for judicial interpretation, and the limits of their applicability. It is necessary to keep in view the caution of Cotton, L.J., in Reid v. Reid (1886), 31 Ch. D. 405.

"The question for our consideration is, what is the true meaning of the language which the Legislature has employed? Cases on the construction of other Acts or instruments generally give very little help to the Court, but if there is any principle laid down we ought not to disregard them in considering a different act or instrument."

To attempt to collect all these decisions would be, if not absolutely useless, at any rate a work of great labour with very little result, for, in a large number of such cases the statutes in question have been repealed, and, where they are still in force, the particular points in dispute are extremely unlikely to occur again, and the decisions are easily found in treatises relating to the branch of law dealt with by the particular act. The author has therefore confined himself to the enunciation of general principles of construction, and has not attempted to collect all the decisions of the Courts upon mere words. But in the chapter on The Interpretation of Words, he has collected such judicial dicta as seem to explain on what principles the meaning of words used in statutes is to be arrived at, and he has also given in an Appendix a list (0) of such words as are often to be met with in statutes and have received judicial interpretation.

struction.

8. It has been usual in treatises of this kind to have strict and liberal cona chapter on strict and liberal construction, and to specify what kind of statutes are commonly construed strictly, and what kinds are construed liberally. It will be seen, however, that the rules on this head turn out to be extremely vague, if, indeed, it can be said that there are any rules at all; (p) the truth being that, as Mr. Sedgwick

(0) This list is not exhaustive. Its omissions can be supplemented from Stroud's Judicial Dictionary, and the various Digests, sub tit. Words. (p) See Ex parte Milne (1889), 22 Q. B. D. 685, at p. 695, Esher, M.R.; and Dwarris, Statutes (2nd ed.), ch. ix. ; Sedgwick, Statutory Law (2nd ed.), pp. 256-316. It is a dangerous doctrine," said Pollock, B., in Hill v. Managers (1879), L. R. 4 Q. B. D. 442," and one contrary to the true rules of construction, to require or allow a judge to give an effect to the same words wider or narrower in proportion as he might think the general scope of the Act in which they were found of great or small public importance.

Extent and effect of judicial authority to interpret

statutes.

says,(2) “the judges have perpetually taken refuge in the clouds and mist of strict and liberal interpretation, whenever they have been pressed by the hardship or injustice of a particular case "; and, as Lord Hobart said, in Sheffield v. Ratcliffe (1616), Hob. 346, "If you ask me by what rules the judges guided themselves in diverse expositions of the self-same word and sentence, I answer, it is by that liberty and authority which judges have over statute laws according to reason and best convenience to mould them to the truest and best use." In this treatise, therefore, a different plan has been adopted with regard to the enunciation of the rules which govern the construction of statutes-namely, in the first instance, to lay down as precisely as possible the rules which regulate the construction of all statutes, the language of which is clear and unequivocal, and then, in the next place, to state in what way the meaning of obscurely worded statutes may legitimately be arrived at. By dealing with the subject in this way, it is hoped that it will be found that all the various rules which exist with regard to the interpretation of statutes are stated in as plain a manner as the nature of the case will permit.

9. The rules enunciated in this treatise as to the interpretation and effect of statutes are in the main taken from the decisions of the courts of law, and the dicta of the judges.

The sole judicial authorities ultimately competent to construe a statute extending to the whole or any part of the United Kingdom, are the Supreme Court of Judicature and the House of Lords.

The interpretations whether of officers or Departments of State, or of resolutions of one House of Parliament, or of subordinate judicial authorities, ecclesiastical or temporal, must yield to the judicial interpretation of the Supreme Courts, which will never adopt an erroneous construction, of however long standing, unless it justifies the application of the principle communis error facit jus. Parliament may

(q) Loc. cit. p. 307.

declare wrong or repeal any judicial legislation effected by interpretation or misinterpretation of statutes, and may make the declaratory or repealing enactment retrospective. Coke (2 Inst. 618), in speaking of judicial authority, said: "Which answers and resolutions, although they were not enacted by authority of Parliament, as our statute of Articuli cleri in 9 Edw. 2 was: yet being resolved unanimously by all the judges of England and Barons of the Exchequer, are, for matters in law, of highest authority sent to the Court of Parliament." One of these resolutions referred to was that the interpretation of statutes concerning the clergy belongs to the judges of the Common Law.

The marked tendency of judicial decisions is to render uniform for all Her Majesty's dominions the rules relating to the construction of statutes.() As Lord Watson said in Cooper v. Cooper (1888), 13 App. Cas. 104, the House of Lords is the commune forum of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and takes judicial notice of the law of each country in an appeal from the other. In dealing with the statutes common to the whole United Kingdom, the House of Lords has to lay down rules applicable to all those countries alike, and to consider and reconcile, or select from the conflicting decisions of Scotch, English, and Irish Courts upon such enactments.(s)

The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is in a like manner the commune forum for the rest of the Empire, and composed of almost the same judges as sit in the House of Lords. The decisions of these august Courts restrain the disposition of subordinate Courts in different parts of the empire to set up divergent rules of construction, and are producing practical uniformity as to rules of construction. Where such restraint cannot be imposed, in some cases the different moral sentiment in different

(r) See per Lords Watson and Macnaghten in Income Tax Commissioners v. Pemsel (1891), App. Cas. 532, 557, 577.

(*) English judges differ as to whether they are bound by Scotch decisions on an Act common to England and Scotland; see Blake v. Midland Ry. Co. (1852), 18 Q. B. 98, 109 (Coleridge, J.); Ford v. Wiley (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 203 (Coleridge, L.C.J.).

Interpretation of statutes sole

temporal

courts.

parts of the United Kingdom has led to a different construction of the same statute. This is conspicuously illustrated by the divergence between the English and the Scotch and the Irish Courts on the application of 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2, to the dishorning of cattle.(s) No appeal being available to the House of Lords on this statute, this divergence can be settled only by legislation.(†)

As Eyre, C.J., pointed out to the House of Lords, in province of the Home v. Lord Camden (1795), 6 Br. Parl. Cas. 201, 1 H. Bl. 476; 2 ib. 533, the duty of expounding Acts of Parliament devolves solely upon the “King's temporal Courts, and your Lordships in the last instance."(u) That duty was once claimed as a right by James I., and Lord Coke has given us() a report of the opinion on the point which he delivered, “with the clear consent of all the judges of England and the Barons of the Exchequer," to the effect that "the King in his own person cannot adjudge any case." And "the province of the Legislature," as the Court of Exchequer said in Russell v. Ledsam (1845), 14 M. & W. 574, at p. 589, “is not to construe, but to enact, and their opinion, not expressed in the form of law as a declaratory provision would be,(y) is not binding on Courts whose duty it is to expound the statutes they [the Legislature] have enacted." It would be no easy task,(2) even if it were the object of the present treatise to do so,

(8) Ford v. Wiley (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 203; Callaghan v. S. P. C. A. (1885), 16 L. R. Ir. 325; Renton v. Wilson (1888), 15 Rettie, Justiciary (Sc.), 84 ; see 5 Law Quarterly, 443.

(t) The Privy Council is careful to avoid applying British prejudices to colonial legislation.

(u) And, as Jessel, M.R., pointed out in Chilton v. Corporation of London (1878), L. R. 7 Ch. D. 740, "a judge is theoretically bound to take judicial notice of all Acts of Parliament," he is bound also "theoretically to know the contents of them" all, and consequently it may not be assumed, when not disputed by the pleadings, that a right has been created by an Act of Parliament, which, as a matter of fact, has not been so created, for the judge is "theoretically bound to be aware that there is no such Act of Parlia

ment."

(x) Prohibitions del roy, 12 Rep. 63.

(y) See below, p. 161, where the meaning of the phrase "parliamentary exposition of a statute " is explained.

(2) Sedgwick on Statutory Law (2nd ed.), 174, says, "We have no means of tracing the manner in which the transfer of authority to the judges was effected, but at a very early day we find it asserted in more than its present plenitude." See also Dwarris on Statutes (2nd ed.), pp. 708, 792.

to ascertain at what period and by what means our courts of law obtained the right of being the sole expositors of the statutes of the realm. In the early ages of the English system it appears that the line between the judiciary and the Legislature was not distinctly marked. (a) Originally the Houses of Lords and Commons sat together, and the courts of law were clearly subordinate to the Parliament. A writ of error lay from them to the Parliament, and they were accustomed even to consult Parliament before they decided points of difficulty and importance.(b) But it is now one of the axioms of our law that it is not only "the right," but also the duty of the judiciary to expound and interpret doubtful provisions of our legislative enactments.(c)

courts may issue prohi

bition to

prevent court

jurisdiction

construction

And since it is the sole province of the King's temporal Temporal courts and of the House of Lords in the last instance to expound the statute law, "the possibility," as the judges pointed out in Home v. Lord Camden (1795), 2 H. Bl. 536, of peculiar "of two different rules prevailing upon the same law, one from acting in the King's temporal courts, and the other in courts of on a wrong peculiar jurisdiction, is effectually prevented without any of a statute. unreasonable interference or breaking in upon the courts. of peculiar jurisdiction by the temporal courts issuing their prohibitions in every such case. And this is no more than saying, 'proceed to the very extent of your jurisdiction without interference from us, only remembering that. . . . when any question arises touching the exposition of the statute law, if the subject is originally of temporal jurisdiction and comes incidentally before you, it is to be expounded by you as we expound it, or if the statute concerns your proceedings only, you are to expound it as we say it ought to be expounded, when the

(a) Sedgwick, p. 18.

(b) Per Sir J. Campbell arguendo in Stockdale v. Hansard (1837), 9 A. & E. 1, 3 St. Tr. N. S. 723.

(c) Sedgwick, p. 173. And in Sheffield v. Ratcliffe (1616), Hob. 346, cited in Att.-Gen. v. Pougett (1816), 2 Price 381, at p. 388, it is said, in answer to the inquiry by what rule judges were guided in expounding statutes, "It is by that liberty and authority that judges have over laws, especially over statute laws, according to reason and best convenience to mould them to the truest and best use.'

B