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emption estate shall be terminated. The injunction was granted, restraining a sale of the property levied upon.

What were the rights of the beneficiaries in the exempt property, supposing that the same had been surrendered by these complainants to their possession as soon as the order of exemption was passed; that is, as soon as the proceeding for exemption which was pending when these complainants purchased at judicial sale terminated? These rights were to have the corpus of the property, and the unrestricted use of it, just as ordinary owners are entitled to use their property of a similar kind, with the single exception that no sale of it could be made save in the mode prescribed by statute. The cattle might have been all butchered and eaten, and the horse worn out, long before the exemption estate would expire by the efflux of time. The record shows that quite a number of the beneficiaries are children; some of them quite young. There is every probability that before they all attain majority every one of the animals would be dead and gone, and it is not unlikely that the rest of the property-such an article, for instance, as a sugar-mill-would, by wear and tear, become worthless. At all events, there can be no doubt that the object of the homestead and exemption laws is to allow families to have the actual possession and use of the specific property claimed and set apart. What right, then, has any one who converts that property to his own use, contrary to the exemption right, to require that the family shall be in a worse condition, by reason of his wrongful act, than they would have been in had he done them no wrong? If he deprives them of their rightful custody and use of the specific property, why should they not have, in place thereof, the custody and use of the money recovered from him as damages, so that they may use it as freely as they might have used the property which it represents? In the case of the sale and purchase of land subject to a pending application for homestead, as in Kilgore v. Beck, 40 Ga. 293, 297; Faircloth v. St. Johns, 44 Ga. 603, the homestead beneficiaries are to have the land specifically for their enjoyment, according to the nature of the property. In like manner, in case of the sale and purchase of personalty, they are to have the specific personalty for their enjoyment, according to the nature of this species of property; and to enjoy it fully, according to its nature, involves the right to consume it or to wear it out. It is the duty of those purchasing personalty subject to a pending application for exemption to respect the exemption right as a sacred thing, and to surrender the property as soon as the right is established, and then wait patiently for what is left of it when the right becomes extinct. If they fail to take this course, they must not only submit to a recovery, but if the recovery be in money, as in the present case, must pay it. The proper interpretation of such a recovery is that it is only a compensation in damages for what the exemption estate has lost by the wrongful act done in withholding or converting the property. As to the mere contingent interest of the wrongdoers in the possible residue after the exemption estate is exhausted, that may well be supposed not to have been embraced in the recovery; but, whether so or not, there can be no legal reason for allowing the wrongful act to work a destruction of the right of the beneficiaries to possess and use the corpus,—a right clearly existing when the wrongful act was committed.

The judge erred in granting the injunction, and we sum up our ruling, under the facts and law of the case, as follows: After a recovery in damages for the conversion of exempt personalty, (such as cattle,) the beneficiaries, by their proper representative, are entitled to have possession of the money, and to use and enjoy it as freely as they could or might have used the property had it not been converted. Those who converted the property, though they obtained possession of it by purchase at a sale under a judgment against the head of the family, and though one of them was the plaintiff in that judgment, and is still a creditor, have no right to have the money invested. Judgment reversed.

(29 W. Va. 571)

WHITE and another v. ROMANS.

(Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. April 9, 1887.)

1. PLEADING-DECLARATION-REQUISITES.

It is an elementary rule in pleading that the declaration must allege all the cir cumstances necessary for the support of the action, and contain a full, regular, and methodical statement of the injury which the plaintiff has sustained, with such precision, certainty, and clearness that the defendant may be distinctly informed of the specific grounds of the action, and thus be enabled to answer by a direct and unequivocal plea with evidence to support it.

2. SAME.

A case in which the declaration fails to conform in its averments to the essential requirements of this rule, and is therefore held fatally defective and insufficient on general demurrer.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Error to circuit court, Logan county.
Action for breach of contract.

The opinion states the case.

H. K. Shumate, for plaintiff in error. No appearance for defendant in

error.

SNYDER, J. Action of trespass on the case brought in June, 1882, in the circuit court of Logan county, by Thomas White and Chapman Williamson, plaintiffs, against Alexander Romans, defendant, to recover damages for alleged breaches of a written contract. The declaration contains three counts. The substance of the first count is that the plaintiffs and defendant, on August 26, 1881, entered into a contract in writing, by which the defendant sold to the plaintiffs all the Isam Romans land on the Elk, Millstone, and Pidgeon creeks, in said county, and six yoke of cattle, with their saw-log rigging, at the price of $3,200, to be paid in timber cut and hauled from said land, and delivered to the defendant well rafted and oared, at the mouth of Pidgeon creek, on or before June 1, 1882, at 10 cents per cubic foot; that by said contract the defendant was to furnish to plaintiffs all the necessary means to carry on and complete said job; that long before said first day of June, 1882 to-wit, on and after March 1, 1882, the defendant, although often requested so to do, failed to furnish the necessary means, to-wit, money, hands, provisions, feed, etc., to enable the plaintiffs to perform said contract; that the plaintiffs did perform said contract on their part until the defendant refused to furnish hands, provisions, feed, etc., to complete the same, and the want of water to run the timber to the place of delivery; and that the plaintiffs did, before June 1, 1882, deliver to the defendant, at the mouth of Pidgeon creek, ander said contract, timber of the value of $1,500. Yet the defendant, well knowing the premises, has not kept and performed said contract, but has broken the same, and to keep the same has wholly refused and neglected, to the damage of the plaintiffs $2,500.

The second count is, in effect, the same as the first, except that it further avers that the defendant delivered to the plaintiffs the possession of said land and cattle, he retaining the legal title thereto until the contract should be performed by the plaintiffs; that under the contract the plaintiffs delivered in Pidgeon creek and its tributaries a large amount of timber, to-wit, of the value of $3,500, and that three months before June 1, 1882, the defendant forcibly took from the plaintiffs the said six yoke of cattle and their rigging, whereby the plaintiffs were prevented from fulfilling said contract on their part.

The third count purports to set out the contract in hæc verba, as follows: "AUGUST 26, 1881. Article of agreement made between A. L. Romans, of the first part, and Thomas White and Chap. Williamson, of the second part. A. L. Romans sells to the parties of the second part the Isam Romans tract

of land, and six yoke of cattle, and the peeled timber on it, for the sum of $3,200 in timber, the same timber that is peeled on said land, at the mouth of Pidgeon C., well rafted and oared, at ten cents per cubic foot, for which they bind themselves to cut and haul the aforesaid timber this year, and deliver it against June 1, 1882, if possible; and the first party binds himself to furnish the necessary means to run said job in, for which the second party binds the land and timber, all of it, and the cattle and rigging and possession of said land and property, till paid for, for which the second party is to use all energy to put said timber out this season, providing there is water." This count then avers in general terms, that the plaintiffs fully complied with and performed on their part the stipulations of said contract; but that the defendant, although often requested, has not kept said contract, but has broken the same, to the damage of the plaintiffs $2,500.

The defendant demurred generally to the declaration, and the court overruled the demurrer. The case was tried by jury on the issue of not guilty, and there was a verdict and judgment against the defendant for $800. The defendant moved for a new trial, which the court refused. He then excepted. and at his instance all the evidence was certified and made part of the record. Our first inquiry is, did the court err in overruling the demurrer to the declaration? The contract set out in the third count is very badly drawn, and not very clear and definite in its purposes. It seems, however, to be intended as a sale of the land and cattle to the plaintiffs, in consideration of $3,200, to be paid in timber at 10 cents per cubic foot, and delivered to the defendant at the mouth of Pidgeon creek by June 1, 1882, if possible; the defendant to furnish the necessary means to enable the plaintiffs to perform the contract, for which he is to retain the title to the land and cattle as security. What means the defendant was to furnish is not specified; nor is it clear to what extent the land and cattle were to stand as security,-whether for the $3,200 purchase money of the land only, or for that and also the repayment of the means advanced by the defendant to enable the plaintiffs to fulfill the contract.

In the first and second counts it is averred that the means to be furnished by the defendant was to be "money, hands, provisions, feed, etc." If by this is meant that the defendant was to furnish all or enough money, hands, provisions, feed, etc., to run the job or complete the contract, then the plaintiffs were bound to do nothing but superintend the work. But I presume the correct interpretation of the contract, and intention of the parties, was that the defendant was only to furnish such means as might be deemed necessary to enable the plaintiffs, with the means under their control and to be furnished by them, to deliver the timber as required by the contract; that is, the defendant was to aid the plaintiffs with means, so far as might be necessary to enable them to complete the contract within the time specified. If this be so, then the measure of damages for the failure of the defendant to furnish such means would be simply the value or cost of the means, whatever it might be, which the defendant refused to furnish. Such refusal by the defendant would not excuse the delivery of the timber by the plaintiffs, but would only authorize them to buy and furnish such means at the cost of the defendant, and recover such cost, or the amount expended. by them for the same, from the defendant. This would constitute the damages sustained by the plaintiffs. In neither of the counts in the declaration is there any averment upon which any such damages could be recovered. It is uncertain from the counts of the declaration, taken singly or together, what the plaintiffs are claiming as damages, or in what they consist, or of what breaches they complain.

In the first and second counts the claim seems to rest upon two separate and distinct grounds: First. the failure of the defendant to furnish the necessary means to enable the plaintiffs to fulfill their part of the contract; and,

second, the value of the timber delivered by the plaintiffs before the defendant refused to furnish the necessary means. These grounds are not only inconsistent, but they fail to state any cause of action. The refusal of the defendant to furnish the means did not, so far as the averments show, render it impossible for the plaintiffs to perform the contract, and therefore, as above stated, it was their duty to furnish the means at the cost of the defendant, and complete the contract notwithstanding such failure on the part of the defendant. Nor could the plaintiffs recover the price of the timber delivered by them, because, by the terms of the contract, the consideration agreed upon for the timber was the land and cattle, and there is no averment that they had been deprived of the land, or that it was of less value than the timber so delivered.

It is an elemental and fundamental rule in pleading that the declaration must allege all the circumstances necessary for the support of the action, and contain a full, regular, and methodical statement of the injury which the plaintiff has sustained, and the time and place and other facts and circumstances, with such precision, certainty, and clearness that the defendant, thus informed of what he is called upon to answer, may be able to respond by a direct and unequivocal plea, with evidence to support it, and that the jury may be enabled to give a complete verdict upon the issue, and that the court, consistently with the rules of law, may give a certain and distinct judgment upon the premises. Rex v. Horne, Cowp. 682; 1 Saund. Pl. & Ev. (415,) 509. Besides this, the pleading must not state two or more facts, either of which would of itself, independently of the other, constitute a sufficient ground of action or defense. 1 Chit. Pl. 249.

According to these elementary rules of pleading, the declaration before us, and each count thereof, is fatally defective and insufficient. Neither of the counts inform the defendant of the breach on which the plaintiffs found their action, nor of the facts and circumstances which entitle them to damages. There is no averment of any request or demand upon the defendant to furnish the necessary means to enable the plaintiffs to complete the contract. So, even if the failure of the defendant to furnish such means could excuse the full performance of the contract on the part of the plaintiff, it could not do so until a demand had been made upon and refused by the defendant. The plaintiffs were, according to the theory of the declaration, to be the judges of what means they required to enable them to complete the work, and it was therefore essential that they should demand them of the defendant. The general averment that the defendant, although often requested, etc., is not sufficient in such cases. The averment of a demand must be made direct and positive, and proved on the trial. 1 Chit. 340; Greenwood v. Curtis, 6 Mass. 358.

In the second count it is alleged that the defendant forcibly took from the plaintiffs the said six yoke of cattle; but it is not alleged that this constituted the breach of which the plaintiffs complain. This averment is introduced merely as an excuse or reason to show why the plaintiffs did not deliver the timber as they were required to do by the contract, and not as a specific breach of the contract entitling the plaintiffs to recover damages.

None of the counts show that the plaintiffs had been by the defendant ejected from or deprived of the land which was the principal, if not the sole, consideration of the contract. They certainly cannot retain the consideration which they were to receive for the full performance of the contract, and then recover from the defendant damages for their failure to complete the contract, on the ground that he refused to furnish them the means to complete it. This would be in effect taking the land from the defendant without consideration, and compelling him to pay damages to the plaintiffs, because he did not furnish them the means to enable them to pay him the agreed consideration for

the land.

But it is needless to pursue this discussion further. The declaration is so incongruous, uncertain, and inconsistent that it is impossible to ascertain from its averments what was the contract between the parties, what damages they have sustained, or of what breaches they complain. Each of the counts states the contract differently, and none of them state any cause of action. The court therefore erred in overruling the demurrer to the declaration.

The conclusion thus reached makes it unnecessary to consider any of the other questions in the case. The judgment of the circuit court must be reversed, the verdict of the jury set aside, the demurrer to the declaration sustained, and the case remanded to said court, where the plaintiffs, if they so elect, will be given leave to amend their declaration; otherwise, the action will be dismissed.

JOHNSON, GREEN, and WOODS, JJ., concurred.

(30 W. Va. 1)

KORNE and Wife v. KORNE.

(Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia. June 25, 1887.)

1. EQUITY-PLEADING-MULTIFARIOUSNESS-ALTERNATE RELIEF.

A bill in chancery is not multifarious, and therefore demurrable, simply because it contains a prayer for alternate relief, inconsistent with its prayer for specific relief.

2. SAME

RESCISSION OF CONTRACT-FRAUD-MENTAL CAPACITY.

While the courts may set aside contracts made by persons of great mental weakness, though not amounting to absolute disqualification, when the contracts are grossly inequitable or unjust to such persons, they will not for such cause set aside valid contracts entered into by parties fully competent to contract.

8. COMPROMISE-CONCLUSIVENESS.

Where a compromise of a doubtful right is fairly made between parties, it is binding, and cannot be affected by any subsequent investigation or result; and this is so whether it is a compromise of a doubtful question of law or fact.1

4. CONTRACT-FOR SUPPORT-INTERPRETATION.

When a father and mother enter into a contract with their son, whereby they sell to the son a small farm, and, as a part of the consideration therefor, the son agrees to comfortably support his parents during their lives; and the contract stipulates that it is expressly understood by all the parties that the parents are to reside on the farm, and occupy a portion of the dwelling-house, and the son another portion of the house, and that the son is to keep his parents in eating at his own table the same as he has for himself: held, that the son is bound to comfortably support his parents at the dwelling-house on the farm, and not elsewhere. (Syllabus by the Court.)

Appeal from circuit court, Ohio county.

Bill to set aside a deed and contracts, on the ground of fraud and undue influence on the part of the grantee. The opinion states the case.

Ewing, Melvin & Riley, for appellants. H. M. Russell and W. P. Hubbard, for appellee.

SNYDER, J. George Korne and Margaret, his wife, were the owners of a small farm of 38 acres of land in Ohio county, upon which they had resided for a number of years. They also had household and kitchen furniture and some live-stock on the farm, and the said Margaret had on deposit in bank about $1,500 in money. They had five children, four of whom were daughters, and one son, John Korne, all of whom had become of age and had mar

1 Respecting what will support a compromise, and the effect of such compromise, see Emmittsburgh R. Co. v. Donoghue, (Md.) 10 Atl. Rep. 233; Anthony v. Boyd, (R. I.) 8 Atl. Rep. 701; Gaines v. Molen, 30 Fed. Rep. 27; Central Trust Co. v. Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co., 29 Fed. Rep. 546, and note; Brown v. Ladd, (Mass.) 10 N. E. Rep. 839; Baumier v. Antiau, (Mich.) 31 N. W. Rep. 880; Richardson & B. Co. v. Independent Dist., (Iowa,) 31 N. W. Rep. 871; Brooks v. Halí, (Kan.) 14 Pac. Rep. 236.

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