was of greater annual value than the annuity, is a grantor within the meaning of the 13 G. 3. c. 26. s. 8., and therefore in such a case no memorial is required. Darwin v. Lincoln and Another, H. 2 and 3 G. 4. Page 444 3. Under the 53 G. 3. c. 141. s. 2. it is requisite that the memorial of an annuity should contain the names and places of abode of the witnesses to a warrant of attorney, given as a collateral security; and, therefore, where it was thus stated, A. B., clerk to J. S. of D. Street, in the county of M., gent.: Held, that this was not sufficient, it appearing that A. B. did not reside, but only attended at the office there at the time. Smith v, Pritchard, E. 3 G. 4. 1. By a public act the Waterloo 4. 2. By the 53 G. 3. c. 141. the memo- A mere surety who charges with the payment of an annuity his estate in fee simple, of which he was seised in possession at the time of granting the annuity, and which 717 But see statute 8 Geo. 4. c. 92. The condition of a bond recited that the obligor had cohabited with a woman for several years, and had by her two children therein named, and that she being desirous to put an end to the connexion, had applied to the obligor to make a provision for herself and children, which he had agreed to do; and for that purpose the obligor entered into the bond in question, which was conditioned to pay to the mother yearly, during the joint natural lives of herself and two children, a certain sum therein mentioned; the annuity to be applied to the maintenance and education of the children as well as of herself; or in case of the death of the two children therein specifically named, then the same annuity was to be payable to her during her life. One of the children died during the lifetime of the mother: Held, that the annuity was payable to her during her life, at all events. James and Wife v. Tallent, T. 8 G. 4. 889 APOTHE APOTHECARIES. By the 55 G. 3. c. 194. s. 14. it is enacted, "that from and after the 1st day of August, 1815, it shall not be lawful for any person (except persons already in practice as such) to practise as an apothecary, unless he take out a certificate, &c. By sect. 20. "if any person (except such as are then actually practising as such) shall, after the said 1st day of August, 1815, act or practise as an apothecary without having obtained such certificate, every person so offending shall forfeit 201.: Held, in an action for the penalty, that it was not sufficient for the defendant, in order to bring himself within the exception, to shew that previously to and on the 12th of July, 1815, (when the act received the royal assent, he was practising as an apothecary,) but that it was necessary to shew that he was SO practising on the 1st of August, 1815. The Apothecaries' Company v. Roby, T. & G. 4. Page 949 APPEAL. 1. An order of removal was dated the 1st of August, 1814, and an order of suspension indorsed thereon, in consequence of the sickness of the pauper; and a copy of such order and indorsement was, in 1814, served upon the appellants, but the original order not produced at the time of serving such copy; and subsequently, in 1815, another part of the order and indorsement, executed by the same justices, but bearing date in August, 1814, was served upon the appellants. The pauper was not removed till 1819, when an appeal was duly entered: Held, that the services of the original order of removal in 1814 and 1815 were both defective, and that the ap 2. peal was made in time, notwithstanding 49 G. 3. c. 124. s. 2. Rex v. Inhabitants of Alnwick, M. 2 G. 4. Page 184 By a clause in an inclosure act, a commissioner was authorised to up 3. Where an order of removal has been executed, and by consent of the removing parish and the magistrates making it, it is superseded, and the paupers taken back, it is in the discretion of the sessions to enter an appeal against it or not, according as they may think that justice requires it, in order to compel the respondents to pay the costs of maintenance, &c. incurred by the appellants before the order was superseded. Rex v. The Justices of Norfolk, H. 2 and 3 G. 4. 484 The 18 G. 3. c. 19. s. 5. gives an appeal only in case the majority of overseers concur in it. Rex v. Justices of Lancashire, E. 3 G. 4. 755 APPEAL, 4. 3 R4 APPEAL, (Notice of) 1. It is not necessary, in order to give the justices at sessions jurisdiction to hear an appeal against overseers' accounts, that such accounts should previously have been examined and allowed, pursuant to 50 G. 3. c. 49. Rex v. The Justices of Colchester, H. 2 and 3 G. Page 535 2. Where a statute gives an appeal, the appellant giving reasonable notice to the other parties, such notice need not be in writing; but a verbal notice, if reasonable as to time, is sufficient. Rex v. The Justices of Surrey, H. 2 and 3 G. 4. APPORTIONMENT. 539 See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 11. APPROPRIATION. See PLEADING, 28. ARBITRAMENT. 1. A submission to arbitration under 9 and 10 W.3. c. 15. s. 1. may be made a rule of court in vacation. In the Matter of Taylor, M. 2 G. 4. 217 Declaration stated that defendant covenanted to obey, abide by, and perform an award, and that he would not prevent the arbitrators from making their award. It then stated that the arbitrators made their award, and thereby directed the defendant to pay a certain sum therein mentioned; and alleged as a breach of the covenant, that the defendant did not pay the sum awarded. Plea, that before the award, defendant, by deed revoked the authority of the arbitrators, of which revocation they had notice: Held, upon demurrer, that defendant was entitled to judgment, although it appeared by the plea that he had been guilty of a breach of the covenant to abide by the award, by revoking the authority of the arbitrators, the plaintiff being entitled to recover damages only in respect of the cause of action stated in his declaration, and not in respect of a cause of action disclosed in the plea. The second count of the declaration stated the deed of reference, and then averred that defendant did, before the making of the award, hinder and prevent the arbitrators from making their award in this, that the defendant, by a certain deed in writing, signed and sealed by him, after reciting, as was therein recited, did revoke the authority: Held, upon demurrer, that this was an allegation, not of the mere legal effect of the deed, but of the fact of revocation; and that it was unnecessary to state that the arbitrators had notice of the revocation, that being necessarily implied in the averment, that the defendant had revoked the authority. Marsh, Executor of Quinlan, v. Bulteel, H. 2 and 3 G. 4. Page 507 3. Where an action for breach of covenant was pending, and, with all matters in difference, was referred to arbitration, the costs of the suit to abide the event: Held, that an award that the plaintiff had no demand on the defendant on account of any alleged breaches of covenant, or on any other account whatsoever, was final, although the suit was not, in terms, put an end to. Jackson v. 848 Yabsley, T. 3 G. 4. ARREST. 1. Where, in the account between plaintiff and defendant, there are items clearly due on both sides, it is an arrest without reasonable and probable cause within 43 G.3. c. 46. s. 3., if the plaintiff arrests and holds the defendant to bail for the amount due to him, without at the same time giving him credit for the items clearly due on the other side of the account. He ought only to hold the defendant to bail for the admitted balance. Dronefield v. Archer, H. 2 and 3 G. 4. Page 513 2. Where a defendant being previously in custody in execution for a debt, a detainer was lodged against him, but for too large a sum, and on this being discovered in a few hours, the plaintiff discontinued on payment of costs, and before the payment of costs lodged a fresh detainer. Held, that this second detainer was regular, and that it was not like the case of a fresh arrest which cannot be made till the costs have been paid. White v. Gompertz, T. T. 3 G. 4. ASSIGNMENT. 905 ment in evidence being only conditional, this was a fatal variance. Vansandau v. Burt, M. 2 G. 4. Page 42 2. Where there were two assignments of the same lease of premises within the county of Middlesex, and that executed last was registered first: Held, that the deed last registered must, in a court of law, be considered as fraudulent and void, in consequence of 7 Ann. c. 20. s. 1., although the party claiming under the second assignment had full knowledge, when it was executed, of the prior execution of the first assignment. Doe dem. Robinson v. Alsop, M. 2 G. 4. 3. 1. Declaration stated, that in con- 142 Where an assignment of a lease by deed, taken in execution, was made in the name and under the seal of office of the sheriff, by A. B., acting as under-sheriff: Held, that such assignment was sufficiently proved, without proving further the appointment of A. B. as under-sheriff, and that he had power by deed to execute deeds in the name of the sheriff. Doe dem. James v. Brown, M. 2 G. 4. 243 ASSUMPSIT. See CARRIERS, 1, 2. The giving up a suit, instituted to try a question respecting which the law is doubtful, is a good consideration for a promise to pay a stipulated sum; and therefore, where a ship having on board a pilot required by law, ran foul of another vessel, and proceedings were instituted by the owners of the latter to compel the owners of the former to make good the damage, and the former vessel was detained until bail was given, and pending such proceedings, the agents of the owners of the vessel detained, agreed, on the owners of the the damaged vessel renouncing all claims on the other vessel, and on their proving the amount of the damage done, to indemnify them, and to pay a stipulated sum by way of damages: Held, that there being contradictory decisions as to the point whether the ship-owners were liable for an injury done while their ship was under the controul of the pilot required by law, there was a suf-2. ficient consideration to sustain the promise made by the agents of the owners of the detained vessel to pay the stipulated damages. Longridge and Another v. Dorville and Another, M. 2 G.4. Page 117 2. Assumpsit will lie upon a bill of exchange against a trading corporation whose power of drawing and accepting bills is recognized by statute. Murray y. The East India Company, M. 2 G. 4. 3. A printer cannot recover for labour or materials used in printing any work, unless he affixes his name to it, pursuant to the 39 G. 3. c. 79. s. 27, Bensley v. Bignold, H. 2 and 3 G. 4. ATTACHMENT. See PRACTICE, 20. ATTORNEY. See PRACTICE, 9.42. 204 335 1. Where an attorney, in order to get possession of papers belonging to A. B., in the hands of A. B.'s former attorney, who had a lien upon them for the amount of his bill then in dispute, undertook that A. B. should enter into an unqualified reference, not revocable, &c.: Held, that A. B. having become subsequently bankrupt for the second time, and without paying 15s. in the pound, the proof of the debt under the commission was not 3. A clerk to an attorney held, during the term for which he was bound, the office of surveyor of taxes under the crown: Held, that he could not, within 22 G. 2. c. 46. s. 8. and 10., be considered as serving his whole time and term in the proper business of an attorney; and that he ought not to be admitted on the roll; and that having been admitted, he ought to be struck off. Ex parte Taylor, Gent. one, &c. H. 2 and 3 G. 4. 538 An attorney brought his action for his bill of costs, and held the defendant to bail for a larger sum than was afterwards found to be due upon taxation, without having any reasonable or probable cause for so doing: Held, that this was a case within the 43 G. 3. c. 46. s. 3.; and that if not within the statute, still the Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction over its officers, would compel an attorney to pay costs under such circumRobinson v. Elsam, E. stances. |