to pay indirectly all fair and reasonable expenses of this kind, for, if the physicians bill the company direct, they are apt to render excessive charges. You are also authorized to advance such money as is necessary for the injured man's current expenses. It is our purpose, when the young man is sufficiently recovered to be about, to make with him a fair and square settlement, notwithstanding we do not believe In an English case it was held that neither the engine driver, guard, nor the superintendent of the traffic department of a railroad company had authority to bind the company for medical services rendered to a passenger who was injured in consequence of the negligence of the company. Cox v. Midland Counties R. Co., 3 Exch. 268, 15 Am. Neg. Cas. 738, 739n (1849). In view of the importance of this case it may be well to quote at length from the judgment of the court. Speaking with reference to the argument of counsel for the plaintiff that each of the servants of the railroad in question had, as an incident to his employment, authority, in case anything happens which would prejudicial to the interests of the company, to do whatever was reasonably fit under the circumstances to remedy or lessen the damages, Parke, B., said: "It was contended, therefore, that if one of these servants happened to be near at the time of the slip of an embankment which, for the purpose of securing the safe and speedy traffic along the railroad ought to be immediately removed, he would have im be plied authority, when fresh laborers were required, to bind the company by a contract to pay them; and that, in like manner, any servant who was near, or at all events the head servant of the nearest station, would be authorized, if a passenger received personal damage requiring immediate surgical attendance, to contract with a surgeon, and to bind the company by that contract to pay what was reasonably due to him, such authority being an incident to his employment, considering its peculiar nature, and it being for the benefit of the company that the damage and consequent loss to them from any occurrence for which they were responsible should be as much mitigated as possible. The We are all of opinion that the power to enter into this contract was not incident either to the employment of the guard or the superintendent. simple employment of servants by a corporation carrying on a business cannot give them, as incident to that employment, a larger authority than if the same appointment were made by a partnership of as many individuals as the shareholders of the company; nor does it appear to us to make any difference that it is carried on by fewer members, or even by single individuals. *Could it be maintained that a coachman from whose carriage a passenger had fallen and broken his arm, or by which another person had been run over, or a horsekeeper who happened to be near, or the bookkeeper, could bind his master by a contract with a surgeon to cure the injured person, and oblige his master there is any liability on our part. in the case.) (Judging from the facts submitted There is evidence that the superintendents of the mining plant had no authority to employ physicians at the expense of the company to attend injured employees, and that the custom of the company was not to allow such a liability to be incurred by its agents or superintend to pay the bill? We are of opinion that he could not. Though it might be a benefit to the master to have the damage diminished by a speedy cure, if he was really liable for that damage, it would be a prejudice to him to be bound to pay if he was not; and is the servant to decide whether his master is liable or not, a man whom he has not appointed with any view to the exercise of such a discretion? We think the servant has clearly no such power." The doctrine of the Cox case supra, seems to have been limited or destroyed by the decision in Langan v. Great Western R. Co., 30 L. T. N. S. 173 (1873). In this case certain passengers injured by a collision on defendant's railway, were carried into plaintiff's inn, by the help of the station master of the station near which the collision occurred. The subinspector of railway police for the district where the accident happened, whose duty it was to attend at the scene of the accident, ordered some brandy to be given to one of the injured passengers, and in reply to a question by plaintiff as to who would pay for the maintenance of the persons injured, replied: "Don't trouble yourself about that; we will see that is right." In an action brought by plaintiff against the railroad company for board, lodging, necessaries, and goods supplied to the injured passengers, the court held that the evidence was sufficient to go to the jury in support of the plaintiff's claim and to show the authority of the subinspector to bind the company for the necessaries supplied. In dis cussing the facts, Bramwell, B., said: "Surely it is reasonable to say that the person who is chief in office where the accident takes place should have authority to do those things which must be done at once, and which are presumably for the benefit of the company. Take the case of a number of bystanding laborers who are asked to clear the line; that is not a matter of absolute necessity, but it is presumably for the benefit of the company. Take the case of a person in a state of collapse, to whom a glass of brandy may be of vital importance, could there not be authority to pledge the company's credit for that? and here the question of quantum is not raised. If at the outset Locke (the subinspector of police) had said that he was going to pledge the company's credit for six or seven weeks' maintenance of the sufferers, it may be that he would thereby have exceeded his authority. If it were his duty to report what he had done, the company might repudiate any further liability and tell the plaintiff that if she continued to keep the persons injured beyond a certain time she must do so at her own expense. I do not determine, therefore, whether the question of quantum, if it were raised, would be determined for or against the railway company. I go on the ground that under the circumstances of the case there was a necessity for immediate action, and there was no one to direct what should be done but Locke." Denman, J., expressed his views as follows: "I think he (the inspector) had authority to do what was reasonable in the case ents, and there is no testimony that such authority was given the superintendents in this case. Under this testimony the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover on the first two counts which allege that the service was rendered at the special instance and request of the defendant, and at the defendant's request, unless the duties of the superintendents by implication of law gave them authority to request the services for and at the expense of the defendant corporation, notwithstanding the testimony that no such authority was given or contemplated by the corporation or by those who exercise its rights The liability of the corporation for negligence of its agents and servants that proximately injures an employee may extend to medical services to an injured employee, but this liability does not give rise to a con of injured persons, and, ex necessitate rei, to take them to a place of security and there have them promptly attended to till the arrival of a doctor. I do not say that it necessarily follows that he would have authority to give orders for the supply of every possible thing that might be comfortable to persons under these circumstances. It depends very much, I think, on the condition of the persons taken in." C. Trespassers. a In case of emergency it has been held that the highest representative of a railroad company on the ground has implied authority to bind the company for professional services rendered to a trespasser who has been injured by the trains. Thus, the conductor of a freight train which has injured stranger by backing its engine and cars against him in the night time, at a point far distant from the general office of the company, has implied authority to bind the company for the services of a physician employed to attend him; but the employment of such physician does not include authority to employ assistants. "In so holding the company liable in such an emergency," said the court, "it will be observed that the rationale of the doctrine (of cases cited), whether in case of a stranger and trespasser, or of an employee or passenger, is found in the duty imposed by the dictates of common humanity. The authorities stress the moral obligation, and find from that the legal duty to alleviate as far as possible the sufferings and to administer to the necessities which the company has contributed, however innocently, to produce. We confess that if the duty, and consequent liability for failure to discharge that duty, grow out of the obligation which the impulses of our common humanity would suggest and impose, under such circumstances, then we do not see that the status or relationship of the party in jured to the party producing the injury could affect the question of the appellee's right to recover. For, from the humane viewpoint, clearly it could make no difference whether the helpless and unfortunate victim of the accident were trespasser, employee, or passenger. It is a question of the authority of the conductor to act for his company. The emergency creates that authority. Some one, as Judge Cooley, J., holds, must have authority to represent the company under such circumstances. The conductor is the highest agent on the ground, and is in command of the train that did the injury. Before sufficient time had intervened to ascertain whether the accident was caused by * tract liability for such services. An issue of liability for negligence and the effect of contributory negligence has no relation to the claim. here made. In view of the testimony here it is not clear that the duties of the superintendents of the mining plant are such that the law implies therefrom authority to employ physicians for the company to attend employees of the company injured by its machinery. This being so, a request of the superintendent to render the medical services is not in law a request of the company, and as a consequence the liability of the company is not shown. A new trial should have been granted. The judgment is reversed. SHACKLEFORD and COCKRELL, JJ., concur. TAYLOR, HOCKER, and PARKHILL, JJ., concur in the opinion. the negligence of the company, he certainly had at least the implied authori ty to protect his company by doing what might be necessary to lessen the damages in the event that it should afterwards be ascertained that the company was liable. This authority would be sufficient to bind the company for his contract with the surgeon, but not for the surgeon's contract with others." Bonnette v. St. Louis, Iron Mountain & S. R. Co., 87 Ark. 197, 112 S. W. 220, 16 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1081 (1908). A railroad company was held liable in Terre Haute & I. R. Co. v. Stockwell, 118 Ind. 98, 20 N. E. 650 (1888), for professional services rendered by a physician to a stranger who was struck by a locomotive and injured, where it appeared that the injury was so serious as to require immediate attention, that the point where the accident occurred was many miles distant from the principal office of the company, that the conductor employed the plaintiff to render the services and soon thereafter telegraphed the general agent and superintendent that he had left the injured man under the care of a physician, and that the company did not repudiate the employment 80 made by the conductor. But, in Adams v. Southern R. Co., 125 N. C. 565 (1899), it was held that a conductor of a freight train had no implied authority to summon physicians, at the expense of the company, to attend three tramps who were injured when the train ran into a wash out while they were stealing a ride. "There are some emergency instances," said the court, "in which the conductor may engage a physician to nurse the passengers when injured, but as to trespassers on defendant's road no such authority is found to exist." And in Wills v. International & G. N. R. Co., 41 Tex. Civ. App. 58 (1905), it was held that the conductor of a freight train has no implied authority to bind the company by the employment of surgeons to amputate the leg of a trespasser who was injured while attempting to board the train when drunk, although the case was one demanding immediate surgical attention. As to Liability of Railroad and Other Corporations for Services Rendered by Physicians and Others to Injured Employees on Contracts Made by the General Officers of Such Corporations, Wherein the Question of Scope of Authority is Involved, see Note in 15 Am. Neg. Cas. 733-745. 1. Master and Servant-Police Power-Workmen's Compensation Act. An Act (102 Ohio L. 524) providing a plan of compensation from a State insurance fund, for accidental injuries sustained by those employed in industrial pursuits pertains to the public welfare and is a valid exercise of the police power. 2. Statutes-Validity-Conjecture. A statute cannot be set aside upon mere conjecture or speculation that an unlawful result will follow. 3. Master and Servant-Workmen's Compensation Act-Validity-Due Process -Assumption of Risk.. That a Workmen's Compensation Act abolished the defense of assumption of risk does not render it repugnant to State and Federal Constitutions as taking private property without due process of law. 4. Master and Servant-Workmen's Compensation Act-Validity-Delegation of Judicial Power-Board of Awards. The board of awards created by the Workmen's Compensation Act is not a court and the Act is not invalid as delegating judicial power to it in contravention of the Constitution. 5. Master and Servant-Workmen's Compensation Act-Validity-Right to Appeal to Courts-Denial. The constitutional right to appeal to the courts for redress of wrongs is not denied by a Workmen's Compensation Act which establishes a board of awards by which the right of claimants to participate in a State insurance fund is determined, where an appeal lies to the courts from its decision, and an injured employee may, in the first instance, waive his claim under the Act and sue in court for his damages. 6. Master and Servant-Workmen's Compensation Act-Validity-Unjust or Arbitrary Classification. A Workmen's Compensation Act affecting only employers of five or more employees and applicable only to workmen or operatives, is not invalid on the ground that it makes an unjust and arbitrary classification. Mandamus by the State, on relation of one Wallace D. Yaple, to the State Treasurer of Ohio. Demurrer to petition overruled. For Relator-Timothy S. Hogan, Atty. Gen., C. D. Laylin, Frank Davis, Jr., J. Harrington Boyd, Wallace D. Yaple, James I. Boulger, D. J. Ryan, J. L. Hampton and George B. Okey. NOTE. On the subject of the Constitutionality of the Workmen's Compensation Acts, see annotation on page 720 of this volume (1 N. C. C. A.), post. |