DEBENTURE, in the Stamp Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 97), schedule, 8. v.

Debenture and Mortgage, "is a word which has somehow crept into the English language and does not appear to admit of any accurate definition, but it is recognised by the statute as something different from a promissory note." British India, &c., Co. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1881), 7 Q. B. D. 168, 170. DEBT, in 9 Geo. 4, c. 14, s. 5, means "actionable debt." Rawley v. Rawley (1876), 1 Q. B. D. 463.

in 12 & 13 Vict. c. 106, s. 113, includes money due under an order of the Court of Chancery. Lees v. Newton (1876), L. R. 1 C. P. 658.

,, in 30 & 31 Vict. c. 69, s. 1, does not include mortgage debt. Newmarch v. Starr (1878), 9 Ch. D. 12.

within the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 18 (3), means everything which might mature into a debt, including all liabilities from which a bankrupt would be relieved by an order of discharge. Flint v. Barnard (1888), 22 Q. B. D. 90.

l'ide ante, p. 207.

DUE, in 32 & 33 Vict. c. 71, s. 15 (5), is not confined to debts presently payable, but does not include debts only contingent at commencement of bankruptcy. Ex parte Kemp (1874), 9 Ch. App. 387.

IMPRISONMENT FOR, does not include imprisonment under a committal order. Mitchell v. Simpson (1889), 23 Q. B. D. 373; Stonor v. Foule (1887), 13 App. Cas. 20.

DEED, in the Forgery Act, 1861 (24 & 25 Vict. c. 98), s. 20, means something which passes a pecuniary interest. Per Blackburn, J., in R. v. Morton (1873), L. R. 2 C. C. R. 27.

"DEFAULT, OWNER IN," in s. 257 of the Public Health Act, 1875, means "one who has not performed his share of the works requisite," ie., so much of the work specified in the notice under the section as applies to him. Simcox v. Handsworth L. B. (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 39.

DEFECT OR INACCURACY, in s. 7 of the Employers' Liability Act, 1880 (43 & 44 Vict. c. 42), as applied to notice of action, includes the omission of the date in the notice of action required by the section. Carter v. Drysdale (1883), 12 Q. B. D. 91.

IN CONDITION OF MACHINERY means unfitness for the purpose for which the machine is supplied. Heske v. Samuelson (1883), 12

Q. B. D. 30. Even if each part is sufficient, yet if the whole arrangement is defective it is a defect within the Act. Cripps v. Judge (1884), 13 Q. B. D. 583.

DEFINE, in 18 & 19 Vict. c. 55, s. 35, which empowers the colonial Parliament to define its privileges, &c., means "declare," and not merely "specify" or "enumerate." Dill v. Murphy (1864),

1 Moore P. C. N. S. 487.

DEFINITE AND CERTAIN, in the Stamp Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 97), s. 3, applies, not to the interest or the nature of the interest of the settlor, but to the amount of the stock put into settlement. Onslow v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue (1891), 1 Q. B. 239. DEFRAUD, INTENT TO, in the Merchandise Marks Act, 1887 (50 & 51 Vict. c. 28), means to make the purchaser take something which he did not know he was taking, not putting off a bad article in order to get money unfairly. Starey v. Chilworth Gunpowder Co. (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 96.

means more than an intent to cheat a customer. (Same case.)

means more than to induce the buyer to accept goods which might otherwise be rejected. (Same case.)

66

DELINEATED, in the Pontypool Railway Act, 1865, s. 23, does not mean surrounded in every part by lines," but "sketched or represented or so shown that landowners would have notice that the land might be taken." Dowling v. Pontypool Rail. Co. (1874), L. R. 18 Eq. 740. See hereon Protheroe v. Tottenham, &c., Rail. Co. (1891), 3 Ch. 278.

DEPENDING.-See Suit depending.

DESCRIPTION OF THE RESIDENCE, in 17 & 18 Vict. c. 36, s. 1, means such a description as would enable a person to make the necessary investigations before advancing money or supplying goods on credit. Jones v. Harris (1872), L. R. 7 Q. B. 158.

DESERTED, in 24 & 25 Vict. c. 55, s. 3, is not used "in the ordinary acceptation of the word, but the statute must be taken to mean that, where the husband permanently gives up the society of his wife and continues to live in a different place apart from her, she shall be looked up to as a different person from what she would otherwise be, for she resides where she does for her own, and not for any marital purpose." Per Cockburn, C.J., in R. v. Maidstone (1880), 5 Q. B. D. 33.

DESIGN, in s. 60 of the Patents, Designs, and Trade Marks Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 57), refers only to the shape or visible form of the object represented, and not to the object which the design has in view in adopting the shape or the particular purpose which the shape is intended to serve. Hecla Foundry Co. v. Walker & Co. (1889), 14 App. Cas. 550; and see Holdsworth v. McCrea (1867), L. R. 2 H. L. at p. 388; Walker v. Falkirk Iron Co. (1887), 14 Rettie (Sc.) 1081.

DETERMINATION OF TENANCY.-Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883, s. 7, construed with reference to custom of country. Re Paul (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 247.

DEVISE, in 29 Chas. 2, c. 3, s. 6, means "that group or collection of words reduced into writing which operates as a disposition of the testator's land." Per Lord Penzance in Swinton v. Bailey (1879), 4 App. Cas. 79.

in the Wills Act (7 Will. 4 & 1 Vict. c. 26), "includes, unless a contrary intention appears by the will, a devise by way of appointment under a special or general power conferred on the testator as to property not his own." Per Jessel, M.R., in Freme v. Clement (1881), 18 Ch. D. 515.

66

DIPLOMATIC OFFICER in the diplomatic service of her Majesty, in the Naturalisation Act, 1870, c. 14, means any Ambassador, Minister, or chargé d'affaires, or Secretary of Legation, or any person appointed by such Ambassador, Minister, chargé d'affaires, or Secretary of Legation to execute any duties imposed by the Act on an officer in the diplomatic service of her Majesty" (s. 17).

REPRESENTATIVE OF A FOREIGN STATE," for the purposes of
the Extradition Acts, 1870 and 1873, "includes any person
recognised by a Secretary of State as a consul-general of that
State." Ext. Act, 1873 (c. 60), s. 7, extending Ext. Act, 1870
(c. 52), s. 7.

SERVICE. Enumeration of diplomatic offices in the Diplomatic
Salaries Act, 1869 (c. 43), s. 7.

DISABILITY, in the Naturalisation Act, 1870, c. 14, s. 17, means the status of being an infant, lunatic, idiot, or married woman. DISCRETION.-Vide ante, p. 288.

DISPOSITION, in 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 74 (Fines and Recoveries Act), s. 38, is not restricted to the deed barring the entail, but comprises it

and all other instruments by which the arrangement between the vendor and the purchaser is carried out. Crocker v. Waine (1864), 5 B. & S. 697.

DISPUTE BETWEEN EMPLOYER AND WORKMAN, in 38 & 39 Vict. c. 90, s. 4, includes a complaint made by the employer as to the conduct of the workman. Clemson v. Hubbard (1875), 1 Ex. D. 179. DISTANCE, when mentioned in a statute, how computed. See Mile. DISTRICT OF A CONSUL, under 11 & 12 Vict. c. 68, s. 19, means—

(a) Such parts of the foreign country in which or at a place in which the consul is appointed to reside or is directed or authorized to solemnise and register the marriages of British subjects as a Secretary of State may by writing under his hand direct.

(b) In the absence of any special direction, then the district of the consulate of such consul (as indicated in his consular commission and exequatur).

DIVIDED, in 41 Vict. c. 15, s. 13, refers to the structural arrangement of the houses taxed by the Act, and not to the mode of dealing with the divided houses. Yorkshire Insurance Co. v. Clayton (1881), 8 Q. B. D. at p. 420 (Brett, L.J.).

DIVIDENDS, in 33 & 34 Vict. c. 35, s. 2, "includes (besides dividends strictly so called) all payments made by the name of dividend, bonus, or otherwise, out of the revenue of trading or other public companies, divisible between all or any of the members of such respective companies, whether such payments shall be usually made or declared at any fixed time or otherwise." Carr v. Griffiths (1879), 12 Ch. D. 661.

DOCUMENT, unless the context otherwise requires, "includes part of a document." Official Secrets Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 52), s. 8.

OF TITLE TO GOODS, in the Factors Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 45), s. 1 (4), includes "bill of lading, dock warrant, warehousekeeper's certificate, and warrant or order for the delivery of goods and any other document used in the ordinary course of business as proof of the possession or control of goods, or authorizing or purporting to authorize, either by indorsement or by delivery, the possessor of the document to transfer or to receive goods thereby represented."

DOMESTIC ANIMALS, in 12 & 13 Vict. c. 92, s. 2 (as amended by 17 & 18 Vict. c. 60, s. 3), includes any pet bird; and also birds kept in

captivity and trained as decoy birds. Colam v. Paget (1884), 12 Q. B. D. 66.

DOMICILED IN ENGLAND, in the Bankruptcy Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 52), s. 6 (1), means "England" as distinguished from other parts of the United Kingdom. Re Mitchell (1884), 13 Q. B. D.

418.

DOMINION. See Foreign dominion.

DOUBLE COSTS.-See Costs.

DRAINS, TRENCHES, AND WATERCOURSES, in 14 Geo. 3, c. 96, s. 97, means those watercourses only which have been made by the hand of man and artificially connected with the navigation in question. Smith v. Barnham (1876), 1 Ex. D. 422.

DRIVER or DRIVERS, in ss. 37, 40-52, 54, 58, 60-67, of the Town Police
Clauses Act, 1847, includes the conductor of an omnibus.
Police Clauses Act, 1889 (c. 14), s. 4 (1).

DRUNKENNESS.-See Permit drunkenness.

Town

DULY MADE.—A contract “made in writing," in the Companies Act, 1867 (30 & 31 Vict. c. 131), s. 25, means a contract executed by all the parties thereto. Ex parte Menzies (1890), 43 Ch. D. 118. DWELL, in 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95, s. 128, applies to the place at which a person who has not any permanent place of abode may be temporarily residing. Alexander v. Jones (1876), L. R. 1 Ex. 133. "To dwell," said Kelly, C.B., in Riley v. Read (1879), 4 Ex. D. 102, "is to live and occupy for all the purposes of life."

DWELLING-HOUSE, in 41 & 42 Vict. c. 26 (Parliamentary and Municipal Registration), s. 5, means a part of a house separately occupied, not by a lodger merely, but in such a manner that the occupied can be separately rated to the relief of the poor. Bradley v. Baylis (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 195.

in 5 & 6 Vict. c. 35 (Income Tax), s. 100, sch. D., "does not include a house in which a bank or limited company carries on business," even if the manager lives in part of it. Russell v. Town and County Bank (1888), 13 App. Cas. 418, 430; cf. Tennant v. Smith (1892), A. C. 150.

in the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, s. 6 (d), for purposes of founding bankruptcy jurisdiction over a foreigner, held to include "furnished rooms" taken under circumstances which did not make the hirer a lodger. Re Hecquard (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 74.