Opinion of the Court. The doctrine invoked by the defendants, that the laws of a conquered or ceded country, except so far as they may affect the political institutions of the new sovereign, remain in force after the conquest or cession until changed by him, does not aid their defence. That doctrine has no application to laws authorizing the alienation of any portions of the public domain, or to officers charged under the former government with that power. No proceedings affecting the rights of the new sovereign over public property can be taken except in pursuance of his authority on the subject. The cases in the Supreme Court of California and in this court which recognize as valid grants of lots in the Pueblo or City of San Francisco by alcaldes appointed or elected after the occupation of the country by the forces of the United States, do not militate against this view. Those officers were agents of the pueblo or city, and acted under its authority in the distribution of its municipal lands. They did not assume to alienate or affect the title to lands which was in the United States. Welch v. Sullivan, 8 California, 165; White v. Moses, 21 California, 34;. Merryman v. Bourne, 9 Wall. 592. It follows from what is thus said that it would be a sufficient answer to the contention of the defendants, that the grant under which they claim to have acquired a perfect title conferred none. The grantees were not invested with such title, and could not be, without an official delivery of possession under the Mexican government, and such delivery was not had, and could not be had, after the cession of the country, except by American authorities acting under a law of Congress. But independently of this consideration, and assuming that the title under the grant was perfect, the obligation of the grantee was none the less to present his claim to the Board of Land Commissioners for examination. The ascertainment of existing claims was a matter of vital importance to the government in the execution of its policy respecting the public lands; and Congress might well declare that a failure to present a claim should be deemed an abandonment of it, and that the lands covered by it should be considered a part of the public domain. Certain it is that a claimant presenting hie VOL. CXXVII-6 Opinion of the Court. claim to the Board for examination and confirmation, in order that he might subsequently acquire a patent from the government, is bound by the adjudication of the Board. After submitting his claim to its examination and judgment, he cannot afterwards be heard to say that in adjudicating upon his title the Board erred, or that the Land Department in determining the boundaries of his claim erred, in order that he may claim outside of the survey and patent other lands which he considers covered by his grant. He cannot repudiate a jurisdiction to which he has appealed; and the estoppel extends to parties claiming under him. Boyle v. Hinds, 2 Sawyer, 527; Cassidy v Carr, 48 California, 339. In determining claims under Mexican grants the Board of Land Commissioners was required by the act under which it was created, to be governed by the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, the law of nations, the laws, usages and customs of the government from which the claim was derived, the principles of equity, and the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, so far as they were applicable. And in United States v. Fossatt, 21 How. 445, 448, 449, this court, in considering what was involved in the inquiry into the validity of a claim to land under that act, said: "It is obvious that the answer to this question must depend, in a great measure, upon the state and condition of the evidence. It may present questions of the genuineness and authenticity of the title, and whether the evidence is forged or fraudulent; it may involve an inquiry into the authority of the officer to make a grant, or whether he was in the exercise of the faculties of his office when it was made; or, it may disclose questions of the capacity of the grantee to take, or whether the claim has been abandoned or is a subsisting title, or has been forfeited for a breach of conditions. Questions of each kind here mentioned have been considered by the court in cases arising under this law. But, in addition to these questions upon the vitality of the title, there may arise questions of extent, quantity, location, boundary, and legal operation, that are equally essential in determining the validity of the claim. In affirming a claim to land under a Spanish or or, Opinion of the Court. Mexican grant, to be valid within the law of nations, the stipulations of the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, and the usages of those governments, we imply something more than that certain papers are genuine, legal and translative of property. We affirm that the ownership and possession of land of definite boundaries rightfully attach to the grantee." Trust relations respecting the property between the patentee and others may be enforced equally with such relations between him and others respecting any other property, but until the patent is set aside or modified by proceedings taken at the instance of the government, all the questions necessarily involved in the determination of a claim to land under a Spanish or Mexican grant, and in establishing its boundaries, are concluded by it in all courts and proceedings, except as against parties claiming by superior title, such as would enable them to resist successfully any action of the government in disposing of the property. The confirmation takes effect, by relation, as of the date of the first proceeding commenced before the Land Commissioners; and an adjudication that at that date it was valid is also an adjudication that it was valid at the date it was made. And the patent which follows the confirmation and approved survey and is a matter of record, is itself evidence of the regularity of preliminary proceedings. As was said in Beard v. Federy, 3 Wall. 478, 492, "by it the government declares that the claim asserted was valid under the laws of Mexico; that it was entitled to recognition and protection by the stipulations of the treaty, and might have been located under the former government, and is correctly located now, so as to embrace the premises as they are surveyed and described. As against the government this record, so long as it remains unvacated, is conclusive. And it is equally conclusive against parties claiming under the government by title subsequent. It is in this effect of the patent as a record of the government that its security and protection chiefly lie." It remains to consider two other positions taken by the appellants; first, that the sale to Poli of the ex-mission of San Buenaventura was illegal and void, and hence that no Opinion of the Court. title passed to the patentee on its confirmation; second, the want of any allegation in the complaint, or any evidence in the proofs, that the plaintiffs were in possession of the premises when this suit was commenced. In support of the first position the appellants cite United States v. Workman, 1 Wall. 745. In that case it was held that the Departmental Assembly of California had no power to authorize the governor to alienate any public lands of the department, and that its own power was restricted to that conferred by the laws of colonization, which was simply to approve or disapprove of the grants made by the governor under those laws. But it does not follow that there were not exceptional circumstances with reference to the sale to Poli, which authorized the governor to make it. We are bound to suppose that such was the case, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, from the fact that the validity of his claim under it was confirmed by the Board of Land Commissioners, by the District Court of the United States, and by this court on appeal. The question of its validity was thereby forever closed, except as against those who might be able to show a prior and better title to the premises. The defendants show no title whatever; but, on the contrary, the grant under which they assert title has been, by the adjudication of the Board of Land Commissioners and by the survey and patent, confined to other land. Second, as to the want of any allegation in the complaint of possession by the plaintiffs, or any evidence of that fact in the proofs, it is sufficient to say that, by § 738 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, a plaintiff asserting title to lands, though out of possession, may maintain an action to determine an adverse claim, estate, or interest in the premises. People v. Center, 66 California, 551. A statute of Nebraska, authorizing a similar suit by a plaintiff out of possession, was before this court for consideration in Holland v. Challen, 110 U. S. 15, and the jurisdiction of a court of equity to grant the relief prayed in such case was sustained. See, also, Reynolds v. Crawfordsville Bank, 112 U. S. 405, 411; Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U. S. 158, 170, 171; United States v. Wilson, Statement of the Case. 118 U. S. 86, 89; Frost v. Spitley, 121 U. S. 552, 557. We see no error in the decree of the court below, and it is accordingly Affirmed. RUCKER v WHEELER. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO. No. 1306. Submitted January 9, 1888.- Decided April 16, 1888. In the courts of the United States the presiding judge may, in submitting a case to the jury, express his opinion on the facts; and when no rule of law is incorrectly stated, and all matters of fact are ultimately submitted to the jury, such expression is not reviewable on writ of error. In this case there was no error in the charge of the court to the jury. THE case as stated by the court was as follows: The cause of action set out in the first count of the complaint is, that the defendant in error, who was the defendant below, agreed with the plaintiff in error that if the latter assisted the former and his agents, in purchasing the interest of Julia Webber in the Emma lode mining claim at a price not exceeding forty thousand dollars, he should receive for his services the sum of ten thousand dollars, but only five thousand dollars if the defendant was compelled to pay more than forty thousand dollars for said interest. The complaint alleges that, in consequence of services rendered by the plaintiff under that agreement, the defendant was, on the 22d of November, 1884, enabled to buy said interest at a sum exceeding forty thousand dollars, whereby the latter became indebted to plaintiff in the sum of five thousand dollars. The defendant in his answer denies that he made any such agreement as that alleged, or that he was enabled to purchase the interest of Julia Webber, by reason of any services rendered by the plaintiff. The second count of the complaint sets forth the following cause of action: |