Opinion of the Court.

Mr. George G. Vest for the motion cited: Detroit City Railway Co. v. Guthard, 114 U. S. 133; Chouteau v. Gibson, 111 U.S. 200; Murdock v. Memphis, 20 Wall. 590; Brown v. Colorado, 106 U. S. 95; McManus v. O'Sullivan, 91 U. S. 578; Brown v. Atwell, 92 U. S. 327; Simmerman v. Nebraska, 116 U. S. 54; Adams County v. Burlington & Missouri River Railroad, 112 U. S. 123, 126, 127; Chapman v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 540; Brooks v. Missouri, 124 U. S. 394; New York Life Insurance Co. v. Hendren, 92 U. S. 286; Dugger v. Bocock, 104 U. S. 596; San Francisco v. Scott, 111 U. S. 768; Grame v. Insurance Co., 112 U. S. 273; Citizens' Bank v. Board of Liquidation, 98 U. S. 140.

Mr. James Carr opposing, on the question of jurisdiction. cited: Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437; Lessee of Walden v. Craig's Heirs, 14 Pet. 145, 154; Hollingsworth v. Barbour, 4 Pet. 466; Thatcher v. Powell, 6 Wheat. 119; Des Moines Navigation &c. Co. v. Iowa Homestead Co., 123 U. S. 552; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701; Chicago Life Ins. Co. v. Needles, 113 U. S. 574; Kennard v. Morgan, 92 U. S. 480; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201; Chapman v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 540; Hall v. Finch, 104 U. S. 261; Railroad v. National Bank, 102 U. S. 14: and as to what constitutes "due process of law"; Hagar v. Reclamation District, 111 U. S. 701; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97; Foster v. Kansas, 112 U. S. 201; Kennard v. Louisiana, 92 U. S. 480; Slaughter House Cases, 16 Wall. 36; Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714; Boswell's Lessee v. Otis, 9 How. 336; Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437; Nations v. Johnson, 24 How. 195; Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Co., 18 How. 272.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the above language, delivered the opinion of the court.

The only question, among those presented, of which this court can take cognizance, is whether the statute of Missouri, which authorizes a special administrator having charge of the estate of a testator pending a contest as to the validity of his

Opinion of the Court.

will, to have a final settlement of his accounts, without giving notice to distributees, and which settlement, in the absence of fraud, is deemed conclusive as against such distributees, is repugnant to the clause of the Constitution of the United States forbidding a State to deprive any person of his property without due process of law. We have no difficulty in answering this question in the negative. Without stating all the grounds upon which this conclusion might be rested, it is sufficient to say that, in matters involved in the accounts of such special administrator, the executor or administrator with the will annexed represents all claiming under the will. The regular representative of the estate, before passing his receipt to the special administrator, has an opportunity to examine this settlement, and, if it is not satisfactory, to contest its correctness by some appropriate proceeding. When an executor or administrator with the will annexed proposes to make a final settlement of his own accounts, he is required to give notice to creditors and distributees; for there are no other representatives of the estate. But when a special administrator ceases to act as such, that is, when his functions cease by operation of law, he must account for the property and estate in his hands to the executor or administrator with the will annexed, who, in receiving what had been temporarily in the charge of the former, acts for all interested in the distribution of the estate. As, therefore, the regular representative of the estate has an opportunity to contest the final settlement of the special administrator, before giving him an acquittance, it cannot be said that the absence of notice to the distributees of such settlement amounts to a deprivation of their rights of property without due process of law.

The judgment is affirmed.

Statement of the Case.

MORGAN v. EGGERS.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF INDIANA.

Plaintiffs' complaint in ejectment sought to recover" all the north part of lot 2, in section 36, township 38 N. of range 10 W. of the second principal meridian, which lies west of the track of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad, and north of a line parallel with the north line of said lot 2, and 753 feet south therefrom." Defendant denied every allegation. The record showed that after the parties had submitted the cause to the court, "the court, having heard the evidence, and being fully advised, finds for the plaintiffs, and orders and adjudges that they are entitled to and shall have and recover of the defendant the possession of so much of said lot 2 as lies south of the south line of lot number 1, as indicated by a fence constructed and maintained by the defendant as and on said south line . . which the plaintiffs shall recover of the defendant." Held,

(1) That though the order embraced both a finding and a judgment, it was not for that reason a nullity;

(2) That it was not a general finding for the plaintiffs, but a finding for them as to the part of the land described in the order, and that the judgment for the possession of this part of the premises was in accordance with the local law of the district in which the cause was tried, Rev. Stat. Indiana, 1881, § 1060;

(3) That this court is bound to assume from the record that the tract described in the order was a part of the premises described in the complaint.

THE case as stated by the court was as follows:

This is an action of ejectment. The complaint, framed in accordance with the local law, describes the premises sought to be recovered as follows: "All of the north part of lot two, in section thirty-six, township thirty-eight north, of range ten west, of the second principal meridian, which lies west of the track of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern Railroad, and north of a line parallel with the north line of said lot two, and seven hundred and fifty-three feet south therefrom." The answer contains a denial of each allegation in the complaint.

Statement of the Case.

On the 20th of January, 1883, during the November Term of the court below, the following proceedings were had :

"Come the parties, by counsel, and by agreement this cause is submitted to the court for trial, and the court having heard the evidence, and being fully advised, finds for the plaintiffs, and orders and adjudges that they are entitled to and shall have and recover of defendant the possession of so much of said lot two as lies south of the south line of lot number one, as indicated by a fence constructed and maintained by the defendant as and on said south line, said fence running from the state line easterly to Lake Michigan, and assess the damages at $1.00 and costs, taxed at $, which the plaintiffs shall recover of defendant.

"All of which is finally ordered, adjudged, and decreed." During the same term, February 5, 1883, the plaintiffs moved that the decision and finding be set aside and annulled, and a new trial granted, for the following reasons: 1. They were contrary to the law and the evidence. 2. The plaintiffs were surprised by a case falsely made by the defendant at the trial, which they had no reason to expect, and therefore did not come prepared to answer at the trial, namely, by his claim, supported only by the testimony of his son, that Jacob Forsyth and the surveyor, Wait, pointed out and agreed upon the line occupied by the fence of defendant mentioned in said decision as the true line of said Eggers' land; by his claim, supported by his testimony alone, that George W. Clarke agreed with him that the line occupied by said fence was the line between his and said Clarke's land; by his claim, supported by his own testimony and that of his son only, that a fence had been maintained on the line occupied by the fence, in said decision mentioned, for more than twenty years last past; and by his claim, supported by the testimony of his son only, that for twenty years past he had occupied all the land as far south as said fence. 3. The court admitted evidence for the defendant against the objection of plaintiffs, and the decision of the court was based on such irrelevant evidence.

On the 6th of March, 1883, the following order was made: "Came the parties by counsel, and the court being fully

Opinion of the Court.

advised, now overrules plaintiffs' motion for a new trial; to which the plaintiffs except, and the court allows plaintiffs thirty days in which to file bill of exceptions." No bill of exceptions, showing what occurred at the trial, was filed.

On the 23d of April, 1884, the plaintiffs moved the court, upon written grounds filed, to amend and reform the judgment of January 20, 1883, so that it "shall conform to the complaint in said cause, and to the finding or verdict of the court rendered upon the trial in said cause."

At a subsequent term of the court, June 27, 1884, the motion to amend and reform the judgment of the court, was overruled. To that ruling the plaintiffs excepted, and took a bill of exceptions embodying only the motion to amend and reform the judgment, the order overruling that motion, and the opinion of the court thereon. The court, among other things, said: "It was competent for the court, under the issue, to find to what extent the defendant was guilty or had held unlawful possession of the premises described; and, if under the evidence it appeared that a fence had become or was the boundary of such occupation, it was proper that the fact should be stated in the finding and judgment of the court. The finding and judgment in this instance are not separate and distinct, as perhaps it would have been better to have had them. The meaning, however, is clear. It is as if the entry read in this way And the court, having heard the evidence, etc., finds and orders and adjudges that the plaintiffs are entitled to and shall have and recover of the defendants, etc."

The errors assigned upon the record are, that the judgment does not pursue the issue and finding thereon rendered and entered of record as the law directs and requires, and that the court erred in refusing to amend and reform the judgment.

Mr. Edward Roby for plaintiffs in error.

Mr. William H. Calkins for defendant in error. Mr. A. C. Harris was with him on the brief.

MR. JUSTICE HARLAN, after stating the facts in the above language, delivered the opinion of the court.

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