Limitations on the rule. c. cxlix. and to hold that the statute must be construed according to its natural meaning, notwithstanding the interpretation which had so long ago been put upon it by eminent judges." Usage is not admitted as interpreting a statute or rule, unless established uniformly and for a long period. Eight years was held by Lord Blackburn (in Danford v. M'Anulty (1882), 8 App. Cas. 463) insufficient to establish a particular construction of R. S. C. 1875, Ord. 19, r. 15, as to pleading possession in an action for eject ment. Fry, L.J., in Reid v. Reid (1886), 31 Ch. D. 410, said: "We are told that a series of decisions on this section has gone far to establish the rights under it; but, looking at the conflict which has taken place in the courts of first instance, it appears to me impossible to say that there is any course of decisions which can in any way bind, or ought seriously to influence, the Court, although we shall always look with the greatest possible respect on the reasons for which the judges of first instance have come to their decisions." In Clyde Navigation Trustees v. Laird (1883), 8 App. 21 & 22 Vict. Cas. 658, it was in dispute whether the Clyde Navigation Consolidation Act, 1858 (repealing eight prior Acts), imposed navigation dues on timber floated up the Clyde in logs chained together. From 1858 to 1882 dues had been levied on this class of timber without resistance from the merchants who owned it. And some judges in the Court of Session suggested that this nonresistance might be considered in construing the statute. On this Lord Blackburn, at p. 670, said: "I think that [submission] raises a strong prima facie ground for thinking that there must exist some legal ground on which they [the merchants] could not resist. And I think a Court should be cautious, and not decide unnecessarily that there is no such ground. If the Lord President [Inglis] means no more than this when he calls it 'contemporanea expositio of the statutes which is almost irresistible,' I I agree with him. I do not think that he means that en joyment at least for any period short of that which gives rise to prescription, if founded on a mistaken construction of a statute, binds the Court so as to prevent it from giving the true construction. If he did, I should not agree with him, for I know of no authority, and am not aware of any principle, for so saying." And Lord Watson added, at p. 673: "Such usage as has in this case been termed contemporanea expositio is of no value in construing a British statute of the year 1858. When there are ambiguous expressions in an Act passed one or two centuries ago, it may be legitimate to refer to the -construction put upon these expressions throughout a long course of years, by the unanimous consent of all persons interested, as evidencing what must presumably have been the intention of the Legislature at that remote period. But I feel bound to construe a recent statute according to its own terms, when these are brought into controversy, and not according to the views which interested parties may have hitherto taken." -66 affect con statute if meaning is And it is important to bear in mind, as Grose, J., Usage will not pointed out in R. v. Hogg (1787), 1 T. R. 728, that struction of although, "where the words of an Act are doubtful, usage may be called in to explain them," still that "usage plain. ought not to be attended to in construing an Act of Parliament which cannot admit of different interpretations." "Where," said Lord Brougham, in Magistrates of Dunbar v. Duchess of Roxburgh (1835), 3 Cl. & F. 354, a statute speaking on some points is silent as to others, usage may well supply the defect; for, where the statute uses language of doubtful import, the acting under it for a long course of years may well give an interpretation to that obscure meaning and reduce that uncertainty to a fixed rule. . . . but it is quite plain that against a plain statutory law no usage is of any avail;" and in Northam Bridge Co. v. R. (1886), 55 L. T. 759, Chitty, J., held that neither usage nor long-continued practice (for eighty years) could render the Crown liable to pay bridge tolls from which it was exempted by the plain 7 will. 4 & terms of the Post Office Management Act. 1 Vict. c. 33. Nor will usage operate unless particular con been univer sally acquiesced in. Again, usage cannot be operative as an interpreter of a statute unless it appears that the statute in question struction has has been universally construed in a particular way. If, said Lord Cottenham in Lord Waterford's Peerage claim (g) (1832), 6 Cl. & F. at p. 172, "there has been a course of decisions, and the decision first made has been adhered to and confirmed by other decisions, that is what is called a current of authorities too strong to be resisted.. I am not aware of any case in which a single decision, even of a court of competent jurisdiction, having before it properly and judicially the matter on which it was pronouncing a judicial decision, has been held to operate so upon the plain meaning of a statute." Thus, in Bank of Ireland v. Evans's Charity (1855), 5 H. L. C. 405, it appeared that it has been the usual, but not the universal, practice to make up the record, when a bill of exceptions had been tendered, in a particular way in accordance with what was supposed to be the meaning of 28 Geo. 3, c. 31. But the House of Lords, acting on the opinion of the judges, held that this statute had been wrongly understood. "The answer to the question put to us," said the judges, "depends wholly on the construction of the Irish Act of 28 Geo. 3, c. 31. We understand that in acting upon the statute in Ireland a practice has been prevalent, though not universal, which is at variance with our opinion as to its proper construction. We conceive that the meaning of the Act is so clear that we ought not to give any weight to the practice." Similarly, in R. v. Hogg (1787), 1 T. R. 728, it was argued that a certain class of property in Rochester was not liable to be rated under 43 Eliz. c. 2, s. 1, because it was not the custom of the town to rate that class of property. But this argument did not prevail. "We are," said Grose, J., "interpreting an universal law, which cannot receive (g) It was argued in this case that an opinion given by Lord Coke and the two other Chief Judges of England, at the request of the Privy Council, upon the effect of the Irish statute, 28 Hen. 8, c. 3, ought to be conclusive, even though erroneous. different constructions in different towns. It is the general law that this kind of property should be rated, and we cannot explain the law differently by the usage of this or that particular place." He added that while an agreement among the inhabitants might bind them, it was no guide to the construction of the statute.(h) rules, 5. Where the language of an Act is ambiguous and Statutory difficult to construe, the Court may, for assistance in its construction, refer to rules made under the provisions of the Act. For not only is every part of the statute itself to be taken into consideration in order to ascertain the meaning of any obscure expression, but "recourse may [also] be had to rules which have been made under the authority of the Act, if the construction of the Act is ambiguous and doubtful on any point, and if we find that in the rules any particular construction has been put on the Act, it is our duty to adopt and follow that construction" per James and Mellish, L.JJ., in Ex parte Weir (1871), 6 Ch. App. 879. : These rules form a sort of contemporanea expositio. But it is not clear whether they are to be deemed— (a) The practice of conveyancers; (b) Parliamentary exposition; or (c) Administrative exposition. Rules made for the Courts may be regarded as judicial expositions of the Act.(i) But too much stress cannot be rested upon rules, inasmuch as they may be questioned as being in excess of the powers of the subordinate body to which Parliament has delegated authority to make them.(k) (h) Vide ante, p. 90. (i) Per Lord O'Hagan in Danford v. M'Anulty (1882), 8 App. Cas. at P. 460. (k) Terms used in statutory rules made after 1889 are construed in the same way as the terms used in the statute authorizing the making of the rules, unless a contrary intention appears: Interpretation Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 63), s. 31. |