PEERAGE, in the Union Act (39 & 40 Geo. 3, c. 67), art. iv. cl. 5, means the status and condition of a peer. Lord Fermoy's case (1856), 5 H. L. C. 716.

PENALTY, in 24 & 25 Vict. c. 134, s. 230, extends to any penal consequences whatever, and is not restricted to a pecuniary penalty only. R. v. Smith (1862), L. & C. 131.

PENDING, in 32 & 33 Vict. c. 83, s. 15, is used with respect to "a cause in a court of justice when any proceeding can be taken in it.” Per Jessel, M.R., in Fordham v. Clagett (1882), 20 Ch. D. 653. PER, the Latin preposition, as used in 8 & 9 Vict. c. clxix. s. 104, in the expression "a penny per ton per mile," properly and primarily signifies the distribution of the charge over the whole aggregate weight of goods for the whole aggregate distance they may be conveyed, tons and miles being mentioned only as common measures of weight and distance convenient for the purpose of measurement." Pryce v. Monmouthshire Canal, dec. Co. (1879), 4 App. Cas. 216, per Lord Selborne.

PEREMPTORY, in a rule of Court which has effect of statute, R. S. C. Ord. 19, r. 8. See Falck v. Axthelm (1890), 24 Q. B. D. 174. Performed and PERFORMANCE, in 1886, c. 33 (Int. Copyright), s. 11, and similar words, include "representation" and similar words.

PERIODICAL WORK, in 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, s. 18, includes a newspaper. Per Jessel, M.R., in Walter v. Howe (1881), 17 Ch. D. 710. PERMANENT SICKNESS, in 1 Will. 4, c. 22, s. 10, "implies something more than such a degree of sickness as would prevent the attendance of a witness at a particular trial." Duke of Beaufort v. Crawshay (1866), L. R. 1 C. P. 714.

PERMIT DRUNKENNESS, in 25 & 26 Vict. c. 94, s. 13, does not include the case of a person getting drunk himself. Warden v. Tye (1877), 2 C. P. D. 74.

PERQUISITES, in an Act (31 Geo. 2, c. 22) imposing duties on pensions= "such profits of offices and employments in Great Britain as arise from fees established by custom or authority, and payable either by the Crown or the subjects in consideration of business done from time to time in the course of executing such offices and employments." 32 Geo. 2, c. 33; 2 Rev. Statt. (2nd ed.) p. 329.

NOTE. These enactments are repealed as to England, and pay ment by fees is almost extinct, except in the case of clerks to justices.

PERSON.-Vide ante, p. 176.

in 1 & 2 Will. 4, c. lxxvi. s. 85, does not include a corporation. Shoreditch v. Franklin (1878), 3 C. P. D. 380.

O'Shan

in 25 Vict. No. 1 (New South Wales), s. 13, is not necessarily
restricted to persons above twenty-one years of age.
nessy v. Joachim (1876), 1 App. Cas. 90.

BELONGING TO SUCH SHIP, in 17 & 18 Vict. c. 104, s. 458, includes
passengers as well as master and crew. The Fusilier (1865),
3 Moore P. C. N. S. 51.

....

PERSONATE, in 22 Vict. c. 35, s. 9, " means to pretend to be a particular person . . . and it is not necessary that a person should by his personation succeed in giving a vote." Per Crompton, J., in R. v. Hayne (1864), 4 B. & S. 720.

PETTY SESSIONAL COURT.-Defined in the Int. Act, 1889 (c. 63), s. 13 (12).

s. 13 (13).

COURT-HOUSE.-Defined in the Int. Act, 1889 (c. 63),

PIRACY, in 6 & 7 Vict. c. 76, s. 1, means such an offence as by the municipal laws of the United States is constituted piracy, and is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States. Re Ferman (1864), 33 L. J. M. C. 201. See also same case, reported as Re Tivnan, 5 B. & S. 645, especially note (a) at p. 696.

PLACE, in 3 & 4 Vict. c. 61, s. 15, is not confined to one parish, but means any aggregation of houses and inhabitants which has received a separate name." Rice v. Slee (1872), L. R. 7 C. P. 381, following R. v. Charlesworth (1851), 20 L. J. M. C. 181.

in 16 & 17 Vict. c. 119 (Betting Houses), s. 3, does not mean place in the nature of "a house, office, or room," but means any (not absolutely) fixed and ascertained spot, piece of ground, or structure appropriated or used by a person offering to make bets. Gallaway v. Maries (1881), 8 Q. B. D. 275; Hornsby v. Raggett (1892), 1 Q. B. 20.

BELONGING TO HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN, in 1889, c. 52, s. 8, includes a place belonging to any department of the Government of the United Kingdom, or of any of her Majesty's possessions, whether the place is or is not actually vested in her Majesty. HAVING A KNOWN OR DEFINED BOUNDARY, in 21 & 22 Vict. c. 98, s. 12, does not necessarily mean a legal district having a legal boundary, but it is sufficient if the place have an actual known boundary, or one which is " physical, visible, and notorious." R. v.

Local Government Board (1873), L. R. 8 Q. B. 227, and East wood v. Miller (1874), L. R. 9 Q. B. 443.

PLACE OF SAFETY, in the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act, 1889 (c. 44), s. 17, includes "a workhouse and any place certified by a local authority by bye-law" under the Act for the purposes of the Act.

OF WORSHIP.-See Usual place of worship.

WHERE A COMPANY CARRIES ON OR EXERCISES A TRADE OR BUSINESSS,

(1) with reference to the place where a company may be sued, means where its place of management is; (2) in the Income Tax Acts, the place where its profit is made, regardless of the position of the head office or place of management. Erichsen v. Last 1881), 8 Q. B. D. 414.

PLEDGE. In the Factors Act, 1889 (c. 45), includes any contract pledging or giving a lien or security on goods, whether in consideration of an original advance or of any further or continuing advance or of any pecuniary liability. S. 1 (5).

PLURAL.-Vide ante, p. 175.

POINT, as used in the Rules for the Navigation of the Thames, “is not to be construed mathematically, for the rule is a nautical one, framed in nautical language, and means what I may term the whole of the point, and not its mere apex." Per Brett, M.R., in The Margaret (1885), 9 P. D. 48.

POLICE AREA.-Defined, Police Act, 1890 (c. 45), s. 33.

"

).

DISTRICT.-Defined in Riot Damage Act, 1886 (c. 38), s. 9.

RECEIVER = receiver of the Metropolitan Police District. 49 Vict. c. 22 (Metropolitan Police Act, 1886), s. 7.

POLICY OF INSURANCE AGAINST ACCIDENT.-Defined in Revenue Act, 1891 (c. 42), s. 20 (a).

POLITICAL CHARACTER, in Extradition Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict. c. 52), s. 3 (1). This term, as applied to an offence, means "incidental to, and forming part of, political disturbances." Re Castioni (1891), 1 Q. B. 149.

POOR LAW UNION.-Vide ante, p. 178.

PORT, in 54 Geo. 3, c. 159, is used, not in its geographical sense, but in its legal and proper sense, as denoting a place to which ships resort for loading and discharging. Nicholson v. Williams (1871), L. R. 6 Q. B. 642.

PORT, as fixed for fiscal purposes, by statutes or Treasury warrant or royal prerogative (i.e., charter), and proof of de facto user as the port: for Customs, port dues, &c. See Hunter v. Northern Marine (1888), 13 App. Cas. 717.

in its commercial sense, as understood by shippers, owners, and underwriters, a place of more or less shelter for a ship while goods are being loaded or unloaded, including a roadstead. Sea Insurance Co. v. Gavin (1835), 4 W. & S. 17 (H. L.); Garston Sailing Ship Co. v. Hickie (1885), 15 Q. B. D. 588.

POSSESSION, as used in 27 Hen. 8, c. 10, and 2 Will. 4, c. 45, s. 26, has a technical meaning. Heelis v. Blain (1865), 18 C. B. N. S.

107.

POSTMASTER-GENERAL means her Majesty's Postmaster-General for the time being. Int. Act, 1889 (c. 63), s. 12 (11).

...

PRECEDENCE, in 5 & 6 Will. 4, c. 76, s. 57, which enacts that "the mayor for the time being of every borough shall . . . . have precedence in all places within the borough," applies only to the social, not to the magisterial precedence. Ex parte Mayor of Birmingham (1860), 3 E. & E. 222.

PREFERENCE SHARES.-Defined in Companies Clauses Act, 1863 (26 & 27 Vict. c. 118), s. 14.

in Railway Companies Act, 1867, ss. 12, 17, does not apply to split ordinary shares, so that the holders of the preferred halves of such shares are not, by virtue of that Act, entitled, in a winding up, to any priority over the holders of the deferred halves. Re Brighton and Dyke Rail. Co. (1890), 44 Ch. D. 28.

PREFERRED, in 13 Geo. 3, c. 84, s. 33, in the expression "before whom such indictment shall be preferred," means "tried." "tried." R. v. Pem

bridge (1842), 3 Q. B. 906.

PREMISES, in 35 & 36 Vict. c. 94 (Licensing), s. 45, means premises for which an 66 on" licence is sought, and does not apply to "off" licences under 32 & 33 Vict. c. 27 (Wine and Beer Houses).

PRESCRIBED means prescribed by rules and orders under the Act in which it is used. 52 & 53 Vict. c. 48 (County Court Appeals, Ireland), s. 18 (1).

PRESUME, in 22 Geo. 3, c. 45, s. 9, implies, "not a mere ignorant act, but an act in which a person knowingly takes upon himself to do that which the law says shall not be done under the circumstances." Royse v. Birley (1869), L. R. 4 C. P. 315.

PRINCIPLES, in 31 & 32 Vict. c. 125, s. 26, although "a large and comprehensive word, means nothing more in this [particular] section

than practice' or 'procedure.'" Per Keating, J., in Earl Beauchamp v. Madresfield (1873), L. R. 8 C. P. 253.

PRISON SERVICE, in the Prison Act of 1877, includes (1) service in a military prison under Army Act, 1879, or the Army Act (1881); (2) service in a naval prison under the Naval Discipline Act. See Prison Officers' Superannuation Act, 1886 (c. 9).

PRIVY COUNCIL means (1) "the Lords and others for the time being of her Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council;" (2) when used with reference to Ireland only, "the Privy Council of Ireland for the time being "-1889, c. 63, s. 12 (5); (3) in the British North America Act, 1867, and amending Acts, the Privy Council for Canada for the time being.

PROBATE DUTY.—A tax on the property to which the probate gives title. Blackwood v. The Queen (1882), 8 App. Cas. 90.

PROCEEDING, in 25 & 26 Vict. c. 102, s. 106, means "something in the

nature of a writ or process, a proceeding of a hostile character. Delany v. Metropolitan Board (1867), L. R. 2 C. P. 532,

in 46 & 47 Vict. c. 52 (Bankruptcy), s. 55. See In re Proctor (1891), 2 Q. B. 433.

in Railway and Canal Traffic Act, 1854.-Defined in L. & F. Rail. Co. v. Greenwood (1888), 21 Q. B. D. 215.

PRODUCED, with reference to copyright (1886, c. 33, s. 11), " means, as the case requires, published or made or performed or represented, and the expression 'production' is to be construed accordingly." Copyright Act.

PROFIT (GROSS), ITEMS TO BE TATEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ESTIMATING.-See Merthyr Tydfil L. B. v. Merthyr Union (1891), 1 Q. B. 186. PROFITS, in 16 & 17 Vict. c. 34, sch. D., means "the incomings of the concern after deducting the expenses of earning them." Per Lord Selborne in Mersey Docks v. Lucas (1883), 8 App. Cas. 903.

in Income Tax Act, 1842 (5 & 6 Vict. c. 35), s. 100, means "the surplus by which the receipts from the trade or business exceed the expenditure necessary for earning these receipts." Russell v. Town and Country Bank (1888), 13 App. Cas. 418, 42 It includes the surplus over expenditure of the receipts of a