1822. A Judge's certificate under 43 Eliz. c. 6. is sufficient to de IRWINE against REDDISH. ACTION on the 11 Geo. 2. c. 19. s. 19. The first count charged the defendant with not having given prive a plaintiff notice of the place to which the goods distrained were of costs, notwithstanding the action be brought under s. 19., by which, in case the plaintiff obtains removed. The second count, with not selling the goods distrained to the best advantage. At the trial, the 11 G. 2. c. 19. plaintiff obtained a verdict, damages 1s., and the Judge certified, under the 43 Eliz. c. 6. A rule had been oba verdict, he is tained, calling upon the defendant to shew cause why the plaintiff should not have his full costs, notwithstanding the Judge's certificate entitled to full costs. Campbell now shewed cause. The words of the. 43 Eliz. c. 6. s. 2. are prospective, for they extend "to all personal actions to be brought." The case of Williams v. Miller (a), is an authority in point. That was an action on the statute 34 Geo. 3. c. 23., for copying and selling a pattern of a calico print, of which the plaintiff was proprietor; the statute expressly gave the plaintiff such damages as a jury should assess, together with costs of suit, yet it was held, that the Judge's power to certify, under the 43 Eliz. was not thereby taken away. Here the statute gives full costs, but that can make no difference. D. F. Jones, contrà. The Judge has no power, under the 43 Eliz. c. 6., to certify so as to deprive the plaintiff of his costs, in an action founded on the 11 Geo. 2. (a) 1 Taunt. 400. c. 19. s. 19. The intention of the 43 Eliz. c. 6., was, to prevent actions being brought in the superior courts, which might and ought to be brought in the county, or other inferior courts. Before the 11 Geo. 2. c. 19., trespass vi et armis, was the proper form of action for a distress irregularly conducted; the landlord was then considered a trespasser ab initio, and the tenant was entitled to recover the full value of the goods distrained. The action of trespass vi et armis could not have been maintained in the county court, that court having no power to assess a fine. (a), The fair inference then is, that the legislature did not intend the action given by the 11 Geo. 2. c. 19. s. 19. in lieu of the former remedy, by action of trespass, to be brought in the county court, where the former remedy could not have been had.. Besides, that statute gives the plaintiff his option of an action of trespass, or on the case; and the power given to him of bringing trespass, seems to shew that it was not intended the action should be brought in the inferior court. Further, the statute in question expressly gives full costs of suit, and it gives different directions as to the costs to be recovered in certain specified cases. When, therefore, in the clause in question full costs are given, it must be taken to be costs of increase, and not mere nominal costs; and there is good reason for this construction, for, before the statute, the plaintiff would have recovered the full value of the goods, which would, in almost every case, exceed 40s., and, therefore, the Judge would have had no power to certify. The statute 11 Geo. 2., while it limits the damages to be recovered to the amount of the injury consequent upon the irregu 1822. IRWINE against REDDISH (a) 2 Inst. 311. 4 Inst. 266. larity, 1822. IRWINE against REDDISH. larity, intended to place the tenant in no worse situation with regard to the costs. The case of Williams v. Miller is clearly distinguishable from the present; for there the statute in the section referred to gives costs in the ordinary way, and in another section, expressly gives full costs; which shews, that, where the legislature intended full costs, they so expressed it, and by costs, merely intended ordinary costs, liable to the ordinary power of limitation, by the certificate of the Judge. Per Curiam. The case of Williams v. Miller is an authority to shew, that, where a statute, passed subsequently to the 43 Eliz. c. 6., gives an action, with costs of suit, the Judge's power to certify, under the latter statute, is not taken away. In this case the statute gives full costs; but that cannot make any difference, for no distinction is known in the law between costs and full costs, and in point of practice, there is no difference in the mode of taxation. If the legislature had intended, by the 11 Geo. 2., to repeal the 43 Eliz., they would have done it in express terms. Rule discharged. 1822. REGULA GENERALIS. Easter Term, 3 Geo. 4. To prevent unnecessary expense to plaintiffs suing in this Court, in case of notice given by prisoners of their intention to apply for their discharge under any act made for the relief of insolvent debtors, It is ordered, that after such notice given to any plaintiff, no prisoner shall be superseded or discharged out of custody at the suit of such plaintiff, by reason of such plaintiff's forbearing to proceed against him according to the rules and practice of this Court, from the time of such notice given until some rule or order shall be made in the cause in that behalf by this Court, or one of the Judges thereof. And it is further ordered, That a copy of this rule shall be hung up in the King's Bench prison, in the place where rules of this Court are usually hung up. By the Court. |