1822. LOWE against MANNERS. tor v. The Bishop of Bath and Wells. (a) Gee v. Aud ley (b), Leake v. Robinson (c), are authorities upon this point. This is a gift upon a contingency, and it might have been suspended beyond a life in being, or 21 years, and was, therefore, void. The gift to the husband was open to this objection. It follows, that the alternate or substituted gift to Mr. Drury must be liable to the same objection. The following certificate was afterwards sent: This case has been argued before us; and we are of opinion, that the plaintiff is now seised of an indefeasible estate in fee simple, in the undivided moiety of the lands in question. An information INFORMATION by the Attorney-General against the defendant for wilful and corrupt perjury. The for perjury, stated that de fendant, before a committee of first count stated, that heretofore, and before the com the House of Commons, being duly sworn, deliberately and knowingly, and of his own act and consent, did say, swear, and give in evidence, &c. It then set out the evidence so given. The count then averred, that the defendant, at the bar of the House of Lords, being duly sworn, deliberately and knowingly, and of his own act and consent, did say, swear, and give in evidence, &c. It then set out his evidence, which was directly contrary to that given before the House of Commons, and concluded (after averments as to the identity of the persons and places referred to in the evidence on both occasions); and so the jurors aforesaid do say that the said E. H. did commit wilful and corrupt perjury: Held, on motion in arrest of judgment, that this count was bad. mitting mitting the offence after mentioned, to wit, at a session of parliament holden on, &c. at Westminster, in the county of M., to wit, at the parish of Saint Margaret, within the liberty of Westminster, in the county of M., a certain bill, intitled, "An act," &c. was pending before the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, which said bill recited, that there was the most notorious bribery and corruption at the then last election for the borough of Barnstaple, in the county of D., and that such bribery and corruption was likely to continue and be practised in the said borough in future, unless some means were taken to prevent the same; and by which bill certain matters and things were proposed to be enacted, touching the election, to be thereafter had for burgesses to serve in parliament for the said borough: and that such proceedings were had upon the said bill in the said parliament before the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal, that afterwards, and during the said session of parliament, and before the committing, &c. to wit, on, &c. at, &c. It was ordered by the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal, amongst other things, that counsel should be at liberty to examine witnesses in support of the said bill. The count then stated, that the defendant, late of, &c. afterwards, to wit, on, &c., at, &c., did appear before the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, that is to say, at the bar of the said Lords Spiritual and Temporal, as a witness in support of the said bill, and that he was then and there sworn, &c. before the said Lords, &c., the said Lords, &c. having sufficient and competent power, &c. And that upon the hearing the evidence before the said Lords, &c. in support of the said bill, certain questions then and there arose and became and were material, that is to say, &c. The count then 1822. The KING against HARRIS. 1822. The KING against HARRIS. then set out the questions, and the defendant's evidence before the House of Lords, and concluded by assigning the perjury as to each particular in the usual way. The second and third counts were similar in form to the first, differing only in the assignments of the perjury. The fourth count stated, that heretofore, to wit, on, &c. in the Lower House of parliament of the said late king, then held at Westminster, to wit, at the parish of, &c., E. H. Esq., commonly called Lord Viscount Clive, J. M. Esq. &c., then being members of the Lower House of parliament, were in due manner, according to the form of the statutes in such case made and provided, chosen, nominated, and sworn to be a select committee to try and determine the merits of an clection of two burgesses to serve in the said parliament, &c., as burgesses for the borough of B., in the county of D., as of the return of, &c. as burgesses, &c. And that the persons so chosen, &c., afterwards, to wit, on, &c., at a certain place adjacent to the House of Commons, to wit, at, &c., did in due manner meet to try and determine the merits, &c. And that the defendant afterwards, to wit, on, &c. at, &c. did appear as a witness, touching the merits, &c. before the said persons so chosen, &c. The count then stated his being duly sworn, and that he, being so sworn, "deliberately and knowingly, and of his own act and consent, did say, swear and give in evidence, &c." It then, after setting out his evidence before the committee of the House of Commons, proceeded to state, that heretofore, and before the committing, &c., to wit, at a session of parliament, holden on, &c., a certain bill, intitled, &c. was pending before the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, &c.; and then, after stating, as in the first count, that the defendant was borough of B., and the election, and the different persons named in the defendant's evidence before the House of Commons, and the borough of B., &c. named in his evidence before the House of Lords, were the same borough of B., &c., and not other and different. And then concluded: "And so the said AttorneyGeneral says, that the said Edward Harris, to wit, at, &c. in manner and form aforesaid, did commit wilful and corrupt perjury to the great displeasure, &c." The fifth count varied from the fourth only in the statements of the evidence, which were different. The sixth and seventh counts were similar to the fourth and fifth, but added, that the questions in answer to which the respective evidence of the defendant before the Houses of Lords and Commons was given, were material questions. Plea, not guilty. At the trial, at the Westminster sittings after last Michaelmas term, before Abbott C. J., the jury acquitted the defendant upon the first three,' and found him guilty upon the last four counts of the information. A rule nisi was obtained in last Hilary term for arresting the judgment, on the ground that these counts were insufficient. (a) The (a) The case of Rex v. Knill, which was precisely similar to the present, and growing out of the same transaction, and in which the indictment was in the same form, was tried on the same day; and the jury convicted the defendant on those counts which charged the perjury specifically to have been in the examination before the House of Lords. No evidence was given, except simply the proof of the contradictory oaths of the defendant on the two occasions. In that case D. F. Jones moved for a rule to shew cause why there should not be a new trial, on the ground that in perjury two witnesses were necessary, whereas in that case only one witness was adduced to prove the corpus delicti, namely, the witness who deposed to the contradictory evidence given by the defendant before the committee of the House of Commons: and he contended, that if this evidence were of itself sufficient, the danger intended to be provided against by the rule requiring two witnesses would be immediately let in, for one VOL. V. false 3 P 1822. The KING against HARRIS. 1822. The KING against HARRIS. The Solicitor-General, Raine, Gurney, Littledale, and Shepherd, shewed cause. These counts are good. It appears on the face of the record that the defendant has deliberately and knowingly sworn, first, before the House of Commons, and, secondly, before the House of Lords; and on these occasions has made contradictory statements. It is, therefore, quite certain that the defendant must have committed perjury. No other mode can be devised of making the charge, and if this be not sufficient, the defendant cannot be punished. It is said that the Court cannot see on which of the two occa sions the perjury was committed. But as both the tribunals were competent to administer the oath, that is not material. It is also put as a difficulty, that, supposing the oaths were in different counties, it would be impossible to say in which the party should be tried; but that difficulty does not exist here, for both the oaths are in the same county. [Bayley J. Suppose by act of parliament all perjuries committed before the 1st Janu ary are pardoned, and on an indictment like this it appeared that of the two contradictory depositions one was before and the other after that day: would the pardon extend to such a case?] It may be sufficient to say, in answer to this and the like objections, that in this case they do not exist; and, perhaps, in cases where they did exist, this form of indictment could not be false witness would only have to swear to the fact of a contradictory statement upon oath by the defendant, and that would suffice without the confirmation of any second witness. Secondly, he insisted that mere proof of a contradictory statement by the defendant on another occasion was not sufficient without other circumstances, shewing a corrupt motive, and negativing the probability of any mistake. But the Court held, that the evidence was sufficient, the contradiction being by the party himself, and that the jury might infer the motive from the circumstances; and they refused a rule nisi for a new trial. adopted. |