man, the entire animal economy into action. The sense of feeling delights not in bodies that produce a mere sensation in the organs of touch. The bodies most pleasing to it, are those which, not confining the sensation to the external organ, communicates it to the entire frame. Hence it happens, that although all the senses impart pleasure, by exciting a certain modification of feeling, yet the external sense of feeling, which is properly extended over the whole surface of the body, is very limited in the pleasure which it imparts; as there is hardly any external body which we touch that communicates the organical feeling to the soul except woman alone. As then there is no positive pleasure without this strong internal feeling that electrifies the soul, and as no object communicates this feeling in any positive degree, through the medium of feeling, but woman, it follows, that the pleasures arising from the external sense of feeling, are confined to the last best work of the creation. Whatever pleases the external sense of feeling, invariably pleases the sight; but innumerable objects please the sight which impart no pleasure to the feeling. Thus we delight in seeing a beautiful painting, but if we touch it, the feeling cannot distinguish the sensation, from that produced by common canvas. In fact, the external sense of feeling is extremely limited in its pleasures, for I know of no object that imparts any sensible pleasure by the touch, but that which I have mentioned. Burke says, there is a pleasure in feeling smooth and soft bodies; but I suspect this pleasure arises, not so much from smoothness, as from association. The fair sex possess both these qualities, and our natural attachment to them, inclines us to suppose, that whatever is soft and smooth, must also be pleasing. Without entering, however, into speculative ideas on the subject, one thing is obvious, that in the sense of feeling, as in all the other senses, the bodies most pleasing to us are those which impart a sensation that confines itself not to the external organ, but pervades the entire frame by a certain inexpressible, though communicable impulse. But it will be said, that all true pleasure and happiness consist in moderation, that beauty itself, which is the most pleasing of all objects, is a medium between extremes, and that pleasures verging upon extremes are always dangerous. All this I admit; but while it is certain, that pleasure verging on pain is dangerous, it is equally certain, that the higher pleasures are the more exquisite while they last, and the most sensibly enjoyed. The enjoyment of ardent pleasures, however, cannot last long; and hence we very justly praise moderate enjoyment. This tempered pleasure is always more pleasing to a well-regulated mind; but the extreme of pleasure is always more agreeable to the natural man, to him who never thinks on the consequence of indulging the desires of the moment, but enjoys whatever he finds most pleasing while he is capable of enjoying it. The great enjoyment we derive in abstaining from these pleasures arises from the reflection or consciousness, that we are fulfilling a moral duty, that by tempering our enjoyments, we render them more permanent, and retain the power of renewing them whenever we will. These, however, are mental pleasures, not the pleasures of sensation, which derives all its enjoyments from yielding instinctively to every pleasing impulse. CHAP. IX. Emotions and Passions, whatever be their Nature and Character, universally pleasing to those by whom they are felt. Objections answered. WHAT I have said in the foregoing chapter chiefly regards the pleasures arising from strong sensations, and though these sensations are intimately allied with our emotions and passions, it will still be proper to treat of the latter by themselves, as there is this difference between them and our sensations, that the latter are painful whenever they reach to a certain degree of intensity, whereas our emotions and passions are universally pleasing. It matters not, whether they affect us as individuals, or as men in general; whether they be moderate or intense; whether they be momentary or permanent: in all cases, and under all circumstances, pleasure is the inseparable attendant of our emotions and passions. This will appear evident from the following view of their nature, and modes of operation. All the phenomena of mind and its affections, of life and its enjoyments, may be traced, as I have already observed, to three distinct sources-abstrac tion, sensation, and will. Two of these faculties are active, the other passive. The soul acts when it wills, when it traces relations and differences, to arrive at conclusions; and when it combines, diversifies, and modifies the primary ideas which it has received through the medium of sense; but it is passive when affected by organical impressions. The soul, however, is, in all cases, either the agent or percipient, the body being a mere instrument in such operations as require its instrumentality. Sensible vision, for instance, is performed through the medium of the eye, but it is not the eye that sees but the soul; or, if it be the eye, it is not the material eye, but the soul living in this material eye, and hence taking cognizance of all its objects. If the body were all eye, the soul would see in all directions; but, constituted as we are, the rays of light falling on other parts of the body, cannot communicate themselves to the soul. The eye is the only part of the body sufficiently tender, sufficiently etherealized, or spiritualized, to be sensible of the action of such minute particles as those of light, and consequently the only part which can perceive the bodies by which they are reflected. The eye is, therefore, all soul, and, accordingly, its rapidity and extreme sensibility, wonderfully accord with its ethereal nature. Abstraction, sensation, and will, are therefore, no qualities of matter, for pure matter cannot feel, much less perceive or will. If |