1822. Tuesday, June 25th. tiff had been nonsuited at nisi prius on WILLIAMS against PRATT. Where a plain- IN this case, which was tried at the Middlesex sittings after last Hilary term, the plaintiff was nonsuited on the ground of a the ground of a variance. The declaration recited, that plaintiff was possessed of a certain memorandum or articles of agreement, &c., and also of certain fixtures, and then set out as the agreement between the parties, trifling variance Court granted leave to amend a new trial with that the plaintiff should sell to the defendant the first the declaration, mentioned memorandum, and the following fixtures, &c., generally on payment of and that the plaintiff would relinquish and give up to the costs, with liberty to the defendant the said first-mentioned memorandum or ardefendant to plead de novo ticles of agreement on the 11th day of August, 1821. At or demur. the trial, the agreement produced in support of this was as follows"Memorandum, &c. David Williams agrees to sell to John Pratt the following articles, viz. An agreement, &c., also the following fixtures, &c. The above D. W. agrees to relinquish and give up to J. P. the aforementioned articles on the 11th of August, 1821." At the trial, the Lord Chief Justice was of opinion, that he word "articles," in the latter part of the agreement, meant to include, not merely the articles of agreement, but the fixtures also. And, on Scarlett's applying to set aside this nonsuit, the Court were clearly of the same opinion. But they granted him a rule nisi for a new trial, with leave to amend his declaration on payment of costs. Gurney Gurney and Lawes shewed cause. They referred to Hoar v. Mill (a), where the plaintiff was nonsuited on a very unimportant variance between "storehouse" and "storehouses." And yet the Court afterwards refused a similar application to the present. (b) At any rate, the amendment should be confined to this particular error, or otherwise the plaintiff will be at liberty to remodel his declaration altogether. Scarlett and Reader, contrà. Amendments of this sort have lately been allowed by the Court. And they referred to Halhead v. Abrahams (c), where a similar application was allowed by the Court of Common Pleas. And as this is on payment of costs, the Court will grant leave to amend generally. Per Curiam. This rule must be absolute upon payment of costs. The plaintiff should be at liberty to amend his declaration generally, and the defendant may then either plead de novo or demur to the declaration, according as he may be advised. Rule absolute accordingly. 1822. WILLIAMS against PRATT. (a) 4 M. & S. 470. (b) This does not appear by the report, but it was certified to the Court by Gaselee, of counsel in that cause. 1822. Tuesday, June 25th. Charges for holding the courts-leet of a manor by the steward, are charges for business connected with his professional character as an attorney, and therefore are ing charges taxable, when found in a bill containing other taxable items. LUXMORE, Gent., one, &c. against LETHBRIdge, THIS was an action brought by the plaintiff, an attorney of this court. The bill of particulars delivered, stated the cause of action to be; 1st, a bill for paying fees; 2d, bills of costs in several actions of ejectment; 3d, a bill of fees and disbursements for holding the courts-leet of the manor of Paris Garden, in the like conveyanc- county of Surry, of which the plaintiff was the steward. On a summons being taken out, Bayley J. ordered the two first items to be taxed, but declined making any order as to the last. A rule nisi was obtained by Coleridge for referring the last bill of costs to the master to be taxed, the defendant undertaking to pay what was due, if any thing. In the affidavits in answer, it was sworn that former bills for holding the courts had been previously paid containing similar charges. As to this the defendant stated, that these had been paid in ignorance. Patteson shewed cause. Here, the bill is not taxable. It is true, the bill of particulars contains some taxable items. But that does not make the whole taxable, it only makes the other items, if legal charges, and connected with his professional character, taxable: as for instance, conveyancing charges, Mowbray v. Fleming (a). Here, the charges are not of this description, they are (a) 11 East, 285. only only for work and labour, and money expended on behalf of the defendant, and they consist partly of disbursements by the steward, and partly of his necessary expences, and there are no fees or allowances to the steward for granting leases, &c. This, therefore, was not business connected with his professional character as an attorney. Coleridge contrà, was stopped by the Court. Per Curiam. We think this was business done by the plaintiff in his professional character as an attorney. The office of a steward of a manor is one usually so filled, and requires legal knowledge. These charges must therefore be subject to taxation under the circumstances of this case. Rule absolute. (a) Hill v. Humphreys, 2 Bus. & (a) See In re Aitken, 4 B. & A. 49. Pull. 345. Marshall's case, 2 Blacks. 912. 6 Taunt. 105., and Sayer's Rep. 223. Ex parte C. C. College, 1822. LUXMORE against LETHBRIDGE. The KING against The LONDON Assurance Company. a PULLER applied to the Court for a rule nisi for mandamus to the defendants, requiring them to permit a transfer to the assignees of Timbrell, a bank Tuesday, The Court will not grant a mandamus to a private trading corporation to permit a trans rupt, of eighty shares in the capital stock of the cor- fer of stock to poration then standing in their books in the bankrupt's name. The affidavits stated, that a commission issued against Timbrell, who was then in partnership with two 3 N 2 other be made in their books. 1822. The KING against The LONDON other persons, dated 8th February, 1821, under which he was declared a bankrupt, and assignees appointed. At the time he became bankrupt he held in his own Assurance Co. right, 80 shares in the London Assurance Corporation, by virtue of which he was a director. By the charter, no person is qualified to be a director unless he has, at the time of being chosen, a given amount in their stock in his own name, in his own right, and for his own use, and not in trust for any person whomsoever; and an oath to that effect is required, and was taken by the bankrupt when he became a director. By the charter, assignments and transfers of stock must be made in a particular form therein pointed out, and no other way or method is to be used, nor can any transfer except one so made, be good or valid in law. The company had refused to permit a regular transfer of the shares into the names of the assignees to be made, and assigned two grounds; 1st, because they had received a notice from the solvent partners of the bankrupt, that the shares were joint property: and 2dly, that the company themselves claimed a lien for a debt due to them. Upon these facts he contended, that the Court should grant a mandamus for a transfer to the assignces, the legal representatives of the bankrupt, leaving the parties to establish these claims, if valid, afterwards: and he referred to Anonymous (a), where a mandamus was granted to swear in a director of the Amicable Assurance, which is a company, like this, created by a charter from the crown. The case of Rex v. The Mayor of London (b) was the instance of a mandamus to restore a person to the office of the clerk of the Bridge-house (a) 2 Str. 696. (b) 2 T. R. 177. estates, |