should be held good, which is liable to the material objection of putting a person twice in peril of the pains of perjury on the same subject-matter, and we know of no election to adopt this or that mode that can be binding on the crown as was suggested in the argument at the bar in support of this information. The rule to arrest the judgment must therefore be made absolute, and the like rule in the other case of The King v. Edwards. Rule absolute. 1822. The KING, against HARRIS. 1822. Wednesday, A. a ship. builder, contracted with B. to build a ship WooDs and Another, Assignees of ALEXANDER THIS case was tried before Bayley J., at the Summer assizes, 1820, and came on for argument in the course of Easter term, upon a special case, which it is unnecessary to set out, as the facts are fully stated in the to pay for her judgment delivered by the Court. The case was ar for him, and to complete her in April, 1819. The latter was by four instal ments: the first gued by when the keel was laid, the second when at the light plank, and the third and fourth when the ship was launched. Before the 25th of June, 1819, the ship was measured with the builder's privity, to the Littledale, for the plaintiffs. The property in the ship, rudder, and cordage, continued in Paton at the time when he committed the act of bankruptcy, the ship not being then completed. The case of Mucklow v. Mangles (a) is an Mangles (a) is an authority expressly in point. There the bankrupt, a barge-builder, had undertaken to build intent that B. might get her registered in his name. On the 25th of June the shipbuilder signed the usual certificate of her building; and on the 26th the ship was registered in B.'s name; and on the same day the third instalment was paid. On the 30th of June A. committed an act of bankruptcy, upon which a commission afterwards issued. On the 2d of July, the ship not being then completed, or launched, the defendant, and a crew hired by him, took possession of her, and a rudder and cordage, the former of which was made by the ship builder, and the latter bought by him, for the express purpose of completing the ship: Held, first, that the legal effect of the ship-builder's having signed the certificate to enable B. to have the ship registered in his name, was to vest the general property in the ship in B. from the time the registry was completed: Held, secondly, that as the rudder and cordage were made and bought by the shipbuilder specifically for the ship, they were to be considered as parts of the ship, and that the property in them also vested in B. Held, thirdly, that the property was not in the possession of the bankrupt as reputed owner, within 21 Jac. 1. c. 19. Held, fourthly, that although the general property in the ship was vested in B., yet as A. had not parted with the possession, and, as he would have had a lien upon the ship for the amount of the fourth instalment, if he had completed it; that the taking possession of the ship by B. without tendering the amount of the fourth instalment, or so much thereof as was due, provided any thing was due, was wrongful, and consequently that the assig nees of A. were entitled to recover from B. the amount of the fourth instalment, provided the expence necessary for the completion of the ship did not amount to that sum, or so much thereof as would remain due after defraying such expence. (a) 1 Taunt. 318. a barge a barge for Pocock, and the latter had paid the whole value in advance, and his name was actually painted on the stern of the vessel after the completion of the work; but before delivery, and before any commission of bankrupt had issued against the barge-builder, the barge was seized in exccution for a debt of the bankrupt. It was held, that no property in the barge passed to Pocock until its completion and delivery, and consequently that the assignees were entitled to recover the value. Here, the bankrupt was only under a contract to deliver the ship, and although the stipulated time for building had actually elapsed, yet the vessel was not completed and launched until after the act of bankruptcy. The certificate under 26 G. 3. c. 69. s. 12. clearly is not to be given till the ship is completed, and until that time, therefore, no property passes to the vendee, Groves v. Buck (a), Towers v. Osborne. (b) But at all events, the case falls within. the statute of James, for the ship was in the hands of the bankrupt as the reputed owner, Hay v. Fairbairn (c), Robinson v. M'Donnell. (d) . Holt, contrà. There are two questions in this case; first, whether the property in the ship, rudder, and cordage, ever passed to the defendant; and, secondly, assuming that it did, whether it continued in the possession of the bankrupt at the time of the act of bankruptcy, as the reputed owner, with the consent of the true owner, within the statute of James. Here the property passed to the defendant under the contract, for there was a delivery to him before the 30th June. The 1822. Woods against RUSSELL 1822. WOODS against RUSSELL. vessel was clearly completed when she was capable of being surveyed and measured. The officers of the customs had taken the usual bond from the master previously to the bankruptcy; the builder, too, on the 26th June, had given the defendant the certificate required by the 26 G. 3. c. 60. s. 20., and from that time he must be taken to have consented that the defendant should have the possession. Secondly, assuming the property to have passed to the defendant, it did not continue," with his consent, in the possession of the bankrupt as reputed owner. That is a question of fact, which ought to have been found; Muller v. Moss (a), and Oliver v. Bartlett. (b) Besides, the circumstance of the vessel's having been registered in the name of the defendant, and of his having advertised her for freight, afford the strongest evidence that he, and not the bankrupt, was the reputed owner of the ship. Cur. adv. vult. ABBOTT C. J. now delivered the judgment of the Court. This was an action of trover for a ship, rudder, and cordage, by the assignees of Alexander Paton, a bankrupt, and the facts were shortly as follows: Paton was a ship-builder, and in October, 1818, he entered into a written contract with the defendant to build and complete a ship for the defendant, and finish and launch her in April, 1819; and the defendant was to pay for the ship by four instalments of 7501. each; the first when the keel was laid, the second when they were at the light plank, and the third and fourth when the ship was (a) 1 M. & S. 338. (b) 3 B. Moore, 597. launched. launched. The payments were to be made by bills at to 1822. WOODS against RUSSELL |