Creating new private Act.

be to carry one line into effect and concealing the design.
of applying for another. . . . . It is not enough that the
existence of such an agreement was at the time of enter-
ing into it, and afterwards, in fact, kept secret from the
Legislature and all the world besides by both parties.
The quality of the agreement, whether fraudulent or not,
must depend upon the intention of the parties to it at
the time of making it, and if there did not then exist the
intention of deceiving the Legislature, by concealing from
it, whilst the petitioners were asking for one set of powers,
the purpose of asking afterwards for others, the agreement
cannot be void." So, also, in Shrewsbury Rail. Co. v. London
and North-Western Rail. Co. (1849), 2 Mac. & G. 324, it
appeared that a Bill had been brought in for the purpose
of enabling one company to grant to another company
a lease of certain lines of railway, and this Bill was
opposed by a third company, but ultimately an agree-
ment was come to, by which, in consideration of the
third company withdrawing their opposition, the other
two companies engaged to conduct their traffic in a
certain specified way, so as not to prejudice the interests
of the third company.
On a Bill being filed to enforce
this agreement, it was contended that the agreement was
a fraud upon Parliament. "I cannot, however," said
Lord Cottenham, "see how that can be the case.
It cannot be said that the parties could not come to a
private arrangement between themselves. The opposi-
tion to a Bill must be supposed to be for the purpose of
guarding the particular interest of the parties opposing.
If those objects are attained by any private arrangement,
it is no fraud on Parliament."

6. Although the Legislature can undoubtedly in a jurisdiction by private Act, by specific enactment and in terms, make any provision it pleases for a particular state of circumstances, it has been held that Parliament cannot by a private Act in a specific and particular case confer upon a Court of justice a jurisdiction to do something which is beyond the general jurisdiction of that Court, and any

provision in a private Act professing to do so would be inoperative. In Green v. Mortimer (1860), 3 L. T. 642, by a private Act called Carew's Estate Act, 1857, certain lands and stock were vested in trustees to pay the yearly income to C., and it was enacted that the Court of Chancery might, so far as the rules of law and equity and the jurisdiction of the Court would admit, make orders so as to insure that the life estate of C. should be inalienable. By an agreement made with one Ford C. covenanted to charge his life interest with the payment of a certain sum of money, but by an order of the Court made subsequently to the agreement it was ordered that the whole of the income payable to C. for his life should be inalienable by him, and from time to time when it became payable should be applied solely for his exclusive personal enjoyment. Upon this a Bill was filed by the plaintiff on Ford's behalf against the trustees, submitting that notwithstanding the order Ford was entitled to a charge in accordance with the agreement made by C. with Ford. To this Bill the trustees demurred, and contended that C. took, not a life estate simpliciter, but an inalienable life estate which it was plainly the object of the Legislature to confer upon him. But the Lord Chancellor (Lord Campbell), in giving judgment against the demurrer, expressed his great surprise that such an Act should appear upon the statute book; it must have been. passed per incuriam. The Act contained something which was quite absurd, and in terms gave the Court power to do that which was quite impossible, for it was clear that the Court could have no power to do that which the Act professed to empower it to do. The order by which the declared intentions of the Act were to be carried out was ultra vires of the Court, for there could be no power to give such a qualification to C.'s interest. There must be the same power in C. to encumber his estate as if the Act had never passed.

But this decision stands by itself as a warning, and not as a precedent. A very large number of Acts, usually

described as private, do create a new jurisdiction, and new offences.(u) And in Cairns v. Linton (1889), 16 Rettie (Justiciary) 84, the Court of Session felt constrained to hold that a local Act had given the Sheriff of Midlothian a large jurisdiction in the rest of Scotland as to execution of process.

(u) E.g., the Eastbourne Improvement Act, 1885.

APPENDIX A.

CERTAIN WORDS AND EXPRESSIONS, USED IN STATUTES, WHICH HAVE BEEN JUDICIALLY OR STATUTABLY EXPLAINED.

ABSENCE, in 20 & 21 Vict. c. 85, s. 23, with regard to a lawsuit, means non-appearance in the suit, and not absence without knowledge or notice of the suit. Phillips v. Phillips (1866), L. R. 1 P. & M. 169.

ABSOLUTE (ASSIGNMENT), in Judicature Act, 1873, s. 25 (6), means an assignment absolute in form and intended to operate in substance by passing the legal property in the chose in action, even if it contains a trust in respect of the amount recorded in respect of the chose in action. Comfort v. Betts (1891), 1 Q. B. 737. ACCORDANCE WITH THE FORM (IN), does not mean in the form, i.e., not verbal and literal following, but substantial following of the form. Thomas v. Kelly (1888), 13 App. Cas. 506, 519; Re Heseltine (1891), 1 Ch. 464, 472.

ACQUISITION OF GAIN, in the Companies Act, 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89), s. 4, as applied to a company or society, does not mean the acquisition of gain to the society itself, but gain to any member. Shaw v. Benson (1883), 11 Q. B. D. 563, following Padstow Total Loss Association (1881), 20 Ch. D. 137.

Аст то BE PASSED IN THE PRESENT SESSION.-43 Geo. 3, c. 122,

S. 2, enacted that certain duties were to be "assessed and collected under the regulations of any Act to be passed in the present session of Parliament for consolidating certain of the provisions, &c." The Act was passed on August 11, 1803, but the Act "for consolidating certain of the provisions, &c.," 43 Geo. 3, c. 99, had been passed on July 27, 1803. It was argued in Nares v. Rowles (1810), 14 East 510, that the words "to be

6

passed" could not refer to 43 Geo. 3, c. 99, as it had been passed prior to August 11. "The session," said Lord Ellenborough, "is a thing of continuity, and therefore, when the legislature speak of any Act to be passed in that session,' they mean any Act that shall be passed from the commencement to the conclusion of the session, embracing both the past and future portions of it. . . . . In referring the words to the whole period of the session, we violate no rule of grammar, they may fairly be taken to mean any Act which at the expiration of that session shall have been passed for the purpose, and, with reference to the whole session from its commencement, it is an Act to be passed in that session.'

ACTION, in 29 & 30 Vict. c. 19 (Parliamentary Oaths), s. 5, is used in its generic sense, as including proceedings by the Crown, as well as by the subject; Selborne, L.C., Bradlaugh v. Clarke (1882), 8 App. Cas. at p. 361 (diss. Lord Blackburn, at p. 375).

ACTIONS AND SUITS, in 53 Geo. 3, c. 216, held not to include a bankruptcy petition. Guthrie v. Fisk (1824), 3 B. & C. 178.

ACTS OR PRACTICES, in s. 59 of the Stamp Act, 1870, c. 97, s. 59 (see now 54 & 55 Vict. c. 39, s. 43), means "carries on business with a quasipermanent habitat," and points to a series of acts, and not to an isolated transaction such as attending a taxation on a retainer for that specific purpose. Re Horton (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 434 (Field and Cave, JJ.).

ADDRESS, in the Bills of Sale Act, 1878, Amendment Act, 1882 (45 & 46 Vict. c. 43), ss. 8, 9, does not mean place of residence, but a place where the witness could be found by letter or call. Re Heseltine (1891), 1 Ch. 464.

ADJOINING OWNER, in Metropolitan Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), s. 85, includes a tenant for years of part of a house. Fillingham v. Wood (1891), 1 Ch. 51.

ADJOURN, in 15 & 16 Vict. c. 57, s. 4, is used in its popular sense, i.e., "deferring or postponing an inquiry to a future day." Fit:gerald's case (1869), L. R. 5 Q. B. 18.

ADMIRALTY.-The Lord High Admiral of the United Kingdom for the time being, or the Commissioners for the time being for executing that office. Int. Act, 1889 (c. 63), s. 12 (4).