ACTIONS AND DEFENSES-Continued.

2. By parties to the combination.

5. Members of the Kansas City Live Stock Exchange can not en-
join the board of directors of that exchange, under the Anti-
Trust Law of 1890, from enforcing against them certain by-
laws of the association claimed to be illegal and in violation
of that act. Greer, Mills & Co. v. Stoller, 77 F., 1. 1-620
6. Where a member of a voluntary association has been suspended
by the directors for nonpayment of a fine for violation of the
by-laws, his action to be restored to the privileges of mem-
bership is founded upon the contract between himself an
the association, which he must either accept in its entirety
or repudiate. He does not occupy the position of a stranger
injured by the acts of co-trespassers.
Ib.
7. May Maintain Action to Set Aside Unlawful Transfer of Prop-
erty. A minority stockholder in a corporation may main-
tain a suit in equity in behalf of himself and all other stock-
holders similarly situated to set aside an alleged unlawful
transfer of the property of the corporation in pursuance of a
conspiracy between its officers and the transferee in restraint
of trade and commerce, where it is alleged that the corpora-
tion, on demand, has refused to bring such suit. Metcalf v.
Amer. School-Furniture Co., 108 F., 909.
2-75

8. Same

Multifariousness.-A bill for such relief which also seeks
the recovery of treble damages under the Anti-Trust Act of
July 2, 1890, is multifarious, since such damages are only
recoverable in an action at law by the plaintiff as an indi-
vidual, and not as a stockholder, while the equitable relief
prayed for is in behalf of the corporation, and, if granted,
would inure to the benefit of all the stockholders.
Ib.

9. No Right of Action Against Trust to Recover Damages.-Section
7 of the Anti-Trust Act (26 Stat., 209), giving to any person
injured by any other person or corporation by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the act the right to recover treble dam-
ages, does not authorize an action against an alleged trust
corporation, by one who was a party to its organization and
a stockholder therein, to recover damages resulting from the
enforcement by defendant of rights given it by the alleged
unlawful agreement. Bishop v. Amer. Preservers Co., 105 F.,
845.
2-51

10. Member of a Combination in Violation of Anti-Trust Law may
Maintain Suit to Enjoin Infringement of Patent Owned
by Complainant.-That a complainant is a member of a com-
bination in violation of the Anti-Trust Law of July 2, 1890
(26 Stat., 209), does not give third persons the right to in-
fringe a patent of which complainant is owner, nor preclude
complainant from maintaining a suit in equity to enjoin
such infringement, General Electric Co. v. Wise, 119 F., 922.
2-205

ACTIONS AND DEFENSES-Continued.

11. Recovery on Collateral Contract.-The act of July 2, 1890, sec-
tion 1 (26 Stat., 209), known as the "Sherman Anti-Trust
Act," does not invalidate, or prevent a recovery for the
breach of a collateral contract for the manufacture and sale
of goods by a member of a combination formed for the pur-
pose of restraining interstate trade in such goods. Hadley
Dean Plate Glass Co. v. Highland Glass Co., 143 F., 242.

See also Jayne v. Loder, 149 F., 22.

3. By illegal combinations.

2-995

12. Can not Enforce Illegal Contract.-An illegal combination or
trust can not resort to equity to enforce a contract or sale
calculated to perpetuate the illegal features of the combi-
nation. Amer. Biscuit & Mfg. Co. v. Klotz, 44 F., 721. 1-2
13. May Recover on Collateral Contracts the Price of Goods Sold.-A
violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 (26
Stat., 209), by the formation of a combination in restraint
of trade, by which a penalty is incurred under the statute,
does not preclude the company thus illegally formed from
recovering on collateral contracts for the purchase price of
goods. Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U. S., 540.
2-118
14. Same. Nor does the illegality, at common law, of such a com-
bination formed by corporations and persons in restraint of
trade, preclude it from recovering the purchase price of goods
sold in the course of business.
Ib.

4. By the United States.

15. The right to bring suits in equity for violations of the Anti-
Trust Act of July 2, 1890, is vested in the district attorneys
of the United States. Pidcock v. Harrington, 64 F., 821.

1-377
16. The right to bring suits for injunction under section 4 of the
act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat., 209), is limited to suits insti-
tuted on behalf of the Government. Greer, Mills & Co. v.
Stoller, 77 F., 1.
1-620

17. Same. The only party entitled to maintain a bill of injunction
for an alleged breach of the Anti-Trust Act of 1890 is the
United States, by its district attorney, on the authority of
the Attorney-General. Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Miami S. S.
Co., 86 F., 407.
1-823

18. The intention of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat.,
209), was to limit direct proceedings in equity to prevent
and restrain such violations of the Anti-Trust Act as cause
injury to the general public, or to all alike, merely from the
suppression of competition in trade and commerce among

ACTIONS AND DEFENSES-Continued.

the several States and with foreign nations, to those insti-
tuted in the name of the United States, under section 4 of
the act, by district attorneys of the United States, acting
under the direction of the Attorney-General; thus securing
the enforcement of the act, so far as such direct proceedings
in equity are concerned, according to some uniform plan,
operative throughout the entire country. Minnesota v.
Northern Securities Co., 194 U. S., 48.
2-533

5. By States.

19. A State can not maintain an action in equity to restrain a
corporation from violating the provisions of the act of July
2, 1890, on the ground that such violations by decreasing
competition would depreciate the value of its public lands
and enhance the cost of maintaining its public institutions,
the damages resulting from such violations being remote and
indirect and not such direct actual injury as is provided for
in section 7 of the act. Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co.,
194 U. S., 48.
2-533
20. Municipal Corporation may Maintain Action for Damages
under Section 7, Act of 1890.-A municipal corporation en-
gaged in operating water, lighting, or similar plants, from
which a revenue is derived, is, in relation to such matters, a
business corporation, and may maintain an action under
section 7 of the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat.,
210), for injury to its "business" by reason of a combina-
tion or conspiracy in restraint of interstate trade or com-
merce made unlawful by such act. City of Atlanta v. Chat-
tanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 F., 23.
2-299

6. At common law-Damages.

21. Action for Damages Must Show that Plaintiff is Engaged in
Interstate Commerce.-An action to recover damages alleged
to have been caused by acts done in violation of the Anti-
Trust Act (26 Stat., 209) can not be maintained when the
complaint fails to show that plaintiff is engaged in interstate
commerce, and no such showing is made by an averment
that plaintiff is engaged in "manufacturing watch cases
throughout all the States of the United States and in foreign
countries." Dueber Watch Case Mfg. v. Howard Watch,
etc., Co., 55 F., 851.
1-178

Case affirmed, 66 F., 637 (1-421).
22. Same-Must Show Intention to Control Market, or a Large Por-

tion of it. An agreement by a number of manufacturers and
dealers in watch cases to fix an arbitrary price on their
goods, and not to sell the same to any persons buying watch
cases of plaintiff, is not in violation of the statute; and a

ACTIONS AND DEFENSES-Continued.

complaint which, on the last analysis, avers only these facts,
without averring the absorption or the intention to absorb
or control the entire market, or a large part thereof, states
no cause of action.
Ib.
23. Action Alleged to be in Violation of the Statutes of a State and
of the United States Held to be Founded upon Act of July 2,
1890 (26 Stat., 290).-An action brought in the United
States Circuit Court for southern New York by a manufac-
turing company against competitors in various States, alleg-
ing the formation of a combination and an attempt to create
a monopoly, "in violation of the statutes of this State and
the United States," whereby plaintiff's business was injured,
and alleging the formation of the combination on and prior
to November 16, 1887, but that, after the passage of the act
of Congress of July 2, 1890, defendants ratified, renewed,
and confirmed their previous contracts, combinations, etc.,
and judgment being demanded for treble damages under
and by virtue of the statute." Held, that the action must
be deemed to be founded upon the said act of July 2, 1890.
Dueber Watch Case Mfg. Co. v. Howard Watch, etc., Co., 66
F., 637.
1-421
24. Same-A Cause of Action not Stated.-Where, in the above
action, complaint alleged that previous to November 16, 1887,
it sold all its goods to a great number of dealers "throughout
the United States and Canada;" that prior to that date de-
fendants had agreed with each other to maintain arbitrary
and fixed prices for their watch cases; that, for the purpose
of compelling plaintiff to join with them therein, defendants
on said date mutually agreed that they would not thereafter
sell any goods to persons who bought or sold goods manu-
factured by plaintiff; that they caused notice thereof to be
served upon the many dealers in such goods throughout the
United States and Canada, who had formerly dealt in
plaintiff's goods, whereupon many of such dealers withdrew
their patronage from plaintiff; that after the passage of the
act of July 2, 1890, defendants ratified, renewed, and con-
firmed their previous agreements, and served notice of such
ratification upon all said dealers in plaintiff's goods, whereby
said dealers were compelled to refuse to purchase plaintiff's
watch cases. Held, that the complaint failed to state a
cause of action under the statutes.
Ib.
25. Same-Held, that no monopolizing or combination to monopo-
lize interstate commerce, contrary to the second section of
the act, was shown, for the reason that the allegations did
not preclude the inference that each defendant may have
sold his entire product in the State where it was manufac-
tured.

Ib.

ACTIONS AND DEFENSES-Continued.

26. Same Held, that the contracts did not produce an unlawful
restraint of trade, under the first section, because the com-
bination and agreement to fix arbitrary prices did not ap-
pear to include all manufacturers of watch cases, but was
only a partial restraint in respect to an article not of prime
necessity, and therefore came within the recognized limits
of lawful contracts.
Ib.
27. Same-Held, that the further agreement not to sell to customers
of plaintiff was a lawful means of enlarging and protecting
the business of the defendants.

Shipman, Cir. J., concurring, on the ground—

Ib.

28. That the acts of the defendants, whether viewed as an attempt
to create a monopoly or as a contract in restraint of trade,
were not shown to concern interstate commerce, because
there were no allegations showing the residence of any
dealers who withdrew their patronage from complainant,
and it therefore did not directly appear that any of them
resided outside of the State where plaintiff's goods were
manufactured.
Ib.

Wallace, Cir., dissenting, on the ground—

29. That the allegations were sufficient to show that the attempts
to monopolize and restrain did operate upon interstate com-

merce.

Ib.

30. That, while the contracts might not be unlawful in themselves,
yet the purpose for which they were alleged to be made,
namely, to compel plaintiff to join in the agreement for fix-
ing arbitrary prices, and to injure and destroy its business
if it refused to do so, was oppressive and unjust, and ren-
dered the acts of defendants unlawful under both sections
of the statute.
Ib.
31. The Only Remedy to Party other than the United States is a
Suit for Damages.-Under the act of July 2, 1890, entitled
"An act to protect trade and commerce against unlawful re-
straints and monopolies," the only remedy given to any
other party than the Government of the United States, is a
suit for threefold damages, costs, and attorney's fees. Gulf,
C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Miami S. S. Co., 86 F., 407. 1-823
32. The only remedy of a private individual to restrain acts for-
bidden by the Anti-Trust Act of 1890 is an action at law for
damages. Pidcock v. Harrington, 64 F., 821.
1-377

33. The remedy of a private party under the Anti-Trust Act of 1890
is an action at law for damages. Southern Ind. Exp. Co. v.
U. S. Exp. Co., 88 F., 659.
1-862

34. By Direct Action. A recovery of the treble damages authorized
by the Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890, section 7 (26
Stat. L., 209, chap. 647), in case of injury sustained by vio-
lation of the act, can be had only by direct action, and not