1823. The KING v. The held to be good ground for the Sessions to dismiss the appeal, Rex v. Stroud (a), and Rex v. Bucks (b), in which latter case, Lawrence, J., commenting upon that statute, declares, that it leaves the necessity of the notice of ap- INHABITANTS peal precisely the same as it was before the statute had of LAMBETH. passed. [Best, J. Was not the order of respite in effect a notice of appeal, as in this Court an order of Nisi Prius, making a cause a remanet, supersedes the necessity of a fresh notice of trial? (c).] In this case there never was any notice of appeal at all, for the order of respite cannot be considered as a notice that the appellants mean to try. This mode of proceeding was likely to be prejudicial to the respondents, because, if they had accepted this notice as a sufficient notice of trial, and had appeared to try, and the appellants had absented themselves, the respondents could not have been allowed their costs; for the 8 & 9 Wil. 3. c. 30. s. 3. empowers the Sessions to award costs only, upon proof made before them of a notice of appeal having been given, which the respondents certainly would not have been in a situation to prove. [Bayley, J. Then, as the respondents did not appear at the Sessions, either for the purpose of trying the appeal, or of applying for their costs, (and the last argument would assume, that they did appear for neither of those purposes,) why did they appear at all?] The respondents appeared in order to inquire in what stage the appeal really was, for of that they were necessarily ignorant. [Bayley, J. The respondents did appear, which they would not have done had they not received the order of respite; and therefore it is clear that they treated that order as a valid notice of trial. Then ought they afterwards to turn round and treat it as a nullity?] It was in fact, and according to the rules of Sessions practice, a nullity; it is perfectly (a) 1 Str. 315. (c) Shepherd v. Butler, 1 Dow. & Ryl. 15. ents could not possibly understand it in any other nor could the appellants have served it for any other se. The appeal, therefore, has been improperly ssed, and justice requires that it should go down to essions to be heard upon the merits. ST, J. (a) concurred. Order of Sessions quashed. (a) Holroyd, J. was absent, KING v. The INHABITANTS of ST. PANCRAS, in MIDDLESEX. an order of two Justices, Kitty, the wife of WilBuchan, was removed from Lambeth, in the county "rey, to St. Pancras, in the county of Middlesex, as ace of her last settlement. The Sessions, on appeal, fa tenement above the yearly value of 10l.; although there ole year, as required by 59 Geo. 3. c. 50. confirmed the order, subject to the opinion of this Court, on the following case :— The husband of the pauper occupied a house in Thornhaugh Steeet, in the parish of St. Pancras, and resided in the same for a period not exceeding nine months, and subsequently to the 2d day of July, 1819, at the yearly rent and value of 807.; and during such occupation, was regularly rated by, and paid a poor rate to the parish of St. Pancras, as such occupier of the said house. The question for the opinion of the Court is, whether the pauper's husband gained a settlement in the parish of St. Pancras, by being so rated at, and paying his share towards, the public taxes and levies of the said parish, under the 3 & 4 W. & M. c. 11. s. 6, and 35 Geo. 3. c. 101. s. 4. 1823. The KING V. The INHABITANTS of ST. PANCRAS, Cowley, in support of the order of Sessions. The question is, whether the 3 & 4 W. & M. c. 11. is or is not absolutely repealed by 35 Geo. 3. c. 101. If it be not, then it is clear that in this case the pauper gained a settlement under the circumstances above mentioned. By s. 6. of 3 & 4 W. & M. it is enacted, "That any person coming to inhabit in any parish charged with and paying his share towards the public taxes of the said parish, shall gain a settlement." Stauding alone, it is quite clear, that under this section a settlement might be gained by paying rates or taxes in respect of a tenement of any value whatever. What then is the effect of 35 Geo. 3. c. 101? No more than to limit the operation of the previous act as to the value of the tenement. By section 4. it is enacted, "That no person shall gain a settlement by being charged with and paying his share towards the public taxes or levies of the said parish, for, or on account, or in respect of any tenement, not being of the value of 101." It is quite obvious that the operation of in MIDDLESEX. decided, that a person residing on a tenement of than 107. annual value, could not gain a settleexcept by paying rates. There, however, the pauper servant of the crown, and resided on a tenement ging to the public, and consequently could not a settlement by such residence. There being g in the 35 Geo. 3. which expressly takes away ettlement by paying rate or taxes, the decision of essions was right. The statute 59 Geo. 3. c. 101. o reference whatever to this question, because that confined solely to settlements by renting tenements. arnewall, contrà, contended, that the operation of to. 3. c. 101. was altogether to do away with the of settlement by the payment of rates and taxes. to that statute the settlement by payment of rates axes was never had recourse to unless the pauper ented a tenement of less than 107. annual value; ore, when it was enacted, that no settlement could ined by paying rates or taxes for such a tenement, it bvious that the legislature intended to put an end East, 283. (b) 5 M. & S. 443. (c) 1 B. & A. 473. 1823. The KING v. The INHABITANTS to that head of settlement. This was the opinion of Lord Kenyon in Rex v. Islington, and of Lord Ellenborough in Rex v. Penryn. It was observable, that Mr. East, the reputed author of this statute, in his report of the first-mentioned case, added a note to the of ST. PANCRAS, text, without intimating any disapprobation of what was in stated by the Chief Justice. Indeed, Lord Ellenborough MIDDLESEX. in the latter case, expressed a decided opinion upon the subject. His Lordship said, "This enactment was undoubtedly meant to abrogate this head of settlement, and the authorities upon it, which, perhaps, had been carried to some degree of absurdity. Lord Kenyon appears to have considered the operation of the act; and I am glad that we have his authority for it. If this construction of Lord Kenyon had not been felt to be the correct one, I doubt not that we should have had some observation upon it from the learned Reporter, with whom the act originated, and which is generally known by his name." The 59 Geo. 3. so far from being beside the present question, afforded a very strong argument in favor of the construction now relied on, for although that statute appeared from the preamble to be confined to settlements gained by the renting of tenements, yet it enacted, "That no person shall acquire a settlement by or by reason of dwelling for forty days in any tenement, unless it be held for the term of one whole year, and the rent paid for a year, &c." If, therefore, a settlement might be gained in every case by paying the smallest amount of rates, although the tenement might not be held for a year, and although no rent was paid, a pauper might be said to gain a settlement by reason of dwelling on a tenement, and this statute would be repealed by implication. |