ments if re pugnant. the whole subject-matter of the statute, and also specific specific enactand particular enactments relating to certain special matters, and if the general and specific enactments prove to be in any way repugnant to one another, the question will arise, which is to control the other. In Pretty v. Solly (1859), 26 Beav. 606, at p. 610, Romilly, M.R., stated as follows what he considered to be the rule of construction under such circumstances:-"The general rules," said he, "which are applicable to particular and general enactments in statutes [if they are repugnant] are very clear; the only difficulty is in their application. The rule is, that whenever there is a particular enactment and a general enactment in the same statute, and the latter, taken in its most comprehensive sense, would overrule the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to affect only the other parts of the statute to which it may properly apply." "For instance," said the same judge in De Winton v. Brecon (1859), 28 L. J. Ch. 604, "if there is an authority in an Act of Parliament to a corporation to sell a particular piece of land, and there is also a general clause in the Act to the effect that nothing in the Act contained shall authorize the corporation to sell any land at all, the general clause would not control the particular enactment, and the particular enactment would take effect, notwithstanding the prior exception was was not clearly expressed in the general clause. If the Court finds a positive inconsistency and repugnancy, it may be difficult to deal with it, but, so far as it can, it must give effect to the whole of the Act of Parliament." So, in Churchill v. Crease (1828), 5 Bing. 180, the question was whether a payment made by a bankrupt before the issuing of the commission against him was protected by s. 82 of 6 Geo. 4, c. 16, which enacted that "all payments really and bona fide made, or which hereafter shall be made, to any creditor by a bankrupt, before the issuing of the commission against him, shall be deemed valid." It was argued that, as by s. 136 the Act was not to come into force until the September then next, and the Same rule applies if one Act is incorporated into another. J payment in question was made before the September, the Act would not apply to that payment so as to protect it, The Court, however, held that it was protected. "I should have thought," said Best, C.J., "that s. 136 was conclusive if there had been no conflicting intention to be collected from the Act, but the rule is that where a general intention is expressed [as here, that the Act should not come into force until September], and the Act expresses also a particular intention incompatible with the general intention [as here, that all payments boni fide made i.e., heretofore made-shall be protected], the particular intention is to be considered in the nature of an exception." Where the later of two Acts provides that the two are to be read together, every part of each Act must be construed as if the two Acts had been one, unless there is some manifest discrepancy making it necessary to hold that the later Act has to some extent modified the provisions of the earlier Act.(x) In other words, such a provision means that the earlier Act, so far as not expressly or impliedly repealed by the later Act, must be read with it, and does not exclude the possibility of implied repeal. The effect of bringing into a later Act, by reference, sections of an earlier Act is just the same as if they had been actually written into it or printed into it, and in their construction the earlier Act need not be referred to at all. The mere fact of bringing clauses from an anterior Act into a subsequent Act cannot on any legal principle prevent the subsequent Act from being treated entirely as a subsequent Act, and cannot, it would seem, prevent the Lands Clauses Acts from being applied to the subsequent Act,(y) so far as it contains any powers as to the taking of lands. The effect of s. 1 of the Lands Clauses Act, 1845 (a) J. C., per Lord Selborne in Canada Southern Railway Co. v. International Bridge Co. (1883), 8 App. Cas. 723, 727. (y) Re Wood's Estate (1886), 31 Ch. D. 615 (Esher, M.R.); see, however, Re Mills' Estate (1886), 34 Ch. D. 14, and Re Cherry's Settled Estates (1862), 4 D. F. & J. 332. (apart from any question whether it binds the Crown or any persons representing the Crown), is, that every part of that Act is to be considered to be incorporated with every subsequent Act which authorizes the purchase or taking of lands for the purposes of any undertaking, save so far as its provisions are expressly varied or excepted by the subsequent Act, whether the Act be a public Act or local and personal only.(2) And the same rule applies if an Act which lays down a general rule upon a subject is incorporated into another Act which gives a particular rule on the same subject that is to say, in this case also the particular rule will abrogate the general rule. "If the incorporating Act," said Lord Westbury in Ex parte St. Sepulchre's (1864), 33 L. J. Ch. 372, "gives itself a complete rule on the subject, the expression of that rule will undoubtedly amount to an exception of the subjectmatter of the general rule contained in the incorporated Act." Thus, in London, Chatham, and Dover Railway v. Wandsworth (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 185, it appeared that the Railways Clauses Act, 1845, was to be treated as incorporated into the special Act, except in so far as its provisions were expressly varied by the special Act. Now, the Railways Clauses Act contained provisions as to how railway companies might be proceeded against in case they allowed any of their bridges to remain out of repair; but the special Act also contained provisions on this subject different from those in the Railways Clauses Act; therefore the question arose which procedure was to be adopted, and it was held, in accordance with the rule above stated, that the fact of the special Act containing provisions on the subject was to be taken as expressly varying the provisions contained in the Railways Clauses Act. And so in Att.-Gen. v. Great Eastern Rail. Co. (1872), 7 Ch. App. 481, it was held by the Lords Justices (reversing the decision of Bacon, V.C.) that the general enactment of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, s. 13, (z) Re Wood's Estate (1886), 31 Ch. D. 607 (C. A.). Incorporation by reference. 10 & 11 Vict. c. 15. which provided that " where it is intended to carry the railway on an arch as marked on the said plan, the same shall be made accordingly," was abrogated by the special enactment of the company's special Act (into which the 8 & 9 Vict. c. 20, had been incorporated), which enabled the company to “ stop up all streets within the area herein before described." It was admitted that upon the "said plan" the street in question which the company claimed to be entitled to stop up (Sun Street) was not marked as to be closed, and it was therefore argued that the company were bound by their plan. "But," said Mellish, L.J., "looking at the private Act, it is difficult to say how plainer words could have been used for the purpose of showing that the company were entitled to stop up this street. . . The real question to be decided in this case is this, Does the recital in the special Act amount to an express varying of the enactment in the general Act, which says that the arch is to be constructed as delineated on the plan? I am clearly of opinion that it does." The system of incorporation by reference which is in these days adopted in the Statute-book produces some curious results.(a) In Gaslight and Coke Company v. Hardy (1886), 17 Q. B. D. 619, the Court of Appeal was called upon to construe a repealed section. The question in the case was whether a gas stove let for hire was a fitting for gas" within s. 14 of the Gas Works Clauses Act, 1847. That Act is incorporated with, and forms 23 & 24 Vict. part of, the Metropolis Gas Act, 1860, and is also incorporated with the special Act (31 & 32 Vict. c. cvi.) of the plaintiff company. Several of the sections of the Act of 1847, including s. 14, are included in the 38 & 39 Vict. Statute Law Revision Act, 1875, and are thereby pealed except so far as incorporated with special Acts to which 34 & 35 Vict. c. 41, does not apply." The last-named Act, s. 3, did not apply to the company's private Act above referred to.(b) c. 125. c. 66. "re (a) See 3 Law Quart. Rev. 114. (b) Vide supra, "Savings," p. 242. |