thing more than a compensation 'for an injury. Where there has been only one wrongful act, there can be but one full and complete indemnity. When that is obtained, the party injured has exhausted his remedy. Another illustration, more analogous to the case at bar, will serve to show the soundness of this conclusion. If, instead of the arrest and imprisonment of which the plaintiff complains, the nine writs against him had been served simultaneously by the same officer, by making an attachment of personal property belonging to him,—his house, for example, in such case it could not be doubted that if for any reason the attachments were irregular and void, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover and to receive from one or all of the parties by whose order the attachments were made the full value of his horse. But it is equally clear that he could not rightfully claim to receive this sum in damages from each of them, or nine times the value of the animal. And yet such would be the result, if the attaching creditors are not to be regarded as co-trespassers. Nor is this the only absurd result which would follow from such a doctrine. If each attachment or each arrest and imprisonment on the several writs is to be deemed as a distinct trespass, for which the creditors are separately and not jointly liable in like manner as if made on one writ only, without any reference to those which were served simultaneously, we can see no reason why the officer might not be held liable to pay to the plaintiff damages as many times as there were writs served by him. He certainly must be regarded as a joint trespasser with each creditor whose writ he served; and if the service of each writ constituted a distinct trespass, for which the party injured might receive separate damages from each creditor, then the officer would also be subject to a like liability.

These views have led us to the conclusion that the evidence offered at the trial by the defendant to show that the plaintiff had received full satisfaction for the arrest and false imprisonment to which he had been subjected, and for which he claimed damages in his action from some of his creditors by whose order he was committed to jail, ought to have been admitted, and that the jury should thereupon have been in structed that the plaintiff could not maintain this action. Exceptions sustained.

LIABILITY OF CO-TRESPASSERS GENERALLY: See exhaustive note to Kirkwood v. Miller, 73 Am. Dec. 137-149, and see particularly page 143, citing the principal case, and other decisions on similar points. In Werner v. Ed

miston, 24 Kan. 153, Boston and Albany R. R. v. Shanley, 107 Mass. 579, sad Bryant v. Bigelow Carpet Co., 131 Id. 503, the principal case is cited to the point that co-trespassers are jointly and severally liable for the whole damage caused by the trespass. A release of one co-trespasser operates as a release of all: Stone v. Dickinson, 7 Allen, 28 (the same case as the principal case on a different appeal); Stevens v. Hathorne, 12 Id. 403; Ellis v. Esson, 50 Wis. 149, all citing the principal case.

THE PRINCIPAL CASE IS DISTINGUISHED in Boyd v. Watt, 29 Ohio St. 279, in the dissenting opinion of Ashburn, J., where it is said that if, under cir cumstances like those in the principal case, the writs had been served at different intervals in the course of the day, the trespasses would have been several, and each of the tort-feasors liable separately.

DANIELS V. HAYWARD.

[5 ALLEN, 43.]

STATUTE EXEMPTING DEBTOR'S TOOLS AND IMPLEMENTS TO VALUE OF ON HUNDRED DOLLARS EMBRACES MACHINES of simple construction, moved by hand or foot, and used in the manufacture of boots; and this, although the machines are generally used by men whom the owner employs in his business.

ACTION against a sheriff for damages for conversion in attaching machines used in the manufacture of boots, and claimed by plaintiff to be exempt. The court instructed the jury that under the Massachusetts statute exempting from attachment a debtor's tools and implements to the value of one hundred dollars, the debtor, a boot-maker, carrying on a small business, and employing a number of men therein, working more or less himself, but being generally engaged in superintending his workmen, would have a right to claim as exempt not only his tools, but also machines of a simple construction. Verdict for plaintiff. Defendant alleged exceptions.

P. C. Bacon and G. G. Parker, for the defendant.

T. G. Kent and H. B. Staples, for the plaintiff.

By Court, DEWEY, J. The court properly instructed the jury as to the effect of General Statutes, c. 133, sec. 32, exempting certain articles from levy on execution. While the exemption was not intended to apply to large manufacturing establishments, it has not been supposed to be at variance with the letter or the spirit of the statute to apply it to the case of a mechanic carrying on a small business, although he may have in his employment men who perform the principal part of the labor with the tools, implements, and fixtures. The limita

tions as to exemptions of this character were carefully stated by the court, and properly applied to the case. This view of the statute seems well authorized by the cases of Pierce v. Gray, 7 Gray, 67, and Dowling v. Clark, 1 Allen, 283; S. C., 3 Id. 570.

Exceptions overruled.

EXEMPTION OF TOOLS AND IMPLEMENTS OF TRADE FROM ATTACHMENT: See the note to Kilburn v. Deming, 21 Am. Dec. 545–554; and see Goddard v. Chaffee, 79 Id. 796, this being a case decided under the same statute as that construed in the principal case. In Wallace v. Bartlett, 108 Mass. 54, the principal case is cited, and the court, considering a similar statute, says that it is intended for the protection of mechanics, artisans, handicraftsmen, and others, whose manual labor and skill afford them a means of earning their livelihood.

PIERCE V. LAMSON.

[5 ALLEN, 60.]

EQUITY HAS JURISDICTION TO COMPEL DELIVERY AND SURRENDER OF DEED of mortgage, which, after having been executed and delivered, though not acknowledged, has been intrusted to the mortgagor for the purpose of having it recorded, if he thereupon retains it in his own possession and refuses to deliver it up or have it recorded.

BILL in equity to compel defendant to deliver up and have recorded a deed of mortgage, which, after having been duly executed and delivered by him to complainant, was returned and intrusted to him for the purpose of having it recorded, which, after he obtained possession of the instrument, he refused to do.

P. C. Bacon, for the defendant.

E. Mellen and W. S. Davis, for the plaintiff.

By Court, BIGELOW, C. J. The bill avers with sufficient precision and certainty that the deed of mortgage was duly executed and delivered by the defendant to the plaintiff, so as to vest the title in the latter as between themselves. The acknowledgment was not essential to its validity as a deed by which the estate would pass presently to the grantee: Dole v. Thurlow, 12 Met. 157, 162; Howard Mutual Loan and Fund Association v. McIntyre, 3 Allen, 572. This averment of delivery, coupled with the other statements of the bill, is sufficient

to show that the plaintiff is entitled to the possession of the deed.

The only other question raised by the demurrer is, whether the court has jurisdiction in equity of the case. Before the enlargement of our chancery jurisdiction, it would seem to be quite clear that, without an averment that the deed was withheld or secreted so that it could not be replevied, the party entitled to its possession could not have maintained a bill in equity for its recovery: Travis v. Tyler, 7 Gray, 146. But under the provision contained in General Statutes, chapter 113, section 2, by which full jurisdiction, according to the course and practice of courts of chancery, where there is not a plain, adequate, and complete remedy at law, is conferred on this court, we have no doubt that the case stated in the bill is one which entitles the plaintiff to relief in equity. One of the most ancient heads of chancery jurisdiction is that which gives specific relief to persons having a right to the possession of deeds and other written instruments, by a decree for their surrender and delivery by those who wrongfully detain and withhold them: Story's Eq., sec. 703, 906; Knye v. Moore, 1 Sim. & St. 61; Freeman v. Fairlie, 3 Mer. 30. The remedy at law is inadequate in the present case, because it furnishes no means by which the plaintiff in one suit can recover his deed and at the same time restrain the defendant, in whom the apparent title to the premises described in the deed stands on the record, from conveying the premises to an innocent purchaser without actual notice of the previous deed to the plaintiff, and thus depriving the plaintiff of the estate to which he is entitled.

Demurrer overruled.

THE PRINCIPAL CASE IS CITED in Wall v. Hickey, 112 Mass. 174, and Hinckley v. Greany, 118 Id. 598, to the point that equity will interfere to relieve against a cloud on title, resulting from fraud, if there be no adequate remedy at law. To the same effect see the principal case cited in Couston v. Shearer, 99 Id. 211, where it was held that the court could compel the surrender of a mortgage fraudulently obtained; and in Brigham v. Home Ins. Co., 131 Id. 321, wher the court compelled the surrender of an insurance policy which was fraudu. lently withheld.

SYLVESTER V. Swan.

[5 ALLEN, 134.]

SALE, BY AGENT EMPLOYED THEREFOR, FOR LESS THAN ITS FACE, OF PRIN CIPAL'S NOTE, payable to his own order and indorsed by him, is usurions, although the purchaser supposes that he is merely purchasing the note in the market, and does not know that the seller is acting only as an agent.

ACTION of contract. Defendant having made his note, payable to and indorsed by himself, employed one Wheeler to sell It, which he did for fifty dollars less than the face of the note, to one Southworth, who had no notice that Wheeler was act ing as defendant's broker or agent. Southworth sold to Swan, who also took without notice of Wheeler's part in the sale, and sued in this action for the amount of the note. Usury was set up as a defense. Verdict was rendered for plaintiff. Defendant appealed.

C. G. Davis, for the defendant.

J. White, for the plaintiff.

By Court, BIGELOW, C. J. The transaction proved at the trial, by which the note in suit was negotiated to the person who received it as the first holder for value, was in legal effect equivalent to a delivery of the note by the promisor directly from his own hands, in consideration of the money advanced to him therefor. It was a loan of money to the defendant on the note. The fact that the money was obtained through an agent of the defendant does not in any degree change or affect the legal character which attaches to the dealings of the parties. Until the note was negotiated by the defendant's agent, it did not become a binding and operative contract, upon which the promisor could be held liable. It was the delivery of the note to the first holder, in consideration of the money which he lent upon it, which made the defendant for the first time chargeable on his promise. It was not, therefore, in any sense a purchase of a note in the market which had been previously put in circulation. It did not on its face purport to have been in the hands of a third person. Being payable to the order of the maker, it was negotiable by delivery only, and in effect was payable to bearer. In this respect it differed from an ac commodation note, bearing the indorsement of a payee, which might mislead an innocent purchaser, because it would appear to have been passed from the promisor to a third person as a