injuries of which appellee complains must he regarded as established; that the preparation and the fumes arising therefrom were liable to blister the skin, cause the skin to peel off, and produce a burning sensation, and that appellant had knowledge thereof, must be regarded as established; but the record discloses that appellee also knew that such injuries were likely to follow from handling the piling. His counsel, in their argument filed in this court, in discussing appellee's knowledge of the preparation used on the timbers, say: "He did know that it would smart and burn and cause the skin to blister and peel. But that was and is not the danger complained of. The danger complained of was poisoning of the system, resulting in permanent injury." And: "He did know it would redden the skin, smart and burn and blister-that it was hot stuff; but he did not know it was dangerous in the sense that an abundance of it breathed into the lungs and taken into the system would permeate the whole system and create systematic poisoning; nor did he know that this burning and parching of the skin and mucous membrane would result in eczema." The record in this case, therefore, fails to establish any duty owing by appellant to warn appellee, before or at the time of ordering him to assist in unloading the piling from the car, that the substance with which the timbers had been treated was liable to blister the skin, cause the skin to peel off, and produce a burning sensation, and for such injuries it is clear that appellee could not recover. Does the fact that the injuries which appellee received were more serious than he anticipated and resulted in a disease of a permanent nature render appellant liable in this case? In our judgment, under the facts disclosed by the record, it does not. The record shows that appellant, as well as other companies, had been using this coal-tar preparation for a number of years, and fails to disclose any injuries other than blistering and peeling off of the skin, except in the case of appellee and an employee of the Illinois Central Railroad Company on the same day. Out of about 125 men who had worked for appellant and had handled timbers treated with creosote, appellee was the only one who ever claimed to have been permanently injured by the creosote or creosote fumes. None of the men working with appellee on August 6th suffered any injuries from working with the piling, other than the burning sensation and the blistering and the peeling off of the skin. So far as the record disclosed, appellee was the first person to sustain any serious or permanent injuries from handling timbers treated with creosote during the many years this substance has been in use as a preservative for wood. Under such circumstances a finding that appellant knew, or by exercising ordinary diligence. might have known, that the coal-tar preparation was liable to produce the injuries of which the appellee complains, is manifestly without any evidence whatever to support it. If the appellant did not know, or by exercising ordinary diligence could not have known, that such injuries were liable to result, then the law did not impose any duty upon it to warn appellee of the danger of receiving such injuries, before or at the time of giving the order which appellee alleges was negligently given. A master is not an insurer of the safety of his servant, and he can only be held liable for consequences which he may reasonably be expected to anticipate as a result of his conduct. In Fent v. Toledo, P. & W. Ry. Co., 59 Ill. 349, 14 Am. Rep. 13, in considering the liability of a railroad company for damages from fire caused by sparks from passing engines, we quoted with approval the following language from 2 Parsons on Contracts (1st Ed.) p. 456: "Every defendant shall be held liable for all of those consequences which might have been foreseen and expected as the result of his conduct, but not for those which he could not have foreseen and was therefore under no moral obligation to take into consideration." In Shugart v. Egan, 83 Ill. 56, 25 Am. Rep. 359, we said that this language quoted from Parsons on Contracts would seem to be equally as applicable to actions founded on torts as to those accruing upon contracts. In discussing damages for which a defendant may be held liable and damages for which he is not liable, we said, in Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 5 Am. Neg. Rep. 15, 51 N. E. 657, 42 L. R. A. 199: "The principle is, damages which are recoverable for negligence must be such as are the natural and reasonable results of defendant's acts, and the consequences must be such as in the ordinary course of things would flow from the acts and could be reasonably anticipated as a result thereof. Proximate damages are such as are the ordinary and natural results of the omission or commission of acts of negligence and such as are usual and might have been reasonably expected. Remote damages are such as are the unusual and unexpected results not reasonably to be anticipated from an accidental or unusual combination of circumstances-a result beyond and over which the negligent party has no control. The law regards only the direct and proximate results of negligent acts as creating a liability against a defendant." There is in this record no evidence tending to show that appellant could reasonably have been expected to anticipate that appellee would be seriously or permanently injured in obeying the order to assist in unloading the piling from the car, and under the principle announced in the foregoing cases decided by this court the appellant cannot be held liable for those injuries. A case very similar in principle to the case at bar is that of Gould v. Slater Woolen Co., 147 Mass. 315, 17 N. E. 531. In that case Frances E. Gould brought an action against the Slater Woolen Company to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been sustained by her in consequence of handling certain cloths purchased of the defendant and which contained certain poisonous dyes. The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant, on the ground that there was no evidence upon which the defendant could be held liable. According to the testimony of the expert witnesses introduced by the plaintiff, it had never been shown until after the plaintiff received her injuries that any case of poisoning had occurred like the plaintiff's, and the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, in sustaining the action of the trial court in directing a verdict for the defendant, said: "For all that appears. the plaintiff's was the first instance of injury that ever was known to arise from the cause alleged in the declaration. All that the plaintiff showed against the defendant was that it used an article for dyeing its cloths which was the most common mordant used in wool dyeing, which was also used very extensively in dyeing stockings black, which, so far as then known, had never caused injury to anybody who merely handled the cloths, and which the defendant did not know or suppose, and had no reason to know or suppose, to be injurious; and under these circumstances, although there was evidence tending to show that, in point of fact, the plaintiff was injured by merely handling the cloths, this was not a result which the defendant was bound or ought to have contemplated as likely to happen." When the facts in the Gould Case are compared with the case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court of Massachusetts, which is in harmony with the decisions of this court above cited, is peculiarly fitting as an authority that the Circuit Court should have directed a verdict for appellant. Appellant also complains of the action of the trial court in giving, modifying, and refusing instructions. What we have said in discussing the action of the court in refusing to direct a verdict for appellant will serve as a sufficient guide for the trial court in passing upon the instructions of which complaint is made, should they be offered upon another trial of this cause. On account of the error of the trial court in refusing the peremptory instruction offered by appellant at the close of all the evidence in the case, the judgments of the Appellate and Circuit Courts will be reversed, and the cause will be remanded to the Circuit Court for a new trial. Reversed and remanded. HAND, FARMER, and CARTER, JJ., dissenting. 1. TURLINGTON v. TAMPA ELECTRIC CO. [SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA, NOVEMBER 21, 1911.] Fla. Negligence-Breach of Duty-Damages. Where, by virtue of the relation towards each other existing between parties, the law implies a duty from one to the other, a breach of that duty by one that proximately causes or contributes to causing a substantial injury to the other may constitute a cause of action for compensatory damages, if the plaintiff is free from fault. 2. Negligence-Public Accommodations-Care Required. Where one undertakes to render a service by furnishing accommodations of a public nature, the law imposes a duty to use proper care, precaution, and diligence in providing and maintaining the accommodations in a reasonably safe condition for the purposes to which they are adapted and are apparently designed to be used. 3. Negligence-Public Accommodations-Care Required-Notice. If accommodations afforded to the public for hire are not reasonably suitable and safe for the purpose for which they may ordinarily and apparently be used in a customary way, the public should be excluded from their use, or appropriate notice of their unsuitable or unsafe condition should be so given as to warn persons of dangers in using them. 4. Negligence-Public Accommodations-Damages. A failure to perform a duty due to the public in furnishing public accommodations may be negligence that, if it proximately results in injury to another without his fault, will constitute a cause of action for compensatory damages. Co. v. Porter, 137 Ill. App. 448 (1907). A bather at an athletic club who slipped upon a slat walk between the dressing room and the bath room, and accidentally put his hand through a glass door which was leaning against the partition at the side of the walk, to avoid having water thrown upon him by another person in the room, cannot recover of the defendant who had leased the premises to the club, on the ground of absence of any proof of negligence. Heath v. Metropolitan Exhibition Co., 11 N. Y. Supp. 357 (1890). One who constructs a toboggan slide to be used by the public on payment of an admission fee upon entering the amusement park, is under obligations |