1821. CLARIDGE against EVELYN. bezzled by him. In Young v. Fowler (a), it was held, that a grant by the bishop of the office of register of a diocese in reversion after the death of the tenant for life, to an infant eleven years of age, exercendum per se vel deputatum sufficientem, is good, notwithstanding the infancy. Now here this office may be exercised by deputy, and therefore that case is in point. ABBOTT C. J. No authority has been cited to shew that the grant of an office of public and pecuniary trust to an infant is valid. It is true, that the offices of sheriff and of jailor have been granted in fee, and that such grants are not void, on the ground that those offices may by descent.vest in an infant. In those cases, however, the grantees have the power of appointing depu tics. In the case of Young v. Fowler, where a grant by the bishop of the office of register of a diocese to an infant was held good, the grant was in reversion, and the grantee attained full age before the office descended to him. Besides, the duties of that office are not stated in the report of the case. Looking at this act of parliament, it appears that this is an office of pecuniary trust, and it seems to me, therefore, impossible to allow the grant of such an office to an infant, for in the event of his being guilty of negligence, with respect to the monies placed in his hands, the suitors of the court might be deprived of that remedy which they ought to have against a public officer entrusted with their money. If, on the other hand, he were to conduct himself so as to be criminally liable, he would be placed in a situation of peril, which the law is anxious he should avoid. I am of opinion, therefore, that he was ineligible to this office; and due notice of his incapacity having (a) Cro. Car. 555, been been given to the electors at the time of their election, their votes were thrown away, and, consequently, there must be judgment for the plaintiff. BAYLEY J. I am of the same opinion. The commissioners are bound to appoint a fit and proper person. Now, a person who is not legally responsible for the discharge of the duties of the office, cannot, in point of law, be considered a proper person to execute it. The clerk, in this case, is to have the money of the suitors entrusted to his care; he ought, therefore, to be civilly answerable for that money, either if misapplied by himself, or lost by the negligence of his deputy. Possibly he might be liable for a tortious conversion of the money by himself; but he would not be so liable where the money was lost either by his own negligence or that of his deputy; and therefore the public, by the appointment of an infant to the office, would lose that privilege which the law gives them against the principal. I am, therefore, of opinion that an infant was not eligible to this office; and, consequently, that there must be judgment for the plaintiff. HOLROYD J. I am of opinion that this is an office which an infant cannot legally hold. The officer is to receive the money, which is paid into court. The act of parliament puts a special trust and confidence in him in that respect; and that being so, I am of opinion that, independently of the provisions of the act, he could not legally appoint a deputy. In Comyn's Digest, tit. Officer, D. 2., it is laid down that a deputy cannot be appointed to an office, if the grant imports a trust or confidence in the person; as, to be squire to the king's body, if a deputy is not allowed by his patent, and for G 4 that 1821. CLARIDGE against EVELYN, 1821. CLARIDGE against EVELYN, that the Year Book, 11 Edw. 4. 1. is cited. Now, by the provisions of this act of parliament, it depends entirely on the discretion of the commissioners, whether they will, in any case, allow a deputy to be appointed; and they may insist that the office shall be executed by the party in person. I think, therefore, the case must be considered as if the office was to be executed by the infant in person. Besides, as the law will not allow an infant to act upon his own discretion, so as to be civilly responsible for his own acts, it will not allow him to be responsible for the acts of others; and, therefore, if he could appoint a deputy, he would not be liable for his acts; and if he is not responsible, he is not a fit person to be put in trust for others; for the public, who paid money to him, would be in a worse situation than if the office was filled by a person of full age, who might be sued. I am, therefore, clearly of opinion that an infant is not a competent person to execute the special trust reposed in the officer by this act of parliament; and, consequently, there must be judgment for the plaintiff. Judgment for the plaintiff. (a) (a) Best J, absent at Chambers, Saturday, October 27th. crops HODGSON and Others, Assignees of SEATON and The growing. THIS was an action on the case, brought by the ant having been plaintiffs against the defendant, as sheriff of the fi. fa., a writ of county of York, for not duly executing a writ of non seized under a hab. fac. poss. was subsequently delivered to the sheriff in an ejectment, at the suit of the landlord, founded on a demise made long before the issuing of the fi. fa.: Held, that the sheriff was not bound to sell the growing crops under the fi. fa., inasmuch as they could not, in point of law, be considered as belonging to the tenant, the latter being a trespasser from the day of the demise laid in the declaration: Held, also, that the sheriff had no right to allow to the landlord a year's rent, under the stat. of 8 Ann. c. 14., that statute contemplating an existing tenancy, which, in this case, must be taken to have ceased on the day of the demise in the ejectment, omittas omittas fi. fa. issued at the suit of the plaintiffs against one Charles Smith, and for making a false return to the writ. Plea, general issue. The cause was tried at the York Summer assizes, 1817, before Wood B., when the jury found a verdict for the plaintiffs for 5000l. damages, subject to the opinion of the Court upon the following case. The plaintiffs, as assignees of the estate and effects of J. Seaton and others, recovered a judgment in Trinity term, 1815, against Smith, for 20,000l. debt, and 80s. costs; and on the 14th of June, 1816, caused to be issued thereon a writ of non omittas fi. fa. against Smith, directed to the sheriff of Yorkshire, indorsed to levy 5446l. 18s. 5d. On the 1st of July, 1816, the writ was delivered to the defendant, as sheriff of the county, who granted his warrant, directed to one Foster, his bailiff, to execute the same. On the same day, the warrant was delivered to Foster, who, on the 2d of July, entered into a mansion-house, farm, and colliery, then in the occupation of Smith, called Barrowby Hall, and seized the furniture, stock, crops, colliery, engines and utensils, and other effects found or growing, or being upon the said farm. On the 9th day of July, 1816, while in possession of the property, Foster received from one J. Clayton, as agent for the defendant, a notice. demanding 8867. 5s., being one year's rent due to the defendant from Smith, for the mansion-house, farm, lands, and coal-mines of Barrowby aforesaid. The defendant was the owner of these premises; and by indenture of the 13th February, 1813, demised the same to Smith, habendum, for 21 years, at the yearly rent of 850l. and 100%. for the colliery, with a proviso for re-entry, on non-payment of rent. In Michaelmas vacation, 1821. HODGSON against GASCOIGNE. 1821. HODGSON against GASCOIGNE. vacation, 1815, there being then two years and a half in arrear, a declaration in ejectment was delivered on the two several demises of the defendant and of R. Oliver Esq., which demises were laid on the 5th December, 1815, and judgment was obtained on the 1st July, 1816. On the 15th July, 1816, J.Clayton, as attorney for the defendant, delivered to Foster a warrant, dated 10th July, 1816, made by the defendant, as sheriff of the said county, and directed to the chief bailiff of the liberty of the Honour of Pontefract, and his deputies (Foster being also one of such deputies), upon a writ of possession issued in the cause on the 1st of July, 1816, against Smith, to recover the defendant's and R. Oliver's term to come in the premises. Foster, having received the two warrants, sold the furniture, stock and colliery, engines and utensils on the farm on the 18th of August, 1816, but refused to sell any the crops then growing and unsevered thereon, which were of considerable value; and immediately afterwards delivered up possession of the farm and premises to the defendant, with the crops then growing thereon, in pursuance of the warrant issued on the writ of possession. On the 13th September, 1816, Foster paid to the land agent of the defendant 8861. 5s. for one year's rent, due to the defendant from Smith, on the 13th February, 1816, for the farm and premises. The defendant afterwards, as sheriff, returned to the writ of fi. fa., that he had caused to be levied of the goods and chattels of the said Smith to the value of 11257. 19s, which money he had ready to render to the plaintiffs; and further certified, that the said Smith had not any other goods or chattels in his bailiwick, whereof he could cause to be levied the residue |