decided, that a Judge's certificate, under this statute, that there was probable cause for seizure, did not deprive a plaintiff of his damages for injuries accompanying the seizure. The Solicitor-General and Gurney, contrà. The object of the statute was to protect the officers from paying any costs or damages where there was a probable cause for the seizure. At common law the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover damages for the seizure. By the statute he is deprived of that right. The owner of the goods is entitled to have them returned, or to recover the value, but that must mean the value of the goods when they are returned, and not at the time when they are seized. The object of the statute. was to prevent frauds upon the revenue. At all events, the plaintiff made his election by accepting the thing itself; and it is too late now to ask for further damages. (a) 1 H. Bl. 28. ABBOTT ABBOTT C. J. I am of opinion, that the plaintiff is entitled to have judgment and execution for the damages found by the jury. The seizure, in this case, turned out in the result to be unlawful. Now, if the act of parliament had never passed, the plaintiff would have been entitled to recover damages for the injury he had sustained by the seizure and detention of his goods: and the value of them at the time they were seized, together with any loss he might have sustained by the seizure and detention, would be the measure of his damages. If, therefore, in the course of the cause, the goods had been returned, the plaintiff would still have been entitled to proceed for further damages. The act of parliament, in this case, deprives the plaintiff of his right to recover damages in respect of the seizure and detention of the goods; but expressly reserves to him the right of recovering the thing seized, or the value thereof. I am of opinion, that the value thereof means the value at the time of seizure, and not the value at the time when the goods are returned; and there being nothing to shew that the plaintiff accepted the verdigrise itself in full satisfaction, I think that he is entitled to have the difference between the value of the verdigrise at the time of seizure and the time when it was returned to him; and that, being so, this rule must be discharged with costs. Rule discharged with costs. 1822. LAUGHER against BRIFITT. |